After explaining the differences between diy bio and synthetic biology, and analyizing the failure of current biosecurity frameworks, the authors (Gaymon Bennett, Nils Gilman, et al.) of this important article in Nature, propose a new security approach:

“We argue that developments in synthetic biology and DIYbio call for another approach. Beyond the denunciation of the activists and the hype of enthusiasts, we need the vigilant pragmatism of what we have called ‘human practices’ (http://www.synberc.org/humanpractices). Such an approach consists of rigorous, sustained and mature analysis of, and preparation for, the range of dangers and risks catalyzed by synthetic biology and DIYbio. Preparedness activities might include on-the-ground tracking of the ramifications of synthetic biology research, or training in emergency response to biological events. Less familiar activities might include scenario development and stakeholder war-gaming (e.g., see http://www.gbn.com/; http://360.monitor.com/).

In the coming years, the intertwined growth of synthetic biology and DIYbio will further limit the scope of the current ‘dual-use’ framing of biological threat assessment and mitigation based on guarding key facilities, establishing export controls and monitoring technical experts. In its stead, policy makers will need to develop new analytic and policy frameworks, frameworks calibrated as much to preparation for unlikely but damaging events as to the design of technical safeguards.

We simply do not know the full extent of dangers on the near-future horizon, or of opportunities for that matter. We cannot be certain how biotechnological capacities will expand and ramify. We cannot be certain of the extent to which synthetic biologists and biohackers will successfully make biology easy to engineer or open source. We can be certain, however, that the stakes are high for everyone involved—above all for the enthusiasts. Those unwilling to prepare for dangerous events are exposing themselves, professionally and personally: if and when an untoward bio-event takes place, the so-called experts who failed to prepare will take the lion’s share of collective blame. Studies, laboratories and careers are likely to be policed or even terminated.

The central challenge today is to neither shut things down, nor simply trust the experts. Rather, the challenge is to foster sustained and engaged inquiry that takes the pragmatic conditions of this techno-science and its practitioners as its primary object of concern, rather than hype or fear about an imagined future. Following this human practices mode, we might be able to anticipate and specify how to prepare regulations, normative frameworks and ethical responses adequate to the demands of the day.”