The new gatekeepers, equipotentiality vs. the Power Law

There is a recurrent debate on the internet, summarized here, about re-intermediation through the new gatekeepers. Observers note that a new elite of A-list bloggers is able to set the terms of the debate, and that many of the existing search engines based on popularity, then re-inforce that dominance. There is therefore a tension in the blogosphere, between the practice and principle of equipotentiality, which says that everyone can participate through self-selection, and the power law, which says that inevitable the distribution of a network tends towards a new dominance. Below is a review of the different aspects of the debate, which I had written for my manuscript. The original notes are appended as well.

One of the most interesting findings of social network analysis is the existence of a power law. A power law says that for any x increase in the number of links per node (or specific characteristic per node, such as acreage per square kilometer for a river basin), the number of nodes having that characteristic will decline by a fixed factor. In economics this gives us the famous Pareto principle, i.e. 20% of the people having 80% of the wealth. Or 20% of the books in a bookstore generating 80% of the sales or profits. But the power law is nearly everywhere, suggesting a natural form of concentration and even monopolization as almost inevitable. In fact, it seems that whenever we have many choices and many distributed agents making these choices, inequality of choice is created[i]. It seems to be the natural result of any ‘economy of attention’. But that is the point, such distribution is not forced, as in a oligopoly or monopoly, but arises naturally from the freedom of choice, and can be considered a ‘fair’ result, provided no coercion is used. Networks where such a power law operates are called ‘scale-free’, because at whatever scale, the same relation between variables (i.e. distribution pattern) applies.

In terms of a normative P2P ethos, it is important to note that it should not necessarily and systematically favor egalitarian networks. The Internet and the web are both aristocratic networks; the blogosphere is characterized by a power law distribution. The key questions are: 1) is the network efficient; 2) does it enable participation; 3) is the emergence of an aristocratic structure non-coercive and eventually reversible. Focusing on this reversibility is probably one of the tasks of peer governance. Granted that a power law may be in operation, that does not mean we must acquiesce in social processes that re-inforce such inequalities, but rather, that we then look for human and technical/algorhythmic solutions that renders the structure fluid enough so that it may be reversed if need be. But in many cases, we have to admit that some form of centralization, is necessary and efficient. We all prefer one standard for our operating systems for example.

The power law can possibly mitigated by the development of algorhythms, that can highlight important information and connections from nodes that may not come up ‘naturally’, but this discipline, though still in its infancy at the moment, is making rapid strides and is the core competence of new internet companies like Google, Technorati and others. However it has been noted that many of these new techniques, which focus on the popularlity of the pages, can actually re-inforce dominance through a feedback loop, since once a link is listed on top, even more people will click on it. The power law is also counteracted by what some network economists have called the ‘Long Tail’. This is the phenomena whereby minority groups are not excluded from the distribution of knowledge and exchange, and markets, but are on the contrary enable to organize micro-communities. In the market for cultural products, this has the effect of radically enhancing the supply and demand for products. Instead of the 80/20 distribution of products, i.e. 20% of the products being responsible for 80% of the sales and profits, we get something more akin to a 50/50 distribution. Online stores like Amazon and eBay are instrumentalising the phenomenon by using affinity matching schemes, which have resulted in the creation of many thousands of previously not existing mini-markets. Books, CD’s and films which would be destroyed for lack of interest in the mass media system, now have a second and third and perhaps infinitely extendable lease of life, through the continued attention given to them by self-organizing minority interests, which can perpetuate across generations. This is an important guarantee for a vibrant cultural life, which does not destroy difference and cultural heterogeneity.[ii]

One of the keys to avoiding the power law may therefore be to keep sub-networks small. One of the recurring debates within cooperation studies indeed concerns a discussion on the optimal size of online groups. Dunbar, an anthropologist at the University College of London, has posited a link between brain size and our maximum number of close social ties[iii], a claim supported by many animal, especially primate, and anthropological studies. He predicts that 147.8 is the “mean group size” for humans and this number has also been applied to online cooperation. But such a number would require a large time of social grooming so in reality it is much less. This discussion is important because other researchers, such as Valerie Krebs, have shown that in smaller groups, the power law does not operate and that they function as egalitarian networks[iv]. The key therefore is to organize online collaboration in such a way so that it is divided in appropriate subgroups, and this seems pretty much the way software peer production teams seem to operate.

There will be a lot to learn from this emergent field of cooperation studies[v], as it weanes us from wishful thinking into a more systematic understanding of what it takes to make cooperative projects work.

One of the most important works have been those of Axelrod, in his Evolution of Cooperation[vi] (Axelrod, 1984). He reconceived Game Theory, which had originally been seen as undermining altruism, by grounding the experiments in the real conditions of social life, instead of abstracting it in unrealistic laboratory or thought experiments. Game theory is important because it models human intentionality[vii] as it wavers between altruistic and selfish strategies. His study of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma[viii] has yielded three important rules for cooperation to occur[ix]: 1) communities must promote ongoing interaction; 2) individuals must be able to identify each other; 3) individuals must have information about the past behaviour of others. Many of these insights have been incorporated in the social software tools being developed, and are the reason of the success of reputation systems such as exists in eBay etc… According to the findings of Howard Rheingold and his cooperation studies group, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which undermines cooperation and operates in an information-poor environment, may well be superseded by new forms of the Assurance Game[x]. A Prisoner’s Game will operate when no information about the partner is available, as distrust will prevail, but the social accounting technologies generate information about the trustworthy of a potential partner, and in such an environment, the Assurance Game will prevail.

Another important milestone in cooperation studies did not focus on interperson interaction (as does Game Theory) but on group behaviour in real physical communities involved in the use and management of communal resources. It can be found in Eleanor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990). Amongst the principles applied in successful communities are: 1) boundaries must be clearly defined so that there is a clear sense of who may use collective resources; 2) the rules of usage must match local conditions; 3) affected individuals must be able to participate in the adaptation of these rules; 4) control mechanisms of user behaviour must exist, as well as a system of graduated sanctions. Her survey concluded that this was done better through self-regulation than through external authorities; 5) finally, the community must have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.

It must be stressed however that her study about physical Commons dealing with scarce rival goods, cannot be applied without adaptation to the digital commons dealing witn non-rival goods, where a Tragedy of the Commons, i.e. an abuse of these scarce goods for personal gain, cannot occur, though some of her conclusions on group behaviour and its regulation do apply. But the totality of her conclusions are certainly of interest to defenders of our very important physical Commons and show that well regulated Commons have found ways to deal with abuse and overuse.

The shift in ‘business models’ characteristics of the new networks is explained by David Reed, who has summarized the different mathematical laws inherent in the value created by networks. First, we focus on the individuals. If a network has N-members and memberships grows, then one can see a linear growth in audience, i.e. N+1, N+2, etc.. i.e. a proportional growth in value. This formula was already at play in broadcast media and in such an environment, ‘content is king’, and publishers vie for the attention of the users of the network. This explains the role of portal sites such as Yahoo, who re-intermediate the economy of attention that we discussed before. If we now focus on the ‘interaction between individuals’, we see that the network enables transactions, but that these grow by a ‘square value’. This characteristic is called Metcalfe’s Law. A network of 2 allows for 2 transactions (back and forth buying and selling), a network of 3 allows for 8 transactions, a network of 4 allows for 16 transactions. This aspect of the network creates transactional platforms such as eBay. Finally, we focus on community. Networks have the ability to enable the formation of subgroups, they are ‘Group Forming Networks’. But value growth here is ‘exponential’. It is this characteristic that is called Reed’s Law[xi]. Every affinity group creates and ‘consumes’ its own content, and it is here that the true peer to peer processes emerge, characterized by infinite content creation[xii]. The economy of attention becomes moot, because what is happening is not limited content competing for the same audience, but infinite content competing for infinite combinations of affinity groups. You are then creating content, not for an audience, but as a means of creating interconnectedness between a group of people sharing an interest or common goal.

To conclude: the discovery of the theory of networks in the physical sphere, has therefore a corollary in seeing it in social life, and in particular, in the area of organizational life, including business. The finds its expression in the emerging discipline of social network analysis and cooperation studies generally, and also the business process applied “coordination theory”, as pioneered by Thomas Malone[xiii]. All these studies are important because they act as a corrective to misplaced idealism and provide lessons from scientific studies and objective experience with true cooperation.


[i]

Consequences of the power law in scale-free networks

“A scale-free network is one that obeys a power law distribution in the number of connections between nodes on the network. Some few nodes exhibit extremely high connectivity (essentially scale-free) while the vast majority are relatively poorly connected. The reason that scale-free networks emerge, as opposed to evenly distributed random networks, is due to these factors.

1) Rapid growth confers preference to early entrants. The longer a node has been in place the greater the number of links to it. First mover advantage is very important.

2) In an environment of too much information people link to nodes that are easier to find. This preferential linking reinforces itself by making the easier to find nodes even more easy to find.

3) The greater the capacity of the hub (bandwidth, work ethic, etc.) the faster its growth”

[ii]

The Long Tail in Marketing:

“People are going deep into the catalog, down the long, long list of available titles, far past what’s available at Blockbuster Video, Tower Records, and Barnes & Noble. And the more they find, the more they like. As they wander further from the beaten path, they discover their taste is not as mainstream as they thought (or as they had been led to believe by marketing, a lack of alternatives, and a hit-driven culture). An analysis of the sales data and trends from these services and others like them shows that the emerging digital entertainment economy is going to be radically different from today’s mass market. If the 20th- century entertainment industry was about hits, the 21st will be equally about misses. For too long we’ve been suffering the tyranny of lowest-common-denominator fare, subjected to brain-dead summer blockbusters and manufactured pop. Why? Economics. Many of our assumptions about popular taste are actually artifacts of poor supply-and-demand matching – a market response to inefficient distribution.”

[iii]

The Dunbar number and the limits to cooperation

… there is a cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom any one person can maintain stable relationships, that this limit is a direct function of relative neocortex size, and that this in turn limits group size … the limit imposed by neocortical processing capacity is simply on the number of individuals with whom a stable inter- personal relationship can be maintained.

[iv]

Cooperation without Power Law?

The following table by Ross Mayfield summarises recent research, showing that small groups can maintain egalitarian networks:

Network

Size

Description

Distribution

Political Network

~1000s

Blogs as mass media

Power-law (scale-free)

Social Network

~150

Blogging Classic

Bell-curve (random)

Creative Network

~12

Blogs as dinner conversation

Dense (equal)

After reviewing data of work relationships, information flows and knowledge exchanges from hundreds of consulting assignments inside Fortune 2000 organizations Valdis Krebs did not see much evidence of power laws in this data. His data is of confirmed ties [both persons agreed/recognized their mutual interactions/flows/relationships] from a worldwide pool of clients dating back to 1988. Of course he found some people were better connected than others, but the extreme hubs found in power law networks just were not evident. Adapting a famous line from the movie “Blazing Saddles” Valdis concluded: “Power Law? There ain’t no stinkin’ power law in this data!”

The whole discussion above was inspired by a entry from the Life with Alacrity blog.

[v]

Some recent books on Cooperation Studies:

On the importance of cooperation in human evolution: Ryan, Frank. Darwin’s Blind Spot: Evolution Beyond Natural Selection. Houghton-Mifflin, 2002

Links between cooperation in nature and culture: Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (Dahlem Workshop Reports). Ed. by Peter Hammerstein. MIT Press, 2003

[vi]

A bibliography on the scientific debate on egoism vs. altruism that ensued after the publication of Axelrod’s book.

[vii]

The following text is a good defense of the use of game theory in scientific research,

[viii]

See for a good review of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this entry of the Wikipedia.

[ix]

Axelrod’s rules of cooperation, summarized by Peter Kollock, expert in ‘social dilemma’s’ affecting cooperating individuals and communities

“Axelrod identifies three conditions that are necessary for even the possibility of cooperation. In other words, without these three elements there is little or no hope that cooperative relationships will emerge and persist. The first condition is that it must be likely that two individuals will meet again in the future. If this is the only time someone will be interacting with another person, or if this is the last time, there will be a great temptation to behave selfishly. Successful communities, in other words, must promote ongoing interaction. Godwin (1994) makes a similar point in his essay on principles for making virtual communities work when he stresses the importance of promoting continuity in online groups. The second condition is that individuals must be able to identify each other. The third condition is that individuals must have information about how the other person has behaved in the past. If identity is unknown or unstable and if there is no recollection or record of past interactions, individuals will be motivated to behave selfishly because they will not be accountable for their actions.”

A more thorough examination of social dilemma’s can be found here

[x]

The Assurance Game defined

“a situation where neither player can provide a sufficient amount of the good if they contribute alone, 
thus for each] player, if the other Defects then she should also Defect, but if the other Cooperates 
then she would prefer to Cooperate as well.  The assurance game is discussed at length by Michael 
Taylor in his book “The Possibility of Cooperation�, Cambridge University Press, 1987

In this essay, defending the possibility of ‘anarchist cooperation’ as a model of society, the author reviews the objections of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, arguing that they are superseded in case of repeated re-iteration, see

[xi]

Reed’s Law on Group Forming Networks

“Networks that support the construction of communicating groups create value that scales exponentially with network size, i.e. much more rapidly than Metcalfe’s square law. I will call such networks Group-Forming Networks, or GFNs. What kind of value are we talking about, when we say the value of a network scales as some function of size? The answer is the value of potential connectivity for transactions. That is, for any particular access point (user), what is the number of different access points (users) that can be connected or reached for a transaction when the need arises.The value of potential connectivity is the value of the set of optional transactions that are afforded by the system or network.”

[xii]

The shift in value creation in peer production of content, by David Reed:

“What’s important in a network changes as the network scale shifts. In a network dominated by linear connectivity value growth, “content is king.” That is, in such networks, there is a small number of sources (publishers or makers) of content that every user selects from. The sources compete for users based on the value of their content (published stories, published images, standardized consumer goods). Where Metcalfe’s Law dominates, transactions become central. The stuff that is traded in transactions (be it email or voice mail, money, securities, contracted services, or whatnot) are king. And where the GFN law dominates, the central role is filled by jointly constructed value (such as specialized newsgroups, joint responses to RFPs, gossip, etc.).”

[xiii]

the general principles of Coordination Theory

“Thomas Malone: What I mean by coordination theory is that body of theory and principles that help explain the phenomena of coordination in whatever systems they arise. Now what do I mean by coordination? We define coordination as the management of dependencies among activities. Now how do we proceed on the path of developing coordination theory? The work we’ve done so far says that if coordination is the managing of dependencies among activities, a very useful next step is to say: what kinds of dependencies among activities are possible? We’ve identified three types of dependencies that we call atomic or elementary dependency types. Our hypothesis is that all the dependencies, all the relationships in the world, can be analyzed as either combinations of or more specialized types of these three elementary types. The three are: flow, sharing, and fit. Flow occurs whenever one activity produces some resource used by another activity. Sharing occurs when a single resource is used by multiple activities. And fit occurs when multiple activities collectively produce a single resource. So those are the three topological possibilities for how two activities and one resource can be arranged. And each of them has a clear analog in the world of business or any of the other kinds of systems we talked about.”

Book: Thomas Malone. Coordination Theory and Collaboration Technology. Ed. by Thomas Malone et al. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2001

The Open Process Handbook Initiative (OPHI)

“a group of organizations and individuals dedicated to developing an on-line collection of knowledge about business processes that is freely available to the general public under an innovative form of “open source” licensing.”

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