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]]>E.F. Schumacher’s seminal work Small Is Beautiful (1973) champions the idea of smallness and localism as the way for meaningful interactions amongst humans and the technology they use. Technology is very important after all. As Ursula Le Guin (2004) puts it, “[t]echnology is the active human interface with the material world”. With this essay we wish to briefly tell a story, inspired by this creed, of an emerging phenomenon that goes beyond the limitations of time and space and may produce a more socially viable and radically democratic life.
We want to cast a radical geographer’s eye over “cosmolocalism”. Antipode has previously published an article by Hannes Gerhardt (2019) and an interview with Michel Bauwens (Gerhardt 2020) that have touched upon “cosmolocalism”. Cosmolocalism emerges from technology initiatives that are small-scale and oriented towards addressing local problems, but simultaneously engage with globally asynchronous collaborative production through digital commoning. We thus connect such a discussion with two ongoing grassroots developments: first, a cosmolocal response to the coronavirus pandemic; and, second, an ongoing effort of French and Greek communities of small-scale farmers, activists and researchers to address their local needs.
Τhe most important means of information production – i.e. computation, communications, electronic storage and sensors – have been distributed in the population of most advanced economies as well as in parts of the emerging ones (Benkler 2006). People with access to networked computers self-organise, collaborate, and produce digital commons of knowledge, software, and design. Initiatives such as the free encyclopedia Wikipedia and myriad free and open-source software projects have exemplified digital commoning (Benkler 2006; Gerhardt 2019, 2020; Kostakis 2018).
While the first wave of digital commoning included open knowledge projects, the second wave has been moving towards open design and manufacturing (Kostakis et al. 2018). Contrary to the conventional industrial paradigm and its economies of scale, the convergence of digital commons with local manufacturing machinery (from 3D printing and CNC milling machines to low-tech tools and crafts) has been developing commons-based economies of scope (Kostakis et al. 2018). Cosmolocalism describes the processes where the design is developed and improved as a global digital commons, while the manufacturing takes place locally, often through shared infrastructures and with local biophysical conditions in check (Bauwens et al. 2019). The physical manufacturing arrangement for cosmolocalism includes makerspaces, which are small-scale community manufacturing facilities providing access to local manufacturing technologies.
Unlike large-scale industrial manufacturing, cosmolocalism emphasizes applications that are small-scale, decentralised, resilient and locally controlled. Cosmolocal production cases such as L’Atelier Paysan (agricultural tools), Open Bionics (robotic and bionic hands), WikiHouse (buildings) or RepRap (3D printers) demonstrate how a technology project can leverage the digital commons to engage the global community in its development.
While this essay was being written in March 2020, a multitude of small distributed initiatives were being mobilised to tackle the coronavirus pandemic. Individuals across the globe are coming together digitally to pool resources, design open source technological solutions for health problems, and fabricate them in local makerspaces and workshops. For example, people are experimenting with new ventilator designs and hacking existing ones, creating valves for ventilators which are out of stock, and designing and making face shields and respirators.
There are so many initiatives, in fact, that there are now attempts to aggregate and systematise the knowledge produced to avoid wasting resources on problems that have already been tackled and brainstorm new solutions collectively.[1] This unobstructed access to collaboration and co-creation allows thousands of engineers, makers, scientists and medical experts to offer their diverse insights and deliver a heretofore unseen volume of creative output. The necessary information and communication technologies were already available, but capitalism as a system did not facilitate the organisational structure required for such mass mobilisation. In response to the current crisis, an increasing number of people are working against and beyond the system.
Such initiatives can be considered as grassroots cosmolocal attempts to tackle the inability of the globalised capitalist arrangements for production and logistics to address any glitch in the system. We have been researching similar activity in various productive fields for a decade, from other medical applications, like 3D-printed prosthetic hands, to wind turbines and agricultural machines and tools (Giotitsas 2019; Kostakis et al. 2018).
The technology produced is unlike the equivalent market options or is entirely non-existent in the market. It is typically modular in design, versatile in materials, and as low-cost as possible to make reproduction easier (Kostakis 2019). Through our work we have identified a set of values present in the “technical codes” of such technology which can be distilled into the following themes: openness, sustainability and autonomy (Giotitsas 2019). It is these values that we believe lead to an alternative trajectory of technological development that assists the rise of a commons-based mode of production opposite the capitalist one. This “antipode” is made possible through the great capacity for collaboration and networking that its configuration offers.
Allow us to elaborate via an example. In the context of our research we have helped mobilise a pilot initiative in Greece that has been creating a community of farmers, designers and fabricators that helps address issues faced by the local farmers. This pilot, named Tzoumakers, has been greatly inspired by similar initiatives elsewhere, primarily by L’Atelier Paysan in France. The local community benefits from the technological prowess that the French community has achieved, which offers not only certain technological tools but also through them the commitment for regenerative agricultural practices, the communal utilisation of the tools, and an enhanced capacity to maintain and repair. At the same time, these tools are adapted to local needs and potential modifications along with local insights may be sent back to those that initially conceived them. This creates flows of knowledge and know-how but also ideas and values, whilst cultivating a sense of solidarity and conviviality.
We are not geographers. However, the implications of cosmolocalism for geography studies are evident. The spatial and cultural specificities of cosmolocalism need to be studied in depth. This type of study would go beyond critique and suggest a potentially unifying element for the various kindred visions that lack a structural element. The contributors (and readership) are ideally suited to the task of critically examining the cosmolocalism phenomenon and contributing to the idea of scaling-wide, in the context of an open and diverse network, instead of scaling-up.
Cosmolocal initiatives may form a global counter-power through commoning. Considering the current situation we find ourselves in as a species, where we have to haphazardly re-organise entire social structures to accommodate the appearance of a “mere” virus, not to mention climate change, it is blatantly obvious that radical change is required to tackle the massive hurdles to come. Cosmolocalism may point a way forward towards that change.
The authors acknowledge funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant no. 802512). The photos were captured by Nicolas Garnier in the Tzoumakers makerspace.
[1] Volunteers created the following editable webpage where, at the time of writing, more than 1,500 commons-based initiatives against the ongoing pandemic have been documented: https://airtable.com/shrPm5L5I76Djdu9B/tbl6pY6HtSZvSE6rJ/viwbIjyehBIoKYYt1?blocks=bipjdZOhKwkQnH1tV (last accessed 27 March 2020)
Bauwens M, Kostakis V and Pazaitis A (2019) Peer to Peer: The Commons Manifesto. London: University of Westminster Press
Benkler Y (2006) The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom. New Haven: Yale University Press
Gerhardt H (2019) Engaging the non-flat world: Anarchism and the promise of a post-capitalist collaborative commons. Antipode DOI:10.1111/anti.12554
Gerhardt H (2020) A commons-based peer to peer path to post-capitalism: An interview with Michel Bauwens. AntipodeOnline.org 19 February https://antipodeonline.org/2020/02/19/interview-with-michel-bauwens/ (last accessed 27 March 2020)
Giotitsas C (2019) Open Source Agriculture: Grassroots Technology in the Digital Era. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Kostakis V (2018) In defense of digital commoning. Organization 25(6):812-818
Kostakis V (2019) How to reap the benefits of the “digital revolution”? Modularity and the commons. Halduskultuur: The Estonian Journal of Administrative Culture and Digital Governance 20(1):4-19
Kostakis V, Latoufis K, Liarokapis M and Bauwens M (2018) The convergence of digital commons with local manufacturing from a degrowth perspective: Two illustrative cases. Journal of Cleaner Production 197(2):1684-1693
Le Guin U K (2004) A rant about “technology”. http://www.ursulakleguinarchive.com/Note-Technology.html (last accessed 27 March 2020)
Schumacher E F (1973) Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics As If People Mattered. New York: Harper & Row
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]]>The post Why ‘Game of Thrones’ was about ecomodernism appeared first on P2P Foundation.
]]>!!! SPOILERS AHEAD !!!
Game of Thrones was arguably about climate change. George RR Martin himself confirmed that it is indeed “a great parallel”. Perhaps that is still the case in the books (we’ll have to wait until, or if, he completes his story), because the HBO series certainly shattered this narrative.
Presumably the message here is: no need to stop our petty squabbling in the face of a cataclysmic threat looming, a last-minute solution will magically turn up. While that might be an unfair bit of criticism to place on a show that indeed specialises in human squabbling, it is yet another example of pop culture reinforcing a dangerous idea. That whatever existential peril we may face as a species, we can solve through our real-world magic: technology!
This belief that eventually technological breakthroughs solve our problems is as powerful today as ever. How could it not? In the face of a problem like planetary collapse, which would require us to completely alter the way we exist as a society, it is easier to just passively hope for that inevitable bit of tech that will save economic growth!
One might imagine that this development in the show was forced due to the creators’ desire to move onto other projects. Because up to the point where the massive problem is instantly resolved, the show seemed to be building a narrative that relied on the humans getting their act together and making radical changes to their behaviour in order to survive. Thus, the opportunity to make a point to millions of people watching was sadly lost.
From Arya Stark’s dagger to personal computers and smartphones, technological artefacts reach users who often ignore the production history of those artefacts. Who produced them? At what social and environmental cost? How was nature transformed in the place where the materials of a certain technological artefact were found? The technologically-enabled abundance that a few people experience is linked to the scarcity experienced by many.
Ecomodernism argues that the issues of scarcity and environmental degradation can be addressed by using more efficient technologies. It has been a matter of debate in political ecology and in this blog. Ecomodernism overlooks the consequences of efficiency improvements. The Jevons Paradox is a finding attributed to the 19th century economist Stanley Jevons. It illustrates how efficiency improvements can lead to an absolute increase of resource use.
For example, the invention of more efficient train engines allowed for cheaper transportation that catalyzed the industrial revolution. However, this did not reduce the rate of fossil fuel use; rather, it increased it. More efficient technologies use less energy, and thus they cost less, which often encourages us to use them more—resulting in a net increase in energy use. Although since the 1970s technological advances have been significant, both global energy use and global material use have increased threefold.
In a famous quote, prolific writer Ursula K. Leguin says
“We live in capitalism. Its power seems inescapable. So did the divine right of kings. Any human power can be resisted and changed by human beings. Resistance and change often begin in art…”.
Art, and especially science fiction and fantasy, has the power to challenge ingrained beliefs and explore radical imaginaries, which may inspire action. Sadly, however, the Game of Thrones series failed to deliver.
Vasilis Kostakis is a Professor at TalTech and a Faculty Associate at Harvard. He is coordinating the Cosmolocalism.eu project. Chris Giotitsas is a Research Fellow at TalTech and a core member of the P2P Lab.
Header image: CC Chapman/Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
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]]>The post How to Create a Thriving Global Commons Economy appeared first on P2P Foundation.
]]>This piece by Michel Bauwens and Vasilis Kostakis was originally published on The Next System.org.
Why is this emerging mode of production so important in discussions about post-capitalist futures? And how can participants in commons-based peer production— the “commoners”—make sustainable livings, thereby creating a thriving global commons economy within and beyond capitalism?
Here’s why and how.
When we investigate realistic social change, it is not enough to ask (normatively) how things should be or (idealistically) how things could be. We must also look at the seeds of potential change. Just as capitalism developed over centuries by combining such patterns as double-book accounting and knowledge diffusion through printing, any post-capitalist system will be grounded in patterns emerging within capitalism or from attempts to solve its systemic problems.
These post-capitalist patterns include commons-based peer production. John Restakis (2017), David Bollier (2016), and others have addressed the re-emergence of the commons, defined as a shared resource, maintained or co-created by a community, and governed through that same community’s rules and norms. Here we go one step farther, describing an emerging mode of production that makes the commons the central feature of its value creation and distribution.
This new modality of value creation has fresh but widespread roots. It emerged in the digital realm to organize the production of open knowledge, free software, and shared designs. Now, it is also a strong candidate to take over the organization of physical production and create a political economy in which the distribution of value is both more socially just and ecologically regenerative. As we will show, forces already afoot could produce and distribute value in socially fair and environmentally balanced ways.
In commons-based peer production (CBPP), originally identified as a new pathway of value creation and distribution, Internet-enabled infrastructures allow individuals to communicate, self-organize, and co-create digital commons of knowledge, software, and design (Benkler, 2006; Bauwens, 2005; Kostakis & Bauwens, 2014). Think of the free encyclopedia Wikipedia, the myriad free and open-source projects (e.g., Linux, Apache HTTP Server, Mozilla Firefox, WordPress, Enspiral), or such open design communities as Wikihouse, RepRap, Sensorica, and Farm Hack. This remarkable new modality combines global coordination mechanisms with the small-group dynamics characteristic of human tribal forms, allowing these dynamics to go global.
CBPP differs fundamentally from value creation under industrial capitalism. In the incumbent models, the owners of the means of production hire workers, direct the work process, and sell products for profit maximization. Production is organized by allocating resources through price signals, or through hierarchical command harking to these price signals.
In contrast, CBPP is in principle open to anyone with skills to contribute to a joint project, pooling the knowledge of every participant. Some participants may be paid by companies or clients, but this system of production is also open to self-motivated contributors and distributors. In these open systems, there are many reasons to contribute beyond or besides receiving monetary payment.
CBPP allows contributions based on all
kinds of motivations, but most important is the desire to create
something meaningful or mutually useful to those contributing. For the
productive communities as well as other users, most of their work is
oriented to use-value creation, not exchange-value.
In CBPP’s
open and transparent systems, everyone can see the signals of others’
work and can that way adapt to the needs of the system as a whole.
In CBPP, some commoners may be paid or employed as wage labor or work for the market as freelancers. Whether paid or not, all of them produce commons. The work is not directed by corporate hierarchies, but through the mutual coordination mechanisms of the productive community. Indeed, corporate hierarchies must defer to the community values if they want to participate in this type of production. In CBPP’s open and transparent systems, everyone can see the signals of others’ work and can that way adapt to the needs of the system as a whole.
CBPP is often based on ‘stigmergic’ collaboration. Basically, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication among agents and actions (Marsh & Onof, 2007, p. 1). Think here about how ants or termites exchange information by laying down pheromones (chemical traces). This indirect form of communication enables social insects to build such complex structures as trails and nests. An action leaves a trace that stimulates the next action by the same or a different agent (ant, termite, or, in the case of CBPP, commoner).
In the context of CBPP, stigmergic collaboration is the “collective, distributed action in which social negotiation is …mediated by Internet-based technologies” (Elliott, 2006). For example, free and open-source software code lines and Wikipedia entries are all produced in a distributed and ad hoc manner as large numbers of people contribute.
Of course, unlike termites and ants, people are given to ego problems, mixed agendas, and other human frailties, so what about quality control? CBPP projects do have quality-control systems based on a hierarchy (or heterarchy). These safeguards are imperfect but improving. Without coercing work, “maintainers” in free and open source software collaboration or Wikipedia “editors,” for instance, protect the integrity of the system as a whole and can refuse contributions that endanger that integrity.
Far from the norm in traditional business, this kind of collaboration does appeal to profit-seekers, too. Since CBPP is based on more freely engaged and passionate labor and obviates some costs to capital, it can appeal to for-profit forces. Hence, we see the massive growth of CBPP in software production for industry.
Through CBPP, we see a new institutional ecosystem of value creation emerging. This ecosystem consists of three institutions: the productive community, commons-oriented entrepreneurial coalition(s), and the for-benefit association. Our description cannot be all-inclusive or definitive because each ecosystem is unique and this new mode of production is rapidly evolving. The aim instead is to offer a birds-eye-view of the expanding universe of CBPP.1
Productive Community | Linux | Mozilla | GNU | Wikipedia | WordPress |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Entrepreneurial coalition | e.g. Linus | e.g. Mozilla | e.g. Red Hat, Endless, SUSE | e.g. Wikia company | e.g. Automatic company |
For-benefit association | Linux | Mozilla | Free Software | Wikimedia Foundation | WordPress |
Five of the oldest and best-known commons-based peer production ecosystems.
Along with Wikipedia and the well-documented ecosystems of the free and open-source software projects, Enspiral, Sensorica, Wikihouse, and Farm Hack offer new perspectives on the rich tapestry of proliferating CBPP ecosystems. All can be described as building new post-capitalist ecosystems of value creation, and all illustrate the shift from the purely digital production of software and knowledge to its use by entities that produce physical products and sophisticated services. Enspiral has a complex service offering, including the participatory decision-making platform Loomio, Sensorica designs and deploys sensors, Wikihouse produces designs for sustainable housing, and Farm Hack engages in the participatory design of agricultural machinery. All four replay the tripartite institutional structure emblematic of digital production. A recent study of the urban commons in Ghent (Bauwens & Onzia, 2017) shows that commons-based urban provisioning systems also exemplify this new structure.
Productive community | Enspiral | Sensorica | Wikihouse | Farmhack |
---|---|---|---|---|
Entrepreneurial coalition | e.g. Loomio ActionStation | e.g. Tactus Scientific Inc | e.g. Architecture 00, Momentum Engineering, Space Craft, Ltd. | e.g. Open Shops |
For-benefit association | Enspiral Foundation | Canadian Association for the Knowledge Economy | Wikihouse Foundation | Farmhack nonprofit |
Three emerging commons-based peer production ecosystems.
The first linchpin of the new model is the productive community. It consists of all the contributors to a project of CBPP. As noted, its members may be paid or may volunteer their contributions out of sheer interest. Either way, all produce the shared resource. Most important when compared to systems based on wage labor, the system must remain open to contributions.
The second institution is the commons-oriented entrepreneurial coalition. It aims to create either profits or livelihoods by creating added value for the market, based on the shared resources. The participating enterprises can pay contributors.
The digital commons themselves are typically outside the market because they are not scarce so are not subject to the laws of supply and demand.
Crucially important in the relation among the entrepreneurs, the community, and the common-pool resource on which they depend is whether their relationship is generative or extractive. That said, every entity is expected to present a mixture.
Two distinctions are relevant here. First, entrepreneurship should not be identified exclusively with capitalism: not all entrepreneurs are motivated by profit maximization. For some, entrepreneurship expresses the desire for autonomy. In the emerging class of autonomous and precariously employed workers, many are involved in the “auto-entrepreneurship” crucial to CBPP ecosystems. Entrepreneurship should not be identified exclusively with capitalism.
Second, markets should not be identified with capitalism. Non-capitalist market systems that are not based on wage labor or the separation of the means of production from the workers, and that operate with different “value logics” than profit maximization, have existed throughout history. They still coexist within capitalism and can be further developed as post-capitalist modalities. CBPP’s potential here is to create commons-oriented market forms that both benefit the commons and the commoners.
Crucial to the “commonification” of the entrepreneurial coalitions is the figure of the “autonomous worker.” Today’s dominant conception of the entrepreneur is of someone who is independent and takes all the risk to play the capitalist lottery. In contrast, if you want a salary, then you need to obey corporate rules. So, if you are a worker, you have a contract of subordination. In contrast, autonomous workers are free to make their own decisions and interact with the market and the commons as they wish and without permission.
This form of self-propelled enterprise should not be confused with neoliberal entrepreneurship. From a Gramscian perspective (Gramsci, 1971), CBPP can be viewed as an effort to advance alternatives to dominant ideas of what is considered “normal” and legitimate. Commons-based entrepreneurship places freedom and autonomy associated with entrepreneurship in a contributory perspective.
Consider here the creation of the labor mutual SMart, which advances the concept of “autonomous worker.” Participating workers freely engage with the market to advance their values and life projects, but mutualize their life risk through a co-owned cooperative. Such workers are ideally situated to join more commons-centric models.
Marjorie Kelly (2012) introduces non-capitalist/generative enterprises, pressing the distinction between markets and capitalism. In these enterprises, collectively owned market agents use their surplus to further social and environmental causes, rather than accumulation. To demonstrate the difference between extractive and generative economic activity, think of industrial agriculture versus permaculture. In the former, the soil grows ever poorer and less healthy while in the latter the soil becomes richer and healthier.
Extractive entrepreneurs seek to maximize their profits, and few of this breed reinvest enough in the maintenance of the productive communities. Like Facebook, they do not share any profits with the co-creating communities that provide the company’s value and its realization. Some, like Uber or Airbnb, tax exchanges without creating transport or hospitality infrastructures. So, though such enterprises develop useful services based on previously untapped resources, they do so extractively. They facilitate these services, but they also create competitive mentalities that destroy the collaborative and environmental advantages of mutualizing pooled resources. Moreover, extractive enterprises may free-ride on social or public infrastructures (e.g., roads in Uber’s case) and further undermine welfare provision by evading taxation and failing to provide social benefits. To demonstrate the difference between extractive and generative economic activity, think of industrial agriculture versus permaculture.
In contrast, generative entrepreneurs add value to these communities, which they both seed and depend on. In the best case, the community of entrepreneurs and the productive community are one and the same. Creating livelihoods while producing commons, contributors re-invest the surplus in their well-being and the overall commons system they co-produce.
The third institution is the for-benefit association. This entity can be seen as the infrastructural organization of the commons that manages commons-based cooperation. Indeed, many CBPP ecosystems feature independent governance institutions that support the infrastructure for collaboration, empowering the CBPP. Cooperation thus takes place autonomously, without any command-and-control apparatus. Indeed, commoning is impossible without it. For example, the Wikimedia Foundation is the non-coercive for-benefit association of Wikipedia. Similarly, free and open-source software foundations often manage infrastructure and networks of projects.
Traditional nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations operate in a world of perceived scarcity. They spot problems, search for resources, and direct their resources toward solving the issues they have identified. This approach arguably mirrors the for-profit model of operating.
In contrast, for-benefit associations operate for ‘potential’ abundance. They recognize problems and issues but believe that there are enough contributors eager to help solve or resolve them. Hence, they maintain an infrastructure of cooperation that allows contributive communities and entrepreneurial coalitions to engage in CBPP processes vital for addressing these issues, without directly commanding the contributors. They protect these commons through licenses and may also help manage conflicts between participants and stakeholders, fundraise, and help build the general capacity needed to work in particular fields through, for example, education or certification.
The specific CBPP ecosystems are interrelated through their digital commons. Since the output of one project can be the input of another, CBPP can be seen as a grand ecosystem composed of diverse smaller ecosystems.
The nascent ecosystems described here are not sovereign in the current political economy, and all come with challenges and contradictions. For instance, Enspiral owes its business success largely to the distinct talent and skills of its members who are very competitive in their respective fields and who acquired skills and experiences from their education and occupations in such traditional institutions as universities, software companies, and financial firms. Beyond that, its area of expertise fills a niche in a developed market with low capital entry. Enspiral’s business model may be hard to replicate absent these factors.
Similarly, Sensorica and Farm Hack both face significant challenges concerning proper and comprehensive documentation of their processes and outputs, while WikiHouse is still striving to broaden the scope and reliability of its layouts and technologies. All the described projects, especially those entailing localized manufacturing, still rely substantially on cheap, mass-produced raw materials and components. Their business models, not yet fully defined, can sustain livelihoods for only a small number of active and highly dedicated contributors.
These caveats notwithstanding, don’t underestimate the importance of examples like those sketched here in solving urgent and neglected societal challenges. These new initiatives are gradually building considerable capacity to support this emerging commons-based political economy. Each case offers unique techno-social solutions, crystallizing a new socially embedded perception of value, defining new forms of organization and relationships to the means of production, and providing a new and more holistic representation of economic reality.
As these solutions mature and get adopted, replicated, and improved by other projects, this new economic reality could subsume and transcend today’s tumbling political order. Empowered by commoning, in time they will reshape and sublate the current contradictions and processes into a synthesized, concrete, commons-centric totality.
To be sure, the autonomous emergence and development of these seed forms are by themselves not a sufficient condition for social change. But they are a necessary feature of such change and their prefigurative function and power are vital to the success of any social change strategy. No conflict or crisis resolution can occur without reliance on these seeds of change.
Make no mistake: the new models of production described here as an emerging institutional infrastructure at the micro level of concrete projects are also potential formats for a new post-capitalist political economy and civilization:
In CBPP, contributors create shared value through open contributory systems, govern their work through participatory practices, and create shared resources that can, in turn, be used in new iterations. This cycle of open input, participatory process, and commons-oriented output can be considered a cycle of accumulation of the commons, and this cycle parallels capital accumulation.
At this stage, CBPP prefigures what could become a post-capitalist mode of production. It is a prototype since it cannot yet fully reproduce itself outside of mutual dependence with capitalism. Productive and innovative “within capitalism,” CBPP also has the capacity to solve some of the structural problems generated by capitalism—in effect, transcending it. That said, CBPP won’t be the new “total social reality” until it also engages in physical production. The new models of production described here as an emerging institutional infrastructure at the micro level of concrete projects are also potential formats for a new post-capitalist political economy and civilization.
As for capitalist competition, CBPP can spur innovation. Firms that can access the digital commons possess a competitive advantage over firms that use proprietary knowledge and rely only on their research (Tapscott & Williams, 2005; Benkler 2006; von Hippel, 2017). For example, by mutualizing the software development in an open network, firms save substantially on their infrastructural investments. In this context, CBPP could be seen as a mutualization of productive knowledge by capitalist coalitions.
This capitalist investment is not negative in itself. Instead, it is a condition that has increased society’s investment in a commons-oriented transition. Since CBPP solves some structural issues of the current system, capital and both productive and managerial classes gravitate toward it. Even though prolonging the dominance of the old economic models distorts CBPP, it simultaneously sparks new ways of thinking that undermine in that dominance.
Even so, the new class of commoners cannot rely on capitalist investment and practices. Marinus Ossewaarde’s and Wessel Reijers’s (2018) threefold observation rings true here: “(1)…through technologically mediated practices of digital commoning implicit and explicit pricing mechanisms can be realised, (2)…such mechanisms draw the practices of digital commoning towards the monetary economy, (3) which in turn affects the forms of resistance that are implied in practices of digital communing.”
In the end, commoners must render CBPP more autonomous from the dominant political economy. Eventually, the balance of power could then be reversed: the commons and its social forces would become society’s dominant modality, forcing the state and market modalities to adapt to societal requirements.
Commoners should avoid situations in which capitalists co-opt the commons and head toward situations in which the commons capture capital and use it to build its own capacity. Such reverse cooptation has been called “transvestment” by Dmytri Kleiner and Baruch Gottlieb (Kleiner, 2010, 2016). In the case of CBPPs, value would flow from the capitalist market to the commons, using generative market practices whenever possible. Thus, transvestment would help commoners become financially secure and independent. Such procedures are being developed and implemented in seed form by such open cooperatives as Sensorica or the Enspiral network.
Sensorica is a collaborative network that develops sensors. It was officially launched in 2011 in Montreal, Canada, inspired by free and open-source projects and the forms of collaboration they entailed. Sensorica explicitly separates its production processes, which are commons-based, from its market operations, which are held by independent entities though controlled by the productive network. The network’s contribution-based accounting system logs every contribution by every project participant at every stage, from initiation to marketing. In turn, all revenue from marketable products is distributed back to those who have contributed to their production. By providing livelihood opportunities, Sensorica emancipates its contributors so they can commit more of their creative energy to commons-based productive processes.
As for structure, the Enspiral network consists of the Enspiral ventures, the Enspiral Foundation, and a community of professionals representing various domains and a broad range of competencies. The Enspiral ventures offer their products and services in the market, like any common enterprise, but their focus is on the social economy, and they mobilize in response to societal challenges. Through this process, they create commons (software, infrastructures, knowledge—most famously, Loomio, a web application that helps groups make decisions together), but also revenue and (in some Enspiral ventures) even profits. A portion of these funds is donated to the Foundation. The latter then uses a part of them to cover its operation, and the rest is reinvested to new commons-based projects through democratic procedures. When projects are externally financed, the backing companies typically redeem their shares once an agreed-upon level of return has been reached. This agreement, combined with democratic control, allows the companies to decide to reinvest profits in their social mission and/or new Enspiral projects.
Open cooperativism is a working concept aimed at infusing cooperatives with the basic principles of CBPP (Bauwens & Kostakis, 2014). Pat Conaty and David Bollier (2014) have called for “a new sort of synthesis or synergy between the emerging peer production and commons movement on the one hand, and growing, innovative elements of the co-operative and solidarity economy movements on the other.” To a higher degree than in traditional cooperatives, open cooperatives would statutorily be oriented toward the common good by co-building digital and/or material commons. This orientation basically extends the seventh cooperative principle—concern for the community (ICA, 2018). In contrast to traditional cooperatives, open cooperatives pool their digital resources (knowledge, software, designs), creating a multifaceted digital commons for other open cooperatives. So, open cooperatives would internalize negative externalities, adopt multi-stakeholder governance models, help create immaterial and material commons, and be socially and politically organized around global concerns, even if they produce locally.
One way to understand open cooperativism is to look at how the medieval guild system functioned. A guild was an association of producers who oversaw the practice of their craft or trade in a particular geographical area. It had elements of a professional association, a trade union, a cartel, and a secret society. Externally, guilds sold their goods or services in the marketplace, but internally they were fraternities and solidarity systems. In a commons-centric economy, such efficiency and solidarity could be achieved through open participatory systems that would connect producers and consumer/user communities, as community-supported agriculture does now. By this token, the models proposed below would intertwine contributors with various roles into one solidarity ecosystem.
Here, six interrelated strategies for post-capitalist entrepreneurial coalitions are outlined. All aim to go beyond the classical corporate paradigm and its extractive profit-maximizing practices to establish open cooperatives that cultivate a commons-oriented economy.
First, it is essential to recognize that closed business models are based on artificial scarcity. Although knowledge in digital form can be shared quickly and at low marginal cost, traditional firms may use artificial scarcity to extract rents from its creation. Through legal repression or technological sabotage, naturally shareable goods are sometimes made artificially scarce to generate extra profits (Kostakis et al., 2018). This is particularly galling when life-saving medicines or planet-regenerating technological knowledge are overpriced or unnecessarily scarce. Open cooperatives, in comparison, would refuse to generate revenue by making such abundant resources as knowledge artificially scarce.
Second, a typical CBPP project involves various distributed tasks, to which individuals can freely contribute. For instance, in the free and open-source software projects, participants contribute code, create designs, maintain websites, translate text, co-develop the marketing strategy, and offer user support. In this setup, salaries based on a fixed job description may not be the most appropriate way to reward contributors. An alternative is open value accounting or contributory accounting: any income from contributions flows to contributors according to the points accrued from their meaningful participation in collective production. This model could be an antidote to the tendency in many firms for a handful of well-placed contributors to capture the value co-created by a much larger community.
Third, open cooperatives could secure fair distribution and benefit-sharing of commonly created value through “copyfair” licenses (Bauwens & Kostakis, 2014). Today’s “copyleft” licenses—such as Creative Commons and the GNU Public License—allow anyone to reuse the necessary knowledge commons provided that changes and improvements are subsequently shared in that same commons. The hitch is that this framework fails to encourage reciprocity for commercial use of the commons or to foster a level playing field for commons-oriented enterprises. These shortcomings can be overcome through copyfair licenses that allow for sharing while also ingraining reciprocity. More particularly, these licenses preserve the right of sharing knowledge but predicate commercialization of any such knowledge commons on contributing to that commons. For example, the copyfair approach to licensing endorses the free and open-source software freedoms enshrined in the GNU Public License, but regulates profit-making potential. The Peer Production License is the first case of copyfair that restricts the usage of a digital commons to worker cooperatives (Kleiner, 2010). Further, the FairShares Association uses a Creative Commons non-commercial license for the general public but allows its members to use the content commercially.
Fourth, open cooperatives would use open designs to produce sustainable goods and services. For-profit enterprises often build planned obsolescence into products to maintain tension between supply and demand and maximize profits. Such obsolescence is a feature, not a bug. In contrast, open design communities do not have the same incentives to plan obsolescence (Kostakis et al., 2018).
Fifth, open cooperatives could reduce waste. The lack of transparency and penchant for antagonism among closed enterprises makes it hard for them to create a circular economy in which the output of one production process becomes an input for another. However, open cooperatives could develop ecosystems of collaboration through open supply chains. These chains may enhance the transparency of production processes so participants could adapt their behavior based on the knowledge available in the network. There is no need for overproduction once the realities of the network become common knowledge. Open cooperatives could then move beyond exclusive reliance on imperfect market price signals and toward mutual coordination of production, thanks to the combination of open supply chains and open value accounting.
Sixth, open cooperatives could mutualize both digital and physical infrastructures. Despite the justified critique it receives, the misnamed “sharing economy” of Airbnb and Uber does illustrate the potential for matching idle resources. Co-working, skill sharing, and ride sharing also exemplify the many ways in which we can reuse and share resources. With co-ownership and co-governance, a genuine sharing economy could use resources far more efficiently, aided by shared data facilities and manufacturing tools.
Cooperative ownership of platforms can also begin to reorient the platform economy around a commons-oriented model. The six practices highlighted here are already emerging in various forms but need to be more universally integrated. In our estimate, the primary aim for fostering a more commons-centric economy is to recapture surplus value that is now feeding speculative capitalism and reinvest it in the development of commons-oriented productive communities. Otherwise, CBPP’s potential will remain underdeveloped and subservient to the dominant system.
Typically, the need for capital is dramatically higher for physical production, which requires natural resources, buildings, machines, and people. Clearly, assembling networked individuals requires substantially less capital. Nevertheless, as noted, CBPP cannot be considered a full mode of production unless it integrates both digital and physical production.
Building on the confluence of the digital commons of knowledge, software, and design with local manufacturing technologies, new models of physical production are emerging. They can be codified as “design global, manufacture local” (DGML). What is light (knowledge, design), this logic goes, becomes global, while what is heavy (machinery) is local and ideally shared. DGML demonstrates how a technology project can leverage the digital commons to engage the global community in its development, celebrating new forms of cooperation (Kostakis et al., 2018; Kostakis et al., 2015; Kostakis et al., 2016). Unlike large-scale industrial manufacturing, the DGML model emphasizes small-scale, decentralized, resilient, and locally controlled applications. DGML could recognize the scarcities posed by finite resources and organize material activities to conserve them. After all, since manufacturing is largely local, shipping costs are lower, and maintenance is easier. Manufacturers design products to last as long as possible under the DGML mantle, and knowledge and design are freely shared since there are no patent costs.
Already, we see a rich tapestry of DGML initiatives unfolding in the global economy that do not need a unified physical basis because their members are located all over the world. For example, consider the L’Atelier Paysan (France) and Farm Hack (U.S.), communities that collaboratively build open-source agricultural machines for small-scale farming or the OpenBionics project that produces open-sourced, low-cost designs for robotic and bionic devices or the RepRap community that creates open-source designs for 3D printers.
Cities around the world are partially embracing this shift, as evidenced in a study on the urban commons (Bauwens & Onzia, 2017). In Ghent, Belgium, nearly 500 urban commons were identified, a tenfold increase in 10 years, covering all the basic provisioning systems. Most of these commons-based forms, however, redistribute but don’t produce goods. For instance, car and bike-sharing schemes mutualize access to transport but do not manufacture the vehicles. Similarly, housing coops, co-housing, and community land trusts offer access to housing but do not “make” the housing.
A further limitation: Many generative projects remain fragmented and locally limited. As welcome as these initiatives’ rapid growth is, it’s not enough to turn the tide. Public-commons cooperation must be combined locally with community wealth building policies inspired by the models in Cleveland and Preston, UK. What’s more, transnational investment coalitions are needed to create global open depositories for setting up provisioning systems and mutual learning endeavors that are locally adapted but globally coordinated. Public-commons cooperation must be combined locally with community wealth-building policies inspired by the models in Cleveland and Preston, UK.
One fast-growing sector amid a more fundamental transformation is ahead of the game. It can create healthy food for urbanites, livelihoods for producers, multi-stakeholder governance systems involving both producers and consumers, and meaningful work in an integrated ecosystem. Indeed, 80 of the 500 projects identified in Ghent were food projects—organic farmers supplying food through various commons-based schemes. Such local agricultural production exemplifies CBPP’s next stage: the cosmo-local production of goods. This stage combines open global communities mutualizing production knowledge, distributed local production, and cooperative, generative organization of the productive ecosystem. The challenge—extending this model to the economy’s more capital-intensive sectors—is likely to require the commitment of both the public sector and the world of cooperative investment and financing.
The greatest challenge, however, remains creating sustainable modes of production. Kate Raworth (2017) has very usefully summarized what needs doing: fulfill humanity’s social needs without exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet and damaging the vital cycles and needed balanced ecosystems that sustain human life. Commoning is both green and efficient.
The commons will be a vital part of this strategy for human survival. Commoning requires pooling and mutualizing resources and infrastructures to replace the wasteful corporate competition that reflects the systematic externalization of social and environmental costs to keep expenses and prices as low as possible. In contrast, CBPP’s “collaborative advantage” is that it produces products and services for human need, at lower thermodynamic costs than capitalist production models (Piques & Rizos, 2017). For example, the associate car-sharing project in Ghent, Degage, uses 130 cars for 1,300 members, guaranteeing them full mobility while greatly lowering environmental costs. Studies of similar projects have shown that every shared vehicle can replace up to 13 private cars (Shaheen, 2017).
Commoning is both green and efficient. Commons-based organic food ecosystems do not pollute the groundwater, do not use toxic additives, and can use carbon-free transportation systems. As shown in the meta-historical comparisons of civilizational overshoots (Motesharrei et al., 2014), more equal access to the resources of life significantly reduces resource catastrophes and makes crisis periods less severe. Production models that use a “subsidiarity of material production” approach will dramatically cut transportation costs and needs while maintaining global cultural and technical cooperation.
The good news is that pioneering communities all over the world are developing many of the tools needed to make this shift. For example:
In medieval times, drinking horns were often used by guilds communally to symbolize and promote conviviality, friendship, and solidarity among the members. These values proved of great importance to the prosperity of the guild (Rosser, 2015).
Needed now is a drinking horn for the commons to help make CBPP a dominant production modality. The guild system can inspire commoners looking for sustainable livelihoods. Our transitional vision includes commons-based networks of “neo-guilds” comprised of cooperatives and autonomous producers. These networks would produce value—a global commons for the commoners and the general public and a product to be sold to enterprises outside the commons.
The small-scale initiatives can now be influential on a larger scale, as nodes in a commons-based global network of local networks. Through digital commoning, grassroots initiatives can have both a local and global orientation: “the small and the local, when they are open and connected, can therefore become a design guideline for creating resilient systems and sustainable qualities, and a positive feedback loop between these systems” (Manzini, 2013). Hence, instead of “scaling-up,” CBPP initiatives are “scaling-wide.”
With a crisis of capital accumulation upon us, might a stream of value seek and find a place in the commons economy? Yes. Instead of the cooptation of the commons economy by capital through capitalist platforms that capture value from common enterprise (e.g., Facebook, Google, IBM), commoners can coopt capital inside the commons, and subject it to its rules. With a crisis of capital accumulation upon us, might a stream of value seek and find a place in the commons economy?
Much depends on whether we can pull off more sophisticated types of reverse cooptation. Commoners must create interconnected transvestment vehicles that admit capital disciplined by the new commons and market forms developed through CBPP. For example, “double-licensing” schemes require those who wish to capitalize to pay a license fee or join the commons-based neo-guild. This approach creates a flow of value from the system of capital to the system of the commons economy.
The ultimate vision for a new society is one of a civil society productive in its own right, not just an adjunct to the market and state. Under this new dispensation, the state enables free social production in a galaxy of interconnected, collaborative initiatives. True, CBPP does not solve many of today’s inequalities and systemic social unfairness, especially involving race and gender. Nor does it directly address the hidden environmental and social costs of digital technologies, which are energy-intensive throughout their life-cycle, from cradle to the grave. Also, low-wage laborers (often including children) work under inhumane circumstances so that ever more people in the advanced economies have access to cheap digital technologies. But these shortcomings and injustices can be addressed, and CBPP traces a unique grand institution dealing with value creation that is far removed from the catastrophic characteristics of modern capitalism. This connection to sustainability is likely to open up new spaces for a free, fair, and long-lived society.
Parts of this essay are based on the authors’ forthcoming open-access book (co-authored with Alex Pazaitis), titled Peer to Peer: The Commons Manifesto, to be published by University of Westminster Press. It also builds on Bauwens M. & Kostakis V. (2016). “Why Platform Co-ops should be Open Co-ops.” In Scholz
T. & Schneider N. (eds) Ours to Hack and Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, a New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet. New York, NY: OR Books, 163-166. Vasilis Kostakis acknowledges funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 802512).
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All web links were active on July 6, 2018.
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]]> (e.g., open knowledge and design) with local manufacturing and automation technologies (from 3D printing and CNC machines to low-tech tools and crafts). This convergence could catalyze the transition to new inclusive and circular production models, such as the “design global, manufacture local” (DGML) model. DGML describes the processes through which design is developed as a global digital commons, whereas the manufacturing takes place locally, through shared infrastructures and with local biophysical conditions in check. COSMOLOCALISM is a pilot-driven investigation of the DGML phenomenon that seeks to understand relevant organizational models, their evolution, and their broader political economy/ecology and policy implications. Through the lens of diverse case studies and participatory action research, the conditions under which the DGML model thrives will be explored.
COSMOLOCALISM has three concurrent streams: democratization; innovation; and sustainability. First, DGML governance practices will be studied, patterns will be recognized, and their form, function, cultural values, and structure will be determined. Second, the relevant open innovation ecosystems and their potential to reorient design and manufacturing practices will be examined. Third, selected DGML products will be evaluated from an environmental sustainability perspective, involving both qualitative and quantitative methods. The interdisciplinary nature of COSMOLOCALISM will explore new horizons to improve our understanding of how to create sustainable economies through the commons.
CANDIDATE PROFILE
The candidate is expected to focus on the sustainability stream of the COSMOLOCALISM project. The objective is to assess the environmental sustainability of DGML artifacts empirically. What is the ecological footprint of a product (e.g., a 3D printer, a digitally fabricated beehive) that has been globally designed and locally manufactured? How well does it fit into the existing natural and cultural environment of its application?
The candidate will conduct life-cycle assessments (LCA) of at least two DGML technological solutions. The candidate should have a strong background in the field of LCA with relevant technical skills and practical knowledge. Master students with practical experience in LCA will also be considered. The position is an excellent opportunity for engineers looking to expand their expertise in social science research given the interdisciplinary nature of the project. Feel free to contact Prof. Vasilis Kostakis for any inquiries: vasileios.kostakis at taltech.ee.
The ultimate goal is to contribute to sustainable transitions research, formulating a groundbreaking research and action agenda which will identify techno-economic opportunities and challenges that are often fundamentally different from any our society has experienced before. COSMOLOCALISM attempts to advance our understanding of the political ecology of alternative technological trajectories; and of the future of the organization in the age of automation and beyond.
KEY RESPONSIBILITIES
The primary responsibility of the doctoral candidate is to conduct an LCA of at least two technological solutions that have been globally designed and locally manufactured, vis-a-vis similar products of conventional industrial production. This also includes primary data gathering and analysis, as well as involvement in the respective scientific publications and reports.
SALARY AND BENEFITS
The successful candidate will receive a three-year contract, renewable for six months after positive evaluation (so 3,5 years in total). Depending on qualifications and previous experience, the net salary will range between 1,100 to 1,300 euros per month (including Ph.D. scholarship and salary). Thus, a Ph.D. from TalTech will be acquired, for which residency in Estonia would be required.
APPLICATION
The position will only be filled when a potential candidate fully meets the project’s requirements, but not later than 1 June 2019. The application procedure can be found here. Should you have any question, feel free to contact Prof. Kostakis before application.
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]]>The post Book Launch: Peer to Peer: The Commons Manifesto appeared first on P2P Foundation.
]]>WHEN: 21st March 2019 @ 5:00 pm – 7:00 pm
WHERE: University of Westminster (Room UG05); 309 Regent St; Marylebone, London W1B 2HT; UK
COST: Free
Michel Bauwens, Vasilis Kostakis & Alex Pazaitis (P2P Foundation) –Book Launch ‘Peer to Peer. The Commons Manifesto’ (University of Westminster Press)
Not since Marx identified the manufacturing plants of Manchester as the blueprint for the new capitalist society has there been a more profound transformation of the fundamentals of our social life. As capitalism faces a series of structural crises, a new social, political and economic dynamic is emerging: peer to peer. What is peer to peer? Why is it essential for building a commons-centric future? How could this happen? These are the questions this seminar tries to answer.
Michel Bauwens is the Founder of the P2P Foundation and works in collaboration with a global group of researchers in the exploration of commons-based peer production, governance, and property.
Vasilis Kostakis is the Professor of P2P Governance at Tallinn University of Technology and Faculty Associate at Harvard University. He is also Visiting Professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Vasilis is the founder of the P2P Lab and core member of the P2P Foundation.
Alex Pazaitis is a Core Member of the P2P Lab and a Junior Research Fellow at the Ragnar Nurkse Department, Tallinn University of Technology.
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]]>We believe that the post-scarcity vision of the future is problematic because it reflects an understanding of technology and the economy that could worsen the problems it seeks to address. This is the bad news. Here’s why:
New technologies come to consumers as finished products that can be exchanged for money. What consumers often don’t understand is that the monetary exchange hides the fact that many of these technologies exist at the expense of other humans and local environments elsewhere in the global economy. The intuitive belief that technology can manifest from money alone, anthropologists tell us, is a culturally rooted notion which hides the fact that the scarcity experienced by some is linked to the abundance enjoyed only by a few.
Many people believe that issues of scarcity can be solved by using more efficient production methods. But this may overlook some of the unintended consequences of efficiency improvements. The Jevons Paradox, a key finding attributed to the 19th century British economist Stanley Jevons, illustrates how efficiency improvements can lead to an absolute increase of consumption due to lower prices per unit and a subsequent increase in demand. For example, the invention of more efficient train engines allowed for cheaper transportation that catalyzed the industrial revolution. However, this did not reduce the rate of fossil fuel use; rather, it increased it. When more efficient machines use less energy, they cost less, which often encourages us to use them more—resulting in a net increase in energy consumption.
Past experience tells us that super-efficient technologies typically encourage increased throughput of raw materials and energy, rather than reducing them. Data on the global use of energy and raw materials indicate that absolute efficiency has never occurred: both global energy use and global material use have increased threefold since the 1970s. Therefore, efficiency is better understood as a rearranging of resources expenditures, such that efficiency improvements in one end of the world economy increase resource expenditures in the other end.
The good news is that there are alternatives. The wide availability of networked computers has allowed new community-driven and open-source business models to emerge. For example, consider Wikipedia, a free and open encyclopedia that has displaced the Encyclopedia Britannica and Microsoft Encarta. Wikipedia is produced and maintained by a community of dispersed enthusiasts primarily driven by other motives than profit maximization. Furthermore, in the realm of software, see the case of GNU/Linux on which the top 500 supercomputers and the majority of websites run, or the example of the Apache Web Server, the leading software in the web-server market. Wikipedia, Apache and GNU/Linux demonstrate how non-coercive cooperation around globally-shared resources (i.e. a commons) can produce artifacts as innovative, if not more, as those produced by industrial capitalism.
In the same way, the emergence of networked micro-factories are giving rise to new open-source business models in the realm of design and manufacturing. Such spaces can either be makerspaces, fab labs, or other co-working spaces, equipped with local manufacturing technologies, such as 3D printing and CNC machines or traditional low-tech tools and crafts. Moreover, such spaces often offer collaborative environments where people can meet in person, socialize and co-create.
This is the context in which a new mode of production is emerging. This mode builds on the confluence of the digital commons of knowledge, software, and design with local manufacturing technologies. It can be codified as “design global, manufacture local” following the logic that what is light (knowledge, design) becomes global, while what is heavy (machinery) is local, and ideally shared. Design global, manufacture local (DGML) demonstrates how a technology project can leverage the digital commons to engage the global community in its development, celebrating new forms of cooperation. Unlike large-scale industrial manufacturing, the DGML model emphasizes application that is small-scale, decentralized, resilient, and locally controlled. DGML could recognize the scarcities posed by finite resources and organize material activities accordingly. First, it minimizes the need to ship materials over long distances, because a considerable part of the manufacturing takes place locally. Local manufacturing also makes maintenance easier, and also encourages manufacturers to design products to last as long as possible. Last, DGML optimizes the sharing of knowledge and design as there are no patent costs to pay for.
There is already a rich tapestry of DGML initiatives happening in the global economy that do not need a unified physical basis because their members are located all over the world. For example, consider the L’Atelier Paysan (France) and Farmhack (U.S.), communities that collaboratively build open-source agricultural machines for small-scale farming; or the Wikihouse project that democratizes the construction of sustainable, resource-light dwellings; or the OpenBionics project that produces open source and low-cost designs for robotic and bionic devices; or the RepRap community that creates open-source designs for 3D printers that can be self-replicated. Around these digital commons, new business opportunities are flourishing, while people engage in collaborative production driven by diverse motives.
So, what does this mean for the future of tomorrow’s businesses, the future of the global economy, and the future of the natural world?
First, it is important to acknowledge that within a single human being the “homo economicus”—the self-interested being programmed to maximize profits—will continue to co-exist with the “homo socialis”, a more altruistic being who loves to communicate, work for pleasure, and share. Our institutions are biased by design. They endorse certain behaviours over the others. In modern industrial capitalism, the foundation upon which our institutions have been established is that we are all homo economicus. Hence, for a “good” life, which is not always reflected in growth and other monetary indexes, we need to create institutions that would also harness and empower the homo socialis.
Second, the hidden social and environmental costs of technologies will have to be recognized. The so-called “digital society” is admittedly based on a material- and energy-intensive infrastructure. This is important to recognize so as not to further jeopardize the lives of current and future generations by unwittingly encouraging serious environmental instability and associated social problems.
Finally, a new network of interconnected commons-based businesses will continue to emerge, where sharing is not used to maximize profits, but to create new forms of businesses that would empower much more sharing, caring, and collaboration globally. As the global community becomes more aware of how their abundance is dependent on other human beings and the stability of environments, more and more will see commons-based businesses as the way of the future.
Vasilis Kostakis is a Senior Researcher at Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, and he is affiliated with the Berkman Klein Center at Harvard University.
Andreas Roos is a PhD student in the interdisciplinary field of Human Ecology at Lund.
Originally published at HBR.org
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]]>Republished from JOPP, Issue #10: Peer Production and Work
Arwid Lund: This article examines the relation between peer production and capitalism on a systemic and theoretical level. One problem with understanding peer production as an alternative and potentially competing mode of production in relation to capitalism is that the main bulk of economic theory deals only with capitalism. Alternative economic theories from an emerging theoretical P2P movement have done important pioneer work on commons-based peer production, and in discussing its sustainability as a mode of production both on a systemic and individual level (for the peer producers) within capitalism. This article argues that the disadvantages of the P2P movement’s theoretical framework, compared to a Marxist one, have their roots in an evolutionist motif, and the article aims to situate peer production more clearly in relation to the workings of capital, and in relation to a Marxist understanding of the potential for political agencies and counter-powers to emerge from capital’s outside.
This article examines the relation between peer production and capitalism on a systemic and theoretical level. One problem with understanding peer production as an alternative and possibly competing mode of production in relation to capitalism is that the main bulk of economic theory deals only with capitalism. Neo-classical theory sees the outside of capitalism as an externality without value (Lehdonvirta and Castronova, 2014: 143). Alternative economic theories from an emerging theoretical P2P movement have done important pioneer work on commons-based peer production as something of positive value in its own right, and in discussing its sustainability as a mode of production both on a systemic and individual level (for the peer producers) within capitalism. It has introduced ideas regarding new licences, venture communes, (platform) cooperatives and alternative currencies (Bauwens, 2009, 2012; Bauwens and Kostakis, 2014; Kostakis and Bauwens, 2014; Kleiner, 2010; Terranova and Fumagalli, 2015; Scholz, 2016). But the perspective lacks some of Marxism’s insights into the history of political economy and the workings of capitalism.
The disadvantages of the P2P movement’s theoretical framework, compared to a Marxist one, have their roots in an evolutionist motif. Tiziana Terranova holds that peer production investigates the possibility of creating a commons-based economy with its mode of production, but not necessarily antagonistically in relation to capital. She stresses that the evolutionary idea is central to what she calls the P2P principles:
The evolutionist motif is preferred to antagonism and is used to sustain the possibility of thinking of the economy as an ecological system, that would allow for, at least at first, the coexistence of different forms of productive organisation and social cooperation valorisation that can coexist side by side, at least until the day when the success of P2P will render other forms of economic organisation obsolete. (Terranova 2010: 157)
This article’s aim is to contribute to the theoretical and political understanding of capitalism’s productive outsides by answering the question of how the P2P idea of evolution can be radically informed by wider social anthropological theories and Marxism.
A rather eclectic theoretical framework will be applied, motivated by the outside to capital being, to some degree, a blind spot also within Marxism. The theories of social anthropologists Karl Polanyi and David Graeber will complement the P2P movement’s positive understandings of capitalism’s outside, whereas a broad sample of Marxist theoreticians will be drawn upon to understand the outside’s conditions in relation to a contradictory and crisis-prone capitalism. An eclectic perspective is always problematic, as each and every theory rests upon its own assumptions, but could also be useful if carefully applied within an explorative analysis of two diametrically different and interacting entities: capitalism and its potentially competing, commons-based and peer-organised productive outside.
Commercial companies exploit the productive force of the long tail (Anderson, 2007) of user-generated content within commercially-governed crowdsourcing. The article’s argument is that this does not qualify as peer production.
Dulong de Rosnay and Musiani use the parameter of centralisation and decentralisation when they develop a typology of peer production, but they include “crowdsourced, user-generated content ‘enclosed’ by corporations” in the concept of peer production (Dulong de Rosnay and Musiani, 2015). Such a wide understanding of peer production differs from Benkler’s original definition of peer production as “radically decentralised, collaborative and nonproprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying on either market or managerial commands” (Benkler, 2006: 60). Brian Brown has called Flickr a quasi-commons (Brown, 2012: 146) and could equally well have called the platform quasi-peer production. Capitalism’s private property regime radically differs from the commons form of ownership. Hess and Ostrom describe ownership as a bundle of rights where the control of certain rights can be distributed in different ways. Private property gathers almost all of the rights in one owner’s hand, whereas the rights are distributed more generously in the commons: Some rights are common to all participants, other rights—often superordinate ones—are controlled by smaller groups of participants. The rights can be more or less (de)-centralised (Hess and Ostrom, 2003: 119-122, 2007a: 52-53, b: 5).
Bauwens chooses to call the Web 2.0 platforms “sharing economies”, because no common product is produced on them (Bauwens, 2009: 125–126), meaning that they differ from peer production in their lack of horizontality and in the sense that their commercial end products are controlled by the company, rather than the users or participants. Peer production is based on voluntary and horizontal co-operation between peers in commons. The self-organisation does not exclude hierarchies and rights control on different levels (heterarchies—or multiple participant constellations—rather than strict hierarchies characterise Wikipedia); it is enough that the conditions for self-organisation exist in the last instance. Peer production is built on the commons form of ownership, being neither public nor private (Bauwens, 2009: 122–127; Gye 2007a, b; Kostakis, 2010). A theoretical distinction between commercial crowdsourcing and peer production could thus be based on two parameters: different forms of power (centralised or de-centralised) and different forms of production and products (use values or exchange values).
Peer production has spread in the production of software and encyclopaedias, but also to citizen journalism, open data sources, and product design ([email protected] 20140312). There are some inroads into the tangible world with 3D printers and Fab Labs (Siefkes, 2012; Anderson, 2013; Maxigas, 2012). Crowdfunding and alternative currencies are also combined with peer production in an attempt to expand the emerging new mode of production (Terranova and Fumagalli, 2015: 151–152).
Zygmunt Bauman asserts that it is the unquenchable thirst for creative destruction and mandatory but always incomplete modernisation that distinguishes capitalist modernity from all other historical forms of human coexistence (Bauman, 2000: 28). Karl Polanyi claims that the economy prior to capitalism was embedded in social and cultural life. Pre-capitalist societies were organised by different principles for reciprocal and re-distributional economising in which gain was not prominent (Polanyi, 2001: 49, 57): “Custom and law, magic and religion cooperated in inducing the individual to comply with rules of behavior which, eventually, ensured his functioning in the economic system” (Polanyi, 2001: 57).
Polanyi’s insights correlate with the ideas of the critical Soviet scholar and Marxist Evgeny Pashukanis, who criticised and historicised the legal form. Pashukanis engaged with the sociological roots of the legal form to demonstrate “the relative and historically limited nature of the fundamental juridical concepts” (Head, 2008: 170). The regulation of society could assume a legal character under certain conditions, but the legal form was not a trans-historical phenomenon. Collective life among animals was regulated, but not by law, and amongst “primitive peoples” seeds of law existed but the “greater part of their relations are regulated extra-legally, by religious observances for instance” (Pashukanis, 1983: 79). And in capitalist society, many services like the postal and rail services, with their timetables, could not in their entirety be related to “the sphere of legal regulation”, and are “regulated in a different manner connected to the ordering and structuring practices and needs of various institutional settings” (Pashukanis, 1983: 79). The social anthropologist David Graeber sees the extra-legal regulations as a communist baseline. Communism is the foundation of all sociality, communism makes society possible. The communist principle is the rule as long as people do not look upon each other as enemies, the need is sufficiently big and the cost reasonable. To share with each other is central in hard times, as well as in festive times (Graeber, 2011: 96–99).
According to Polanyi, markets were social and historical constructions deviating from past history. The transition from isolated markets to a market economy, from regulated to self-regulated markets, is a central transformation in history. The dissociation of the economy from social life to a special sphere where it is assigned a characteristic economic motive, is described as a “singular departure” (Polanyi, 2001: 74). This singular departure of the unregulated and generalised market is complemented by the singular development of the legal form in its support.
To Polanyi, the people and the natural milieus that society consists of are the substance of society, which is subordinated in capitalism to the formal market economy and its abstract laws. Capitalism is characterised by having a substantial and informal outside in relation to the formal market economy. Market capitalism cannot survive without its substantial economic outside, but only some of people’s exchanges with their natural and social life follow a formal economic logic (Fleischer, 2012: 19). Theoretically, this broader perspective on the economy opens up our understanding of capitalism and the alternatives to it. The substantial and informal outside can be a passive outside, or challenge the power of the formal economy with the aim of once again embedding it within social and cultural life. Projects like Wikipedia with its voluntary participants driven by a whole range of motives other than economic gain, within a project that is regulated by rules of thumb, netiquette, principles of reciprocity and combinations of networked and hierarchical organisation, contribute to new forms of social and cultural embeddedness of economic productivity, mainly outside of the market and legal form.
The outside to capital can also be portrayed as alternative social practices and struggles based in alternative forms of valorisation. The autonomist Marxist Massimo De Angelis speaks of value practices and claims that individuals are “singular agents” that bear both capitalist value practices and alternative value practices. Social interactions in the market turn dominant meanings of the capitalist value system into a programme that constitutes part of disciplinary processes and create norms for social cooperation. These value practices enter into conflict with other value practices and value struggles emerge and constitute an “ongoing tension in the social body” (De Angelis, 2007: 29–30).
Capitalism’s inside, when analysing peer production as an outside to capital, is defined as concrete labour subordinated under the logic of abstract labour, producing its opposite: capital (Marx, 1973: 305). Capitalism’s outside is defined as consisting of concrete labour separated from abstract labour, but organised in some other social form. Marx stressed that the socially-determined production of individuals should always be the point of departure in political economy and not the isolated individual of the bourgeois Robinsonades (Marx 1973: 83, 1857). In Capital, he clearly stated that all the different use values and their corresponding forms of concrete labour were classified according to the “order, genus, species, and variety to which they belong in the social division of labour”, and he stressed that the production of commodities was not a necessary condition for this “division of labours” (Marx, 1867: 49).
De Angelis’ alternative forms of valorisation (2007), together with the wider economic theories of social anthropological character, offer a way to move beyond neo-classical economic theory and capitalism for the peer producers. The theories empower the idea of differently organised forms of social production, as well as different coexisting forms of value practices in a society dominated by capitalism.
There is a difference between useful productive activities and socially necessary productive activities. The first suggests an activity that is useful for the producer, while the second points to a social phenomenon on a social level where the useful activity has been socially constructed as necessary.[1]
The Marxian value theory connects the first category to a produced use value, and the second to the exchange value, or commodity, on the market. It is not the input of labour per se that creates value; value is a social relation and is decided socially amongst people. The value theory of Karl Marx is, therefore, not a theory of labour, but a theory of the “modern socialisation of necessity” (Fleischer, 2012: 22).[2] The argument put forward here is that the socialisation of necessity is not necessarily dependent on the market exchange, but can be constructed within the gift economy of commons-based peer production. This argument finds support in Moishe Postone’s claim of a trans-historical form of social necessity in Marx’s understanding of work (Postone, 1993: 381): “some form of social production is a necessary precondition of human social existence. The form and extent of this transhistorical, ‘natural’, social necessity can be historically modified” (Postone, 1993: 382).
In capitalism, all socially necessary products have a value and are sold as commodities in exchange for money. De Angelis contends that when value systems harden into value programmes, these latter impose patterns of behaviour regarded as necessary (De Angelis, 2007: 28). The question then becomes whether peer production’s value system can harden into a value programme that imposes patterns of behaviour regarded as necessary. Looked upon in this way, the Marxian value theory provides peer producers with a crucial question: Should peer production be only useful in a limited sense, or strive to be socially necessary? In the first alternative, peer production is positioned as a complement that can be instrumentally used by capitalism; in the latter it competes with capitalism and has the potential to function as an alternative germ of a commons-based economy, built on socially necessary use values.
It could lead to a value struggle with capital, if projects like Wikipedia strive to be seen as socially (or as “commonsly”) necessary.[3] It would open up for a critical political economic discussion of peer production’s relations to capitalism. A commons-based value programme would create a new “space” for the socialisation of necessity in between the state and the market. But the question above not only indicates how capitalism and commons-based peer production potentially could clash with each other, it also points out how they potentially can co-operate. Sylvère Lotringer comments on the multi-facetted social subject of the multitude:
Capitalism itself is revolutionary because it keeps fomenting inequality and provoking unrest. It also keeps providing its own kind of “communism” both as a vaccine, preventing further escalation, and an incentive to go beyond its own limitations. The multitude responds to both and can go either way, absorbing the shocks or multiplying the fractures that will occur in unpredictable ways. (Lotringer, 2004: 18)
The multitude is an individualisation of the universal and generic, the people and the state, and to a certain extent defies any clear distinction between the private and the public (Virno, 2011: 28, 30–31), therefore, both opening up for commons-based peer production and a deepening commodification. The communist potential that is (re)produced and exploited by capital today is the radical individualism that is inscribed in the communist motto: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need, with more horizontal, flexible and creative and immaterial (non-tangible) modes of producing within post-Fordist capitalism. This potential is part of processes that also could function as a vaccine against the transcendence of capitalism (that would involve a real emancipation with accentuated horizontal, flexible and free forms of creativity). But the communist potential in today’s creative labour can also be part of contemporary processes that strengthen the incentive and potential to go beyond capitalism, which in the case of peer production translates into a self-confident understanding as a socially necessary and more fully emancipatory mode of production outside of capital.
Peer Production Projects (PPP) that want to succeed in imposing value programmes could either continue to collect money through crowdfunding of donations and strategic use of wage labour, or go forward with expanding the voluntary and unpaid activities as socially or commonsly necessary activities to new sectors in society. The problem with the second alternative is that the peer producers cannot secure their livelihood as such under capitalism, and it risks functioning as a useful complement for capitalism to exploit. Pragmatically the first alternative seems to be a necessary precondition for the second alternative: capitalism of communism (or commons) paves the way for communism or commonwealth.
The crucial question for peer production to succeed in becoming socially necessary is whether it simultaneously can become a resilient and increasingly independent social power. Making a strategic pact with capitalism, combining voluntary work with wage work within commons-based peer production, makes it easier for peer producers to secure their livelihood, at the same time as it could foster views of the project as socially necessary (with more obligations and rights), albeit in a capitalist sense. But alliances with abstract labour also risk harming the alternative mode of producing of the PPPs, and deepening the commodification of the alternative. The social necessity of peer production could risk being informed, controlled and exploited by capital. Capitalism’s value form structures the sphere of production, as well as that of distribution. Capitalism’s historically particular form of labour has an abstract form that can be measured by the amount of socially necessary labour time. It introduces a social mechanism that dominates the mode of producing use values in a negative way and is uncontrolled by the producers themselves and not in their interest. Abstract labour is characterised by abstract standards and a logic of run-away growth for un-social private or partial economic interests (Postone, 1993: 17, 45-68, 312, 314). Postone’s claim that abstract labour transforms the mode of producing of concrete labour must be remembered when making tactical pacts.
In the case of Swedish Wikipedia, it can be argued that the editing community takes into careful consideration the trade-offs involved in using wage labour, being against wage labour within the editing process that is paid for by the Wikimedia Foundation, but accepting professionals from different state agencies to be involved in it, as well as consenting to commercial editing that is not blatantly partial (Lund 2015a, b).
The concept of being socially necessary comes from the Marxian theory of value and it helps us to understand the possibilities and dangers involved in developing tactics and strategies for a successful expansion of peer production’s alternative processes of self-valorisation in society. Marxism tells us about the structural conditions for alternative value struggles under capitalism.
Capital is a process where economic growth has become an end in itself, and where value, understood as a social relation, expresses this growth within the accumulation of capital. People make themselves, their actions and their products exchangeable in these processes (Fleischer, 2012: 22, 25–26). Roswitha Scholz points to the paradox that “individuals of capitalist enterprise” are integrated in a social network at the same time as they are engaged in non-social production where the socialisation is mediated by the market. “[P]eople appear asocial and society appears to be constituted by things, which are mediated by the abstract quantity of value” (Scholz, 2014: 126–127). The result is alienation, but this alienation looks different in the reproductive sphere, which is dissociated from the value production (Scholz, 2014: 127). Fleischer uses the value dissociation theory developed by Scholz to theorise how capital strategically adapts and transforms the value-producing system’s inside and outside.
Value’s growth as a historical process is undistinguishable from the parallel evolution of norms regarding what is not exchangeable. A capitalist society is accordingly a society where this demarcation line between an inside and outside is under constant renegotiation. Some activities are “dissociated” from value (Fleischer, 2012: 25–26).
Scholz contends that value and value dissociation stand in a dialectical relation to each other, but value production occurs on the micro level within the macro field of the value dissociation processes. The patriarchal gender system is active within the dissociation processes and is, thus, central to capitalist value production (Scholz, 2014: 128–129).
Liberal economic doctrines idealise a constant expansion of market logic; neo-classic theory ultimately sees the outside to capitalism as an externality and market failure (without value). The outside is caused by the market, rather than already existing. Fleischer contends instead, based in the Marxist tradition of Wertkritik, that capitalism can never be total in its character (Fleischer, 2012: 25; Lehdonvirta and Castronova, 2014: 143).
Rosa Luxemburg stressed that capitalism needed a “non-capitalist social strata as a market for its surplus value, as a source of supply for its means of production and as a reservoir of labour power for its wage system”, but because of that, all “forms of production based upon a natural economy are of no use to capital” (Luxemburg, 1951: 368). Dependent outsides, rather than independent ones, could serve capital’s purposes. The natural economies that Luxemburg spoke of were self-sufficient and focused on the internal needs of the communities and, thus, did not produce surpluses of any kind. The problem with them from capital’s perspective was the lack of demand for external products and that they were not poised to work in ways that made it possible to acquire them in any reasonable scale. “Capitalism must therefore always and everywhere fight a battle of annihilation against every historical form of natural economy” (Luxemburg, 1951: 368–369).
Capital’s need to transform and shape its outside according to its needs leads to different forms of violence and sometimes (when capital needs an outside to be an inside) to a continuously and ongoing form of what Marx called primitive accumulation. De Angelis and others claims that primitive accumulation has a contemporary and ongoing role where the dissociation of people from the means of production can take many forms (De Angelis, 2008: 28–31). In recent times, David Harvey has pointed out that capital needs new realms of accumulation to ride out its own crises (Fuchs, 2014: 166).
During the 20th Century, the outside to capital gradually became politically empowered. State regulations grew in importance after the Great Depression of the 1930s, the fundamental role of ecology was articulated by the environmental movement in the 1960s, and feminism focused on unpaid reproductive work and its importance for capitalism. Bio-politics and the connected bio-economy are today given more importance in academia than yesterday. Contemporary Marxism is informed by the experiences of these social struggles. But neo-liberal restoration has succeeded, through re-negotiations and struggles around value, non-value, exchange and use value, in creating new demarcation lines between the substantial and formal economy. Markets with their conflict-ridden and crises-prone developments have expanded, and earlier outsides have been manipulated and transformed into insides.
Luxemburg’s notion of non-dependent natural economies outside of capital provides a more dynamic perspective on peer production than the externality perspective of neoclassical theory. Scholz and Luxemburg enable an understanding of the potential for different political agencies and counter-powers to emerge from the outside of capital. From Scholz’s theories we can take away the importance of expanding the norms of what is not exchangeable, from 20th-Century history we can take the importance of peer production developing strategic alliances with the state, and from Luxemburg the insight that peer production threatens capitalism according to its degree of self-sufficiency as natural economy.
Since the 1970s, the leading segments of the world economy have become increasingly dependent on new information and communication technology (ICT) and a kind of labour organisation emphasising flexibility, decentralised responsibility in work teams, and just-in-time production. Post-modernism and post-structuralism have advanced in academia since the 1980s with an increased interest in the importance of language and culture in the social sciences and humanities. The Frankfurt School’s cultural industry has morphed into something quite different, today often requiring the active communicative participation of people. Autonomist Marxists, influenced by Marx’s writings about a general intellect and Michel Foucault’s thoughts of the growing importance of bio-politics, describe today’s situation in terms of social life being value-producing and productive in itself, within what Paolo Virno has called communism of capital (Virno, 1996, 2004: 110, 2007). The argument assumes that the demarcation line between the substantial and formal economy—between value production and social life—is drawn afterwards in the cases when social life is appropriated by capital (Hardt and Negri, 2009; Negri, 2008: 29).
Fleischer offers a critique of Hardt and Negri’s assumptions that value today is impossible to calculate due to the fact that its sum is the totally qualitative general intellect, meaning that turning the labour force into a commodity no longer plays a decisive role when all social activities can be counted as immaterial (non-tangible) labour; that the exploitation of surplus value no longer occurs in production but afterwards; and that capital, therefore, takes on a parasitic role (Fleischer, 2014a, b). This theory implies that value once was possible to calculate, but Wertkritik assumes that value is a social relation between the commodities and no historical actor has ever been able to measure how much value exists in a commodity, even if value has always been a quantitative relation upheld by the market. The market actors do not care about the amount of labour time being put into the commodity; they care about prices, but in that process they help to “measure” what Marx called abstract labour. Fleischer contends that it becomes harder to claim that capitalism has mutated under post-Fordism with this theoretical point of view (Fleischer, 2014a).
On the other hand, if value is a social relation, and it is not work that constitutes the value, but the social construction (valorisation) in the market between people, this valorisation could take new forms outside of the market, especially within contemporary capitalism’s focus on communication, culture and affects. De Angelis claims the existence of an outside to capital’s valorisations.[4] The outside does not have to be, but can be a fixed place, and does not necessarily have a fixed identity, but the values of the outside are grounded in material practices “for the reproduction of life and its needs”. The alternative value practices include the emergence of discourse, needs and practices of objectivation that are limited in space and time (due to a lack of resources), and phenomena that are unable to “mature into the cyclical time of norm creation” but nevertheless are active social forces (De Angelis, 2007: 32). Therefore, how peer production is looked upon by outsiders (readers and donors of money in the case of Wikipedia), as well as insiders, is important. If peer producers increasingly identify with being socially necessary, the telos of their value practices would contribute to an alternative value programme and the development of proper value struggles.
The interesting thing about autonomist Marxism is that the tradition turns the understanding of the capital relation upside down. It is no longer capital that is the main actor, but rather the working class within cycles of struggles. Desire, play and class composition explain the historical changes of the working class (Negri, 1988: 209–210, 212–214, 218, 220). The cycle of struggle theory gains relevance from the last decade’s developments in cognitive capitalism. Carlo Vercellone maintains that capitalist production’s dependency on the general intellect signals a third step in the history of the division of labour, and enables a direct transition to communism (Vercellone, 2007: 15). The qualitative change in capital’s organic composition due to the general intellect of the social brain turns the subordination of living labour under dead labour (constant capital) upside down. Vercellone calls this “the tendential fall of the capital’s control of the division of labour” (Vercellone, 2007: 18). When intellectual and scientific work becomes the dominant productive force, knowledge re-socialises everything, which eventually becomes an unsustainable problem for capital. The cognitive social worker is still dependent on the wage, but has an autonomy in the immediate labour process that resembles that of the craftsman under an earlier period of labour’s formal subsumption under capital. As a consequence, capitalism can be expected to become more brutal and extra-economic in its operations to maintain control over an increasingly autonomous immediate labour process (Vercellone, 2007: 20–22, 31–32).
The rising independence and strength of some privileged parts of the social worker have consequences for PPPs. It seems plausible that the cognitive type of social worker is drawn to peer production, and that the social worker as peer producer only is indirectly connected to the class system of capitalism. The political-awareness processes within peer production not only stem from capitalism’s class relations, but also from productive activities outside of capitalism. Vercellone’s argument implies an increasingly strengthened position for peer production, as capital becomes more dependent on more independent social workers, free software, open knowledge and open data for its production. Successful PPPs can force capital to find new niches for its value production, but these niches are increasingly found within the activities connected to the general intellect, and are increasingly populated by the cognitive social worker, and could therefore be increasingly harder to control for capital.
Fleischer’s (2014a) critique of understanding non-commodified and unpaid labour force activities as value producing (in a capitalist sense) is important in yet another way. The activities of Facebook users or peer producers would then not strengthen capitalism on a systemic level with the production of new surplus value. This could eventually be a problem for capital.
An undogmatic use of Marxism, combining parts of Wertkritik and autonomist Marxism, helps us to see the contours of a new political and potentially anti-capitalist subject, with knowledge and skills that capital is increasingly dependent on. Emergent forms of more independently organised outsides (PPPs), point to the potential for several simultaneously existing and competing modes of production within historical social formations.
New emerging and anticipatory modes of production can exist outside and in parallel with a hegemonic mode of production. History has shown us that the outside’s modes of production can expand at the expense of the hegemonic mode of production. Mihailo Markovic stresses that the bourgeois revolution that overthrew the aristocracy from political power did so after a long period of capitalist expansion and growth within the feudal economic sector (Markovic, 1991: 542).
There exists a dynamic coexistence of modes of productions before, during and after historical transition processes between different hegemonic modes of production. Raymond Williams saw emerging, dominant and residual cultural systems coexisting in such a dynamic and historical interplay (Williams, 1977: 121–127). These cultural systems or modes of production are in different stages of their development and, therefore, have different forms of influence and power over the totality. Fredric Jameson holds that no historical society has existed in the form of a pure mode of production. Old and residual modes of production have been relegated to dependent positions within the new hegemonic mode of production, together with “anticipatory tendencies which are potentially inconsistent with the existing system but have not yet generated an autonomous space of their own” (Jameson, 1989: 80).
Louis Althusser understands Marx’s concept social formation as a superior concept in relation to the concept of mode of production. Every social formation is a concrete historical society based on a hegemonic mode of production, which means that there always exist at least two modes of production in a social formation. The modes of production that are not hegemonic are dominated and have their origin in earlier social formations or within emerging social formations (Althusser, 2014: 17–18). Althusser held that you had to understand the relation between the dominating and dominated modes of production, which were always antagonistic, if you wanted to understand the relation between productive forces and social relations of production (Althusser, 2014: 20). Often, it is a question of contradictions “between the productive forces of the whole set of modes of production in that social formation, on the one hand, and, on the other, the relations of production of the mode of production currently dominant” (Althusser, 2014: 20).
It is unclear why Althusser maintains that the productive forces of all the modes of production are active, whereas only the social relations of the dominant mode of production are active. This perspective, though not forgetting that it is the social relations of the hegemonic mode of production that dominates the distribution of societal wealth, seems too unilateral and one-sided, but Althusser is also onto something.
In a famous passage, Marx writes that, first, no social order ends without all its productive forces having been developed; second, a higher form of social relations of production never emerges before the material conditions for them are in place or in the process of formation (Marx, 1859). The statement borders on determinism, but only just: the transition occurs when and if all the conditions are realised. Marx also describes necessary conditions, not sufficient condition, and the necessary conditions are constructed in social contexts and in social struggles. The conclusion is that no actual transition period will be without social struggles and conflicts. No matter how gradual, slow and symbiotic the period is to begin with, the later phases of the transition period will see increased conflicts when the social relations of production start to hamper, rather than stimulate the productive forces’ development (Marx, 1859). Vested class interests, social privileges and power relations are involved.
But Marx’s formulation needs to be complemented with a theoretical stress on the politicised struggles between hegemonic and alternative social relations of production in the later phases of the transition period. Althusser’s position could then be revised so that contradictions between all productive forces and social relations of production are involved in the conflicts between dominating and dominated modes of production.
It is, therefore, argued that the emphasis of Williams, Jameson and later Richard Barbrook, with his theory of a cyber-communism slowly superseding capitalism in evolving syntheses of the “gift and commodity” (Barbrook, 2000: 33, 2005), on the synchronous and non-antagonistic interplay between different modes of production in an open and dialectical way within a historical moment or social formation (Jameson, 1989: 81) is only valid outside of, or in the early phases of, an actual transition period between different modes of production.
The Marxist tradition, thus, on the one hand, acknowledges hybrid developments and tactical alliances and, on the other hand, is theoretically clear about the necessary social struggles that at one point will be needed to complete the transition period. This tactical openness regarding coexisting modes of production from different origins, dependencies and strengths, and long-term strategic clear-sightedness has the potential to further empower a P2P movement, where Benkler only talks of coexisting modes of productions, and Bauwens and Kostakis seem to think that capitalism will eventually fade away in an ethical market economy where the corporate and solidarity economy converge, albeit under the political pressure of strong social movements (Benkler, 2006; Kostakis and Bauwens, 2014: 65-68).
In this context, something has to be said about Marxist crisis theory and, after that, it will be time to discuss peer production as an anti-capitalist project.
Marxism contains a tradition of both technological and social determinism. Ernest Mandel thought that dead labour, constant capital’s share of total capital, and therefore the organic composition of capital, increased in the 1970s. According to the theory of value, this results in a depressed rate of profit, and for Mandel capital’s final crisis was coming (Mandel, 1982: 46, 49–50, 59–57; Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 43–44). But, Marx identified many counter-acting factors in relation to the law of the falling rate of profit, and Andrew Kliman has convincingly argued that the regular crises of capitalism will not necessarily result in a final crisis. It is not only profit that decides the rate of profit, but also the amount of capital value being advanced, which, in turn, depends on how much capital value was destroyed in the last crisis. The peak of the rate of profit that follows a crisis is likely higher than the prior peak and more frequent crises leave less time for the law to work (Kliman, 2012: 25).
There is, thus, no predetermined end to capitalism, but many recurrent crises. Capital’s expansion outside of the factory walls, understood as the expansion of the capital relation into social life’s virtuosic social interactions, also counteracts an increase in the organic composition (Dyer-Witheford, 1999: 45). Social life, affects and communication are today the outsides, together with the recurrent crises, that inhibit capital’s final crisis.
This Marxian framework generates crucial questions regarding how an organised outside to value production can coexist and increasingly influence a capitalism recurrently in crisis with a constant need to commodify the digital sphere that is increasingly mediating contemporary social life. Clashes seem inevitable in the future, especially if peer producers should self-valorise themselves and their project as socially necessary, but the forms of conflicts remain an open question and the radicalisation of peer producers could be tempered by the fact that digital goods do not cease to exist freely even if they become commodities in another context.
Peer production projects can be, and have been, analysed as a variety of the autonomist Marxists’ idea of an exodus from capitalist society (Virno, 1996a; Söderberg, 2008). But the exodus perspective was weakly represented in a study of Swedish Wikipedia. The encyclopaedia was understood by several informants as an oasis of trustworthy and ad-free information and knowledge. But, more than inspiring a critique of capitalism, the strong ideological positions in the study stressed Wikipedia’s potential to improve life within capitalism with its neutral information. And regarding peer production being a challenger of capitalism, the study concluded that the identified ideological formation capitalism of communism attributed strength and a higher productivity to Wikipedia compared with capitalism and, thus, raised the issue of outcompeting capitalism, but that it was the weakest and most latent of three ideological formations that were identified (Lund, 2015a).
On the other hand, struggles against the market’s normalisation processes often give capital energy and pulse. De Angelis names it “the claustrophobic dialectic that needs to be overcome”: exoduses, lines of flights, emergences and ruptures with norms and values are moments of creative acts that are taken back to the measure of capital under capitalism (De Angelis, 2007: 3). Thus, not all struggles against capitalism have progressive results.
We are, therefore, confronted with a situation where peer production’s relation to a crises-prone capitalism could lead to conflicts, and necessarily will do so if an actual transition period is embarked upon, but where, simultaneously, not all struggles are progressive in their results. Here, time is of crucial importance. The P2P movement’s downplaying of antagonism could hold some strategic value in the short run, especially as long as capital’s co-optation processes cannot be counteracted. But Marxism’s more antagonistic view, on the relation between capitalism’s inside and outside, will likely be of crucial importance in the medium and long run of things. The political tactic and strategy would also have to adapt to different PPPs in different sectors of the political economy. A different tactic could be needed in relation to peer production within FOSS, which is placed in a central sector of cognitive capitalism, whereas encyclopaedias are not. Today 40% of all developers within FOSS are paid wages (Dafermos and Söderberg, 2009: 60, 63–64; Bauwens, 2009: 123–124) and open licences, rather than copyleft licences, are often used, which calls for a more critical approach taking the increasingly socially necessary function of free and open software programming seriously before its existence and development as an alternative is stalled, rather than radicalised.
In the case of Wikipedia, the exodus to capital’s organised outside in the form of peer production can gain further strength if it does not—for now—take on a fully anti-capitalist approach. Non-commercial PPPs, predominantly financed by popular donations and administered by non-profit foundations, offer a livelihood under capitalism when they employ people. These projects increase the resilience of both peer production and peer producers, without contributing to value production, and foster attitudes and self-valorisations of peer producers as being socially necessary (in a capitalist sense). But importantly, the financial model, with many small and popular donations, comes with a twist. It requires some kind of non-commerciality for the donations to keep coming (Lund and Venäläinen, 2016). Such PPPs cannot exclusively rely on wage labour; there has to be voluntary and unpaid production going on. The challenge for peer production projects will be to keep attracting voluntary newcomers at the same time as they employ the right numbers of people for the strategically best functions.[5]
Following Postone’s (Postone, 1993: 17, 45-68, 312, 314) critique of abstract wage labour, peer production has to handle wage labour with care, scepticism, and within an overall perspective of abolishing it at some point. Peer production as an employer turns the inside of capital—the capital relation—into an instrument for strengthening an outside of only use-value production, but the strategy has its clear limits. Wage labour within peer production is parasitic and dependent on capital’s value production and it is, therefore, negatively affected by its crises.
A hybrid strategy alternating between copyleft licences and the peer production licences (PPL) that Bauwens and Kostakis suggest to prevent the Linux commons from becoming a “company commons” (Bauwens and Kostakis, 2014: 356–357) could give both flexibility and optimise the resilience of peer production. PPL regulates that PPPs get paid for their products by commercial actors, whereas they give them for free to peers in associated co-operatives, like Kleiner’s venture communes (Kleiner, 2010). Such a strategy would help in creating an economic buffer without direct connection to capital’s financial system.
But Bauwens and Kostakis’ proclaimed paradox that a communist sharing licence without restrictions on sharing results in an accentuated capitalist practice (Bauwens and Kostakis, 2014: 357) is only partly true. The copyleft licence does have restrictions and demands that commercial actors share derivative commercial products freely. This virus character of the copyleft licence can potentially be used as an offensive tool for a commonification of capitalism. In this process, it could try to turn liberalism’s positive notion of competition against capitalism itself, implying that open knowledge creates better competition and markets, meanwhile strengthening the commons.
Having said this, it is true that the copyleft licence is seldom practically implemented in relation to capital interests. Wikipedians do not prioritise controlling whether commercial actors comply with the licence and open up derivative commercial products (Lund, 2015a). The reason for not totally letting go of the copyleft licence is the risk that the strategy proposed by Bauwens and Kostakis (2014: 358) fails to expand the counter-economy, at the same time as the virus character of the copyleft licence cannot be used or politicised. For the time being, this calls for a mixed approach and strategy.
Finally, peer production alone cannot make a social revolution. Peer production can be understood as commons-based communistic islands, rather than Hardt and Negri’s ubiquitously present “common”, and it does not exist everywhere in society and will require a social revolution to become generalised. Alliances have to be struck between anti-capitalist activists, hackers and peer producers (Rigi, 2013: 404, 412–414). Alliances could also be struck with the remnants of the welfare state and different forms of co-operatives.
A wider social anthropological perspective and Marxist frame give contours to peer production’s potential as an anti-capitalist social power. In this, they strengthen the P2P movement’s positive view of the externalities but also add realism to the struggles that lie ahead for a peer production that actually challenges capitalism.
The Marxian concept of being socially necessary helps the P2P movement to identify the possibilities and dangers involved in expanding peer production’s alternative processes of self-valorisation in society. With a pragmatic strategy, involving wage labour, the resilience and socially necessary character of the peer production (in a capitalist sense) will strengthen, rendering the peer producers more self-aware and in continuation either more radically opposed to or in favour of capital.
Scholz and Luxemburg provide us with a wider understanding of the potential for different political agencies and counter-powers to emerge from the outside of capital. From Scholz’s theories we can take away the importance of expanding the norms of what is not exchangeable, from 20th-Century history we can take the importance of peer production developing strategic alliances with the state, and from Luxemburg the insight that peer production threatens capitalism the more self-sufficient it becomes.
Combining parts of Wertkritik and autonomist Marxism, helps us to see the contours of a new political and potentially anti-capitalist subject, with knowledge and skills that capital is increasingly dependent on. Marxism’s tactically nuanced view of coexisting modes of production supports hybrid strategies alternating between different licences by the P2P movement, but stresses the necessary social struggles involved in actual transition periods, and in relation to capitalism’s recurrent crises—especially if peer producers self-valorise themselves and their project as socially necessary in increasingly independent ways. This theoretical clear-sightedness has the potential to prepare and empower a peer production that will have to show, with each new crisis, that it is more stable, effective and socially resilient than capitalism.
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[1] A concept is needed for activities perceived as socially useful by their producers, but that still have not achieved that status on a social level.
[2] Author’s translation from Swedish.
[3] Commonsly is obviously a play with words. The deeper meaning being that the social could be re-constructed bottom-up through a multitude of commons, and commons-based PPPs forming ever more interacting and encompassing networks in society.
[4] Autonomist Marxist collective and the magazine Endnotes stresses, in opposition to Hardt and Negri, that the labour process that capital claims as its own equals capital’s immediate production process (defined by the capital relation and wage form), and not the entirety of social life (Endnotes 2013, p.100).
[5] Critical theory could do some practical work identifying which alliances with capital serve the ends of peer production (Lund 2015a).
Arwid Lund, Uppsala University
Photo by Mantissa.ca
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]]>Vasilis Kostakis, Senior Researcher at the TTÜ Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance received today the prestigious European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant. Estonian Research Council has confirmed that this year Tallinn University of Technology is the only ERC Starting Grant nominee in Estonia.
Dr. Kostakis will use the €1.1 million ERC Starting Grant for a four-year research project titled “Cosmolocalism” that will advance understanding of the future of work in the age of automation and beyond.
“We will create an interdisciplinary team consisted of three postdoctoral researchers and at least four PhD students. We will utilize our networks with global changemakers, from governments and top-universities such as Harvard, MIT, and ETH Zurich to prominent NGOs such as the Greenpeace or the P2P Foundation, to create awareness of new forms of production that may be more free, fair, and sustainable,” says Kostakis.
“Similarly how a free and open encyclopedia Wikipedia has displaced the Encyclopedia Britannica, the emergence of networked micro-factories are giving rise to new open-source forms of production in the realm of design and manufacturing, ” he says, adding that such spaces can either be makerspaces or other co-working spaces, equipped with local manufacturing technologies, such as 3D printing and CNC machines or traditional low-tech tools and crafts.
What are the sustainability, democratization, and innovation potentialities of these emerging forms of production, is the question Kostakis and his team are looking to answer in the coming years.
“This ERC grant is in symbiosis with university’s TalTechDigital initiative, aimed at developing and deploying digital technologies in teaching and research, but also examining the impact of technology in the broader industrial, economic and social processes. ERC Starting Grant received by Vasilis Kostakis is a significant recognition for TTÜ, and marks a milestone for the 100th anniversary of the university,” says Renno Veinthal, Vice-Rector for Research at Tallinn University of Technology.
According to Prof. Erkki Karo, director of the Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance at TTÜ, an ERC Grant is one of the biggest recognitions for a scientist in Europe. The Starting Grants are highly competitive, with 3170 applications and 403 successful projects funded in 2018, and may be awarded up to 1.5 million euros for a period of 5 years, allowing young scholars to concentrate on their groundbreaking research.
“Vasilis Kostakis started his research journey ten years ago as an MA and then PhD student at Ragnar Nurkse Department. Despite his rather short academic career, Dr. Kostakis has built an impressive research community around his visionary research on governance of P2P technologies that reaches from TalTech to Harvard and engages the global P2P community,” says Karo.
“We are sure that his ERC Grant will have a global impact by proposing a more sustainable future for our technology-infused society,” Karo adds.
Dr. Vasilis Kostakis obtained his PhD and MA degrees at Tallinn University of Technology (TTÜ). He works as a Senior Researcher at the TTÜ Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance and is also a Faculty Associate at Harvard University, Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society.
In addition to his academic papers and books, Kostakis has written popular science articles for major outlets, such as the Harvard Business Review and Aeon.
The Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance (RND) at Tallinn University of Technology is one of the largest public administration and innovation research centers in the Baltic Sea region. Four RND faculty members have received the National Research Award of the Republic of Estonia in the field of social science: Wolfgang Drechsler, Rainer Kattel, Tiina Randma-Liiv and Ringa Raudla.
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]]>Critical approaches to the smart city concept are used to begin highlighting the promises of makerspaces, that is to say, those emerging urban sites that promote sharing practices; exercise community-based forms of governance; and utilize local manufacturing technologies. A bird’s-eye-view of the history of makerspaces is provided tracing their roots back to the hacker movement. Drawing from secondary sources, their community-building, learning and innovation potential is briefly discussed. Makerspaces, this essay argues, can serve as hubs and vehicles for citizen-driven transformation and, thus, play a key part in a more inclusive, participatory and commons-oriented vision of the smart city.
Urbanization is a trend of our times, with the largest share of the human population globally living in cities; a trend that is only increasing. Cities are economic centers that through the consumption of massive resources lead to heavy environmental impact as well as to social contestations and conflicts. This creates the need for new conceptualizations for a city that will be able to deal with the current issues in more imaginative, inclusive and sustainable ways.
In this paper, critical approaches to the smart city concept are used to begin highlighting the promises of emerging urban sites that promote sharing practices and commons-based peer production.
In light of the rise of the collaborative commons, i.e., shared resources, the concept of urban “makerspaces” is discussed. The latter are community-led, open spaces where individuals share resources and meet on a regular basis to collaboratively engage in creative commons-oriented projects, usually utilizing open source software and hardware technologies. Through the intersection of digital technologies and urban life, several initiatives have emerged that attempt to circumvent the dependence on private firms or governments to provide solutions.
What is the community-building, learning and innovation potential of makerspaces towards a more inclusive, commons-oriented smart city?
Makerspaces can be viewed as community-run hubs that connect citizens not only of the same city but also of other cities worldwide. Approximately 66% of the UK-based makerspaces collaborate with other UK-based or foreign makerspaces on a regular basis, while 46% contribute to commons-oriented, open source projects which normally have a global orientation. Yet, individuals are more engaged and committed to one local makerspace. Further, two of the top reasons people use makerspaces are socializing and learning. Hence, makerspaces can be platforms that cultivate relationships and networks, building social capital, i.e., “social networks and the attendant norms of trust and reciprocity”.
However, claims around the potentialities of makerspaces are still speculative and depend on how individuals associate with such places. While makerspaces have been built in ethnically and geographically diverse environments, there is yet a lack of racial and gender diversity within many of them. For instance, membership is predominantly male in 80% of UK makerspaces and 77% of China’s makers are male. Additionally, 81% of U.S. makers are male with an average income of $106,000. These are indications that participation in the maker movement is heavily dominated by affluent men.
As an attempt to correct this lack of diversity, some feminist and people of color-led makerspaces have emerged, such as Mz Baltazar’s Laboratory in Vienna and Mothership Hackermoms in Berkley (feminist spaces created in 2008 and 2012 respectively) or Liberating Ourselves Locally in Oakland (a “people of color-led” space created in 2012). However, such strategies have been met with controversy, since they are deemed to go against the principle of openness.
The learning potential of making coupled with open learning environments; project-based learning; informal tinkering; and peer collaboration can motivate the social learning and personalized involvement of participants. Makerspaces exhibit the aforementioned characteristics and, thus, show great promise as emerging learning hubs. That is why makerspaces have recently generated much interest in diverse educational circles. For example, several libraries and museums have created spaces with the aim to empower creative activity, resource-sharing, and active engagement with making, materials, processes, and ideas in relation to their collections and exhibits.
It appears that makerspaces offer the capacity for informal community activity as well as a proper learning environment with a focus on productive processes rather than skill-set building. Varying activities may be combined (like programming and hardware building and even manufacturing tools development), following the approach of constructionism.
Nevertheless, inclusivity and participation in such educational activities is not assured. Although more than 50% of UK makerspaces offer support, courses and tool inductions, the majority of makers are well-educated and technologically-confident. Likewise, 97% of makers in the U.S. have attended or graduated from college, while 80% say they have post-graduate education. Thus, to facilitate learning for diverse users, makerspaces should be staffed by qualified educators who are knowledgeable about theories of teaching and learning as well as about user needs and behaviors.
In makerspaces people innovate and learn together by making things and using the Web to globally connect and share designs, tutorials and code. They offer creative environments where sustainable entrepreneurs, potentially with diverse motives and backgrounds, can meet and interact and thus benefit from synergies and the cross-pollination of ideas. Moreover, in makerspaces designers can come together and collaborate in participatory explorations during the use phase by prototyping, adding small-scale interventions and, therefore, moving from a “design-in-the-studio” to a “design-in-use” strategy.
Several innovative entrepreneurial endeavors and start-ups have emerged through makerspaces. This article refers to some prominent cases with the aim to provide an overview of the most mature examples that cover a wide spectrum of areas, from ICT and local manufacturing technologies to farming, culture and neuroscience.
In all, makerspaces should not be viewed merely as experimentation sites with local manufacturing technologies but as places “where people are experimenting with new ideas about the relationships amongst corporations, designers, and consumers”. The review of makerspaces-related innovation illustrated that they mainly produce user-led, incremental product and process innovations. Some of the aforementioned projects and eco-systems, such as the RepRap- or Arduino-based eco-systems, may represent both the Schumpeterian and social-oriented understanding of innovation. They seem to create win-win situations for both instigators/entrepreneurs and society, and inaugurate commons-oriented business models which arguably go beyond the classical corporate paradigm and its extractive profit-maximizing practices.
Are makerspaces a manifestation of the “new spirit of capitalism” that has successfully incorporated and adapted several of its various critical cultures? Or could we consider makerspaces as sites with non-negligible post-capitalist dynamics? Both possibilities still exist.
If we subscribe to the idea that at least some makerspaces can be seen as CBPP in practice, then, makerspaces may belong to a new form of capitalism but, at the same time, also highlight ways in which this new form might be transcended. If the dominant discourse of the “smart city” project is aligned with a neoliberal, corporate vision for urban development, then the “makerspace” could simultaneously be a source of legitimacy for the project and also serve as an institution for citizen-driven transformation.
An alternative vision for the smart city may be possible through a commons-oriented approach, geared towards the democratization of means of production. The basic tenet of this approach encourages citizens to participate in creating solutions collectively instead of merely adopting proprietary technology. In addition to virtual connections observed in several sharing economy initiatives, makerspaces can be the physical nodes of a collaborative culture. Further, they can serve as a new “design template”, where knowledge/design is developed and shared as a global digital commons while the actual customized manufacturing takes place locally, thus initiating a decisive break from the current production model.
Full title: “Making (in) the Smart City: The Emergence of Makerspaces”.
Originally published at Telematics & Informatics.
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]]>The new site features four types of materials suited different levels of interest: short Q&A-style articles with illustrations; longer, in-depth articles for the more serious reader; a library of downloaded PDF versions of research publications by the P2P Foundation; and a collection of videos, audio interviews and links to other content.
The website does a great service in introducing topics that are sometimes elusive or abstract, giving them a solid explanation and lots of working examples. Go check it out!
Start with a series of Short Articles that addresses such questions as “What is a commons transition?” and “What is distributed manufacturing?” Then browse the Longer Articles section and read “10 ways to accelerate the Peer to Peer and Commons Economy,” a visionary piece on the movement to design global and manufacture locally.
The Library contains a number of major reports on how to embark upon a commons transition. The organizational study of Catalan Integral Cooperative as a post-capitalist model is fascinating. Check out the new conceptualizations of value in a commons economy, and the two-part report on the impact of peer production on energy use, thermodynamics, and the natural world.
There is also a wonderful overview of some leading commons, especially tech-oriented ones, in a collection of fifteen case studies. These explore such projects as Wikihouse, Farm Hack, L’Atelier Paysan, Mutual Aid Networks, Spain’s Municipalist Coalitions, and the Ghent’s urban commons (in Belgium).
Elena Martinez Vicente has produced a number of fantastic infographics that really help demystify some abstract ideas (the new ecosystem of value creation, patterns of open coops, cosmo-local production). Mercè Moreno Tarrés did the dazzling original art for the site, which helps make the material so engaging.
The Commons Transition Primer was produced by the Peer to Peer Foundation and P2P Labs with support from the Heinrich Boell Foundation. Kudos to Stacco Troncoso and Ann Marie Utratel for conceptualizing the project and preparing much of the material, and to Michel Bauwens and Vasilis Kostakis for their contributions to the text.
The post The Commons Transition Primer Demystifies and Delights appeared first on P2P Foundation.
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