In other words, Ostrom and the commons movement have yet to define the dynamic equilibrium which they seek as the balance between two opposing forces – population and resources – which continually counteract each other. Instead, the commons movement is more focused on counteracting the Market and the State than on measuring the replenishment of renewable and non-renewable resources and managing them to sustain their yield. In short, the commons movement does not seem to be producing alternative indicators for the production and provisioning which can be used to guide policy.

The book, Secular Cycles, made me realize that the commons, as Ostrom viewed it and as others are now envisioning it, is too informal and small-scale to work in a way that establishes empirical targets that will bring down exponential growth to arithmetic growth levels; and thus organizing society according to the dynamic equilibrium between population and the availability of food, water and energy. Instead, what we get in the commons movement is a general opposition to quantitative analysis because it reminds people too much of the metrics of unbridled capitalism.

My point is that if we don’t know how to develop evidence-based policy for a soft landing toward a reasonable level of subsistence — and I’ve seen very little of this in the commons movement — then I don’t know how we expect to create a long-term system for meeting human needs through sustainable yields. I would hope that the commons movement begins to create the basis for a viable new society by actually focusing on the optimum rate at which a resource can be harvested or used without damaging its ability to replenish itself. That would be something.

Let me put this in more structural terms. First, the carrying capacity rate for renewable resources follows a carefully guided policy of maintenance and sustenance to ensure that resources are replenished sustainably in meeting the needs of people in the present. This requires that social policies are made more equitable to ensure that everyone’s needs are met. Meanwhile, the needs of people in the future are in no jeopardy, so long as renewable resources continue to be replenished and provisioned within their carrying capacity. Hence, the carrying capacity rate of renewables is geared toward market coefficients for provisioning resources, goods and services for people at the current time, and will continue to be sustainable far into the future. This carrying capacity rate, based on renewable resources, in no way precludes (in fact, should be accompanied with) the creation of taxes toward a universal basic income and for maintenance of renewable resources.

Second, the carrying capacity rates of non-renewable resources are much more challenging and must be treated very differently. Society must decide scientifically how much non-renewable resources to use in the present and how much to save for the future. By guaranteeing that valuable resources will be ‘left in the ground’ or put away securely into a tamperproof lockbox, as it were, this formula has a benefit which, in one way, is similar to how gold used to function as a guarantee of reserve asset values and as a disciplining measure for currency exchange rates. Since a certain percentage of non-renewables are held in strict reserve for future generations, adherence to this process creates a value which is entirely *independent of the market* and is based on a relative scarcity index of non-renewable resources. This fraction (how much non-renewables to use for people now / how much non-renewables to set aside for people in the future) provides for a fixed and stable monetary rate that is tailor-made for the valuation of currency in the present.

In a society which is facing net energy loss and steep declines in non-renewable resources, this would be an extremely stable, strong, treasured, desired, sacrosanct and entirely non-marketized value. Instead of looking at productivity indices, commodity market rates, price inflation or unemployment indicators, monetary economists really ought to be turning their attention to the long-term carrying capacity of the planet’s non-renewables and their sustainability rates. I am in no way suggesting that the world should return to a gold standard; but to generate a system in which currency values are fixed to a meaningful measure of non-renewable resources, similar in some ways to the way that gold used to function. If this is done, the correlation of ecological sustainability with monetary sustainability will become a primary way of steering the world’s economy on a middle path between exponential growth and arithmetic growth, ensuring the sustenance and safely of society during a period of economic decline (originally posted to Facebook, August 2017).

Photo by optick

The post Carrying Capacity as a Basis for Political and Economic Self-Governance Discussion appeared first on P2P Foundation.

Degrowth in Movements: Environmental movement

About the authors and their positions

The authors are either voluntary or full time active in the environmental movement.

Franziska Sperfeld leads projects at the Unabhängigen Institut für Umweltfragen e. V. (UfU) [Independent Institute for Environmental Issues], including projects relating to the development and future of environmental associations. Prof. Kai Niebert is professor for science and sustainability education at the University of Zurich and president of the German League for Nature German League for Nature, Animal and Environment Protection (DNR). Theresa Klostermeyer and Hauke Ebert head projects on environmental and social justice at the DNR.

1. What is the key idea of the environmental movement?

The destruction of nature at the heart of the environmental movement

The roots of the environmental movement lie in the protection and conservation of nature and heritage; it has fought against the consequences of industrialisation since the beginning of the 19th century and was borne out of a romantic concept of nature. Associations such as the Bund für Vogelschutz (Association for the Protection of Birds), the Bund Naturschutz Bayern (Bavarian Association of Nature Conservation) or the NaturFreunde (Friends of Nature) were founded at the turn of the century. During the 1960s, people’s living conditions were also taken into consideration, particularly due to a marked deterioration of natural resources (water, air, ground, etc.). The resulting ‘modern’ environmental movement progressed through six stages:

Historic development of the modern environmental movement; Brand 2008: 219 ff., own addition for the phase from 2007 onwards.

Opposition to nuclear energy has shaped the identity of the environmental movement since the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, environmental NGOs were often associated with an eccentric alternative lifestyle, stylised by shapeless woollen jumpers and wrinkled apples. The ‘modern’ environmental movement has tried to actively distance itself from this view.

Since the sustainability principle was introduced on the back of the Brundtland Report published in 1987, intra- and inter-generational justice have been influencing factors behind the environmental movement. The report Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland (‘Sustainable Germany’) and its follow-up publication, Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland in einer globalisierten Welt (‘Sustainable Germany in a Globalised World’), published by BUND and Misereor, together with Brot für die Welt and the Evangelischen Entwicklungsdienst, shaped the movement’s identity during this time. They were able to break down the concept of sustainability for local applications and personal lifestyles. Both studies described significant concepts that are now understood to be part of the degrowth debate: They outline concepts of ‘dematerialisation’ and ‘self-limitation’, and promote a holistic subsistence strategy while emphasising the living-environment economy. Furthermore, the studies focus on the importance of regional and global public assets as part of shared, responsible use and in contrast with private and state ownership.

Opposition to nuclear energy has shaped the identity of the environmental movement since the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, environmental NGOs were often associated with an eccentric alternative lifestyle, stylised by shapeless woollen jumpers and wrinkled apples. The ‘modern’ environmental movement has tried to actively distance itself from this view.

Since the sustainability principle was introduced on the back of the Brundtland Report published in 1987, intra- and inter-generational justice have been influencing factors behind the environmental movement. The report Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland (‘Sustainable Germany’) and its follow-up publication, Zukunftsfähiges Deutschland in einer globalisierten Welt (‘Sustainable Germany in a Globalised World’), published by BUND and Misereor, together with Brot für die Welt and the Evangelischen Entwicklungsdienst, shaped the movement’s identity during this time. They were able to break down the concept of sustainability for local applications and personal lifestyles. Both studies described significant concepts that are now understood to be part of the degrowth debate: They outline concepts of ‘dematerialisation’ and ‘self-limitation’, and promote a holistic subsistence strategy while emphasising the living-environment economy. Furthermore, the studies focus on the importance of regional and global public assets as part of shared, responsible use and in contrast with private and state ownership.

The sustainability agenda (Agenda 21) agreed by the UN in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 also generated much food for thought and many positive initiatives, both in politics and in practice. However, looking back, we can ask the question whether the sustainability concepts that were set within a global economic system, which focuses on the circulation of goods and consumerism, could ever be expected to be of use.

The latest developments in environmental NGOs highlight one thing in particular: The movement is differentiated and many organisations act in a highly professional manner, which is particularly reflected in their campaigns and ability to mobilise. This is proven by large demonstrations: e.g. 100,000 people campaigning for a nuclear phase-out in 2010; 20,000-50,000 people involved in a campaign over the past six years demanding a new, sustainable agriculture; and 250,000 people supporting the broad coalition between trade unions and critics of globalisation against undemocratic free trade (TTIP). These events also prove the fundamental malaise within society in relation to practices that threaten our existence and the policies that support these practices.

The central focus of the environmental movement continues to be the destruction of natural resources. Thematically, this is now very broadly distributed: from the use of nuclear energy, climate change, loss of biodiversity, resource use, pollution, and consumption patterns. However, the weakness behind this criticism is that it mostly focuses on symptoms of environmental and natural crises, and rarely examines the underlying causes. However, a few organisations have put forward very strong conceptual designs for the transition of society. This does not mean, however, that these designs are well-received and followed within the broader movement.

2. Who is part of the environmental movement, what do they do?

Heterogeneity, differentiation and niches

The environmental movement is heterogeneous in every respect —there is both a plethora of institutional stakeholders and diverse legal forms and structures. Research carried out by the science centre in Berlin in 1998 identified 9200 environmental organisations. Statistics for the year 2014 list 8665 associations related to environmental and nature conservation (see Association statistics 2014). Furthermore, approximately 1800 environmental foundations are currently active in Germany, and this figure is increasing rapidly (see The Federal Association of German Foundations 2009: 5). Statistics relating to other legal forms, such as non-profit LLCs and cooperatives, are unavailable. Furthermore, there are citizens’ initiatives that have no legal status, yet they often deal with topics relating to the environment, nature conservation, traffic and noise, and town planning, and are estimated to have over one million members (see Wolling/Bräuer 2011: 4 f.). This shows that the environmental movement stretches far beyond the large associations with 5.5 million members, even though these associations are the pacesetters and backbone of the movement.

Throughout Germany, there are many significant associations and foundations, including Greenpeace, the Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU—Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union), the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND —Friends of the Earth Germany), the NaturFreunde (Friends of Nature), Robin Wood and the Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH—German Environmental Relief). Many associations organise themselves under the auspices of the Deutscher Naturschutzring (DNR—German League for Nature, Animal and Environment Protection), which they set up together in 1950. Yet, the various organisations within this relatively manageable group are still organised very differently: The WWF acts as a foundation without a member/activist base; Greenpeace is coordinated and controlled internationally by a small group of members but has different groups and campaign teams in different Federal States and cities; NABU and BUND work as campaign and project organisations —both on a Federal level and a communal and regional level, and are also organised democratically throughout the Federal States.

Wildlife sanctuary (Photo: Public Domain, KRiemer )

The different organisation models are an expression of the differentiation in the environmental movement. Thematically speaking, the large organisations cover almost every single question that is associated with the protection of the natural environment and natural resources —yet with different priorities. In contrast, there are smaller organisations that have found a niche within individual themes. As an example, traffic-related matters are covered by Verkehrsclub Deutschland (VCD—Motor Club of Germany) and forestry-related matters are handled by the Schutzgemeinschaft Deutscher Wald—Forest Conservation Society of Germany. As before, traditional nature conservationists form a large part of the environmental movement. With a systematic viewpoint on the environment and sustainability concepts, they have now become a little more modern, however. In addition to traditional nature conservation, modern and pragmatic environmental protection and the political ecology movement have become intertwined. The environmental movement of the 1970s had more of a left-libertarian profile. Nowadays, the movement is also represented by traditionalist-conservative, ecological-capitalist, ecological-socialist and anarchist-libertarian standpoints (see Brand 2008: 231).

It must be mentioned that, although there is a relatively vague common consensus to preserve natural resources within the movement, the reasons for becoming active are highly personal. A large proportion continues to account for personal consternation based on infrastructure developments, or the proverbial ‘love of nature’. This regularly results in friction within the environmental movement in relation to future questions and discussions on societal change, such as discussions on nature conservation versus renewable energy.

3. How do you see the relationship between the environmental movement and degrowth?

Reflecting on our own efficiency as a starting point for determining common pathways?

The environmental movement is increasingly at a loss as to whether it has the right answers to hand for conserving natural resources. This self-criticism is best expressed in the words of a pioneer of the American environmental movement: ‘We have won many victories, but we are losing the planet’ (Speth, 2014). Smart CSOs (2015), an international network of representatives from civic organisations, describes the challenges facing the environmental movement as follows:

• Focus on symptoms rather than causes;
• Professional specialisation on specific topics;
• Adaptation to the system;
• Focus on specific “bogeymen”, hiding the fact that environmental organisations themselves are part of the system;
• Dependence on donors and project funds, which are mostly geared towards short-term goals rather than long-term systematic change;
• The ‘5-before-12 syndrome’, which leaves no time for reflection and neglects the fact that any kind of change and adjustment takes time.

As the environmental movement is very heterogeneous, the economic positions also differ greatly. This does not necessarily manifest itself in policy papers —these are often surprisingly unanimous. However, cooperation with economic partners, business models, thematic focuses, etc., is very diverse. As a consequence, a policy change towards a degrowth society is not seen as a priority throughout the movement. A belief in technical solutions, also known as green growth strategies, is also enshrined in parts of the environmental movement. However, large swathes of the movement are increasingly of the view that it is crucial for the movement to deal with scenarios for a degrowth period as a growth compulsion often initially creates problems relating to environmental destruction, or exacerbates these problems. Many approaches to this problem area were devised, such as ecological farming, an energy and heat transition, calling for a stop in using additional land, etc. Successes in these areas can be traced back to the environmental movement.

As a consequence, there are also impulses from the environmental and nature conservation scene that correspond with the focus of the degrowth movement. Together with trade unions and churches, member organisations of the German League for Nature, Animal and Environment Protection (DNR) therefore drew wider attention to the debate on social-ecological transition during a Transition Congress in 2012; for visitors, the event almost exclusively dealt with institutionally embedded stakeholders. However, it is important to remember that at the fourth Degrowth Conference —held in Leipzig in 2014— there were surprisingly few representatives from established environmental associations, yet there were many young people in attendance. Apparently there is a structural problem here: Due to their character and constitution, environmental associations are seemingly unattractive to the clientele of the degrowth movement, and the environmental association scene is therefore alien to them.

A few smaller and larger projects that promote social-ecological transition have already originated from environmental associations. Many of these projects want to broach the subject of degrowth, to explore it and to make it tangible, or to offer practical support for local groups undergoing the transition. However, there are only a few isolated examples of dedicated, openly expressed criticism of growth in lobbying activities, public outreach work and large campaigns led by federal associations.

BUNDyouth members in front of a ‘free’ shop; BUND Blog City.Country.Happiness. (Photo: Helge Bendl)

The subject of post-growth does not have its origin in the economic and social criticism branch of the environmental movement. It is therefore necessary to seek out alliance partners with the corresponding economic expertise or to forge topic alliances —as was already established at the Transition Congress in 2012 or as part of individual projects. For the degrowth movement in turn, the expertise offered by the environmental movement is worth its weight in gold if detailed concepts are required, such as explaining how sustainable practice can work. Furthermore, larger and smaller environmental organisations alike can use their experience of the political arena, as well as their experience translating difficult matters into manageable routines and understandable messages.

4. Which proposals do they have for each other?

Could the degrowth perspective act as a compass for the environmental movement?

Our market economy functions for only one reason: It is based on permanent exploitation. Either we are exploiting nature by contaminating it with CO2, waste or harmful substances; or we are exploiting people by letting them work for starvation wages; or we act at the expense of people in the future by leaving behind an ecological and social debt the size of a mountain. None of these three variants are viable for the future.

The symptoms of this exploitation system have pointed to several different stakeholders. Exploitation of resources became a problem handled by environmental associations and social injustices of recognition and redistribution were handled by trade unions as well as social associations. This contracting division of responsibilities must be overruled by a systematic approach to environmental problems. The weight behind the environmental movement can be of use since environmental associations were once in a position to initiate large social projects, such as the nuclear phase-out and energy transition. However, they were only successful when they joined forces with other social powers.

So that degrowth is not seen as an elite project for a reduced group of environmentalists, distributing resources fairly is an essential requirement. A wider social majority will only accept change if this change does not result in yet more injustices. This represents the political dimension. We must therefore be united, but we also imperatively need a new language and way of thinking that makes it possible for other social groups to connect with this change. Degrowth, shrinking, negative growth, décroissance —the environmental movement is also seeking a language that makes the transition of the economic system comprehensible. In contrast with successful campaigns led by environmental associations, there are currently too few concrete political or conceptual alternatives. Degrowth does not represent an alternative concept, it simply criticises an existing one. The problem is that as soon as we negate an idea, we unintentionally reinforce it. This is particularly dramatic in the case of growth criticism since the notion of growth is —culturally speaking— positively charged. Up is better than down; more is better than less. Negating these ideas creates fear, particularly among those who already feel left behind.

The environmental movement was founded on the basis of preventing anything worse from happening and to offset existing environmental damage. In this sense, the movement has acted educationally for a long time. But it now needs to successfully undergo two transitions to become systematically effective: It must become an agenda-setting movement and it must consider the entire society. To do so, the movement must know where it wants to see Germany, Europe and the state of the planet in ten, twenty or even fifty years’ time.

The environmental movement urgently needs a compass that points to those activities that support the introduction of systematic change. There are therefore several opportunities waiting to be seized by the environmental movement by following the growth critique: Degrowth has a mission statement and could therefore further crystallise the sustainability triangle —based on economy, society and environment— and the very vague notion of a great transition. This means that the topic of distributive justice, which has been left ignored for a long time now, and questions of social participation could be combined. This would give rise to an important, macrosocial discourse and also has the potential to make the lifestyle attempts of the environmental movement attractive, liveable and financially viable for many more people.

The fractures within the change are a significant acid test for the environmental movement, particularly in the case of the energy transition. Certain renowned conservationists, for example, have publicly declared that they are leaving large environmental associations to found their own monothematic associations for nature conservation, as they no longer feel there is a balance between nature conservation and environmentally friendly energy production. Here, it is clear how it makes (excessive) demands on some people that one cannot be allowed to play out against the other with the aim of using limited planetary resources sustainably. The degrowth movement calling for more sufficiency could have a unifying effect here. Because not every kilowatt hour from coal-fired electricity nor every barrel of oil that is used today can and should be replaced by wind turbines and more bioethanol in the future at the expense of people and nature. In some parts of the movement, this complexity leads to a defensive stance (‘The only thing that matters is species conservation’), but excessive demands (‘What should we do?’) and appeasement (‘But we’re already doing all that’) can also be seen.

What can now be expected of the environmental movement? While certain organisations have set themselves the task of communicating the social-ecological transition to their members, supporters and donors, others are continuing to follow the well-worn path. A review and readjustment of the work carried out by organisations, large and small, is required: Of the work we are doing, what is transformative? In contrast, what supports an economic system based on growth? In an ideal world, these questions would be contemplated at the beginning. This change of perspective can also change views of your own efficacy and trigger a change in the organisations.

The biggest question still remains: How will degrowth be received from now on within the broader movement? Is it translatable and is it a completely new turning point for the environmental movement as well —beyond academic discussions and nice niche projects that will be accused of tending towards a new, apolitical eco-conservatism?

5. Outlook: Space for visions, suggestions or wishes

The aim? To create a sustainable Anthropocene

The environmental movement has achieved a lot in recent decades: It has increased the number of designated conservation areas in Germany, it has enshrined animal protection as a national objective within the constitution and has successfully phased out nuclear energy. It has managed to turn environmental, nature and animal protection issues into an integral part of the public debate as policies for a better future. At the same time, however, we are experiencing how —as a consequence of unrestricted growth— biodiversity has declined dramatically in Germany; far too much land is being used; and there are still no answers to Peak Oil (the maximum rate of oil extraction), which we have already exceeded. These developments show that we still need —perhaps now more than ever— forward-thinking people in environmental, nature and animal protection. But their task has now changed. Nowadays, it is no longer imperative for them to push for recognition that environmental, nature and animal protection policies have a place in society. Instead, it is more important to transform the movement into an agenda-setting movement and to fight for effective long-term environmental, nature and animal protection. But how can environmental NGOs become an effective agenda-setting power?

In 2016, the Anthropocene Working Group within the International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) found enough evidence to prove that we have left the last interglacial period known as the Holocene and entered the epoch of mankind, the Anthropocene. The official recognition that humans are a geological force —together with the physical impossibility of never-ending growth— could result in a political acceptance of mankind’s responsibility towards the environment. The rapid acceleration of (over)using natural resources is key to people realising their power to both influence the world and to cause destruction: Since the 1950s, all data has shown a sharp increase in the exploitation of natural resources (see Steffen et al, 2015). These trends have only been slightly slowed by smaller and larger economic crises. Environmental, nature and animal protection organisations see this as good grounds to create political pressure to act based on science.

Twelve indicators of the earth’s system—trends from 1750 to 2010; from: Steffen et al, 2015: 87.

However, rapid acceleration also brings another controversial discovery to light: As scientific evidence shows people are having an exponentially increasing influence on the earth’s system, the —somewhat homoeopathic— effect of current policies also becomes clear. Data on the great acceleration clearly shows that current environmental and sustainability policies, which came into effect in the 1970s and gained further momentum at the Earth Summit in Rio at the beginning of the 1990s, would not have made a shred of difference to the level of destruction. Any slow-down in global trends were only ever caused by economic crises: The oil crises in the 1970s, the collapse of the Communist dictatorship in the East and the 2009 financial and economic crisis have all slightly flattened the graphs on resource consumption. The political successes of environmental NGOs associations could, no matter how important they have been locally, not have halted the accelerating rate at which resources have been consumed, and have instead shifted this consumption in time and to a different territory.

The constraints of shaping social development become clear if the influencing stakeholders only seek to organise within their limited disciplines and spheres: in ministries sorted by policy area; in individual associations (on a civil-society level); in individual specialist areas (within science). As a result, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB) is trying to improve the quality of the environment with a budget of €4.6 billion, while the German government is spending €52 billion on subsidies harmful to the environment and climate. As long as a lifestyle that destroys nature and the climate is being subsidised, trying to live a sustainable life is like swimming against the stream. And while environmental scientists are describing planetary boundaries in one lecture hall, they have no influence on the business administration students in the neighbouring lecture hall who are still learning about and teaching growth models. A society that can free itself from its growth compulsion and become sustainable cannot become a reality under these conditions.

To have a chance of success, an alternative, positive concept must be devised —both conceptually and linguistically— that not only speaks to satisfied wealthy classes. To do so, environmental NGOs must realise that a focus on social justice, equality, and the rights of low-income earners is also necessary. We do not need an economy that shrinks, nor do we need negative growth. We need a society, and by extension an economy, that understands that it can escape from being dependent on growth —a society that is grown-up.

We will only achieve this if we also change our notion of sustainability. The environmental movement’s greatest mistake was to accept a concept of sustainability where ecology, economy and social issues —in supposed equal balance with each other— can be dealt with separately. But the fact is that environmental and social issues are always ultimately consigned to the sidelines in pursuit of economic growth. To break away from being dependent on growth, we must understand sustainable economy as an economy that serves the people of today and tomorrow, and eliminates hunger and poverty. But that can only happen within our planetary boundaries.

Literature and Links

Links

Movum – Briefe zur Transformation, herausgegeben vom BUND, der Deutschen Umweltstiftung, euronatur, dem Forum Öko-Soziale Marktwirtschaft und dem Deutschen Naturschutzring
Stadt.Land.Glück – Blog des BUND über Projekte zur kommunalen Suffizienzpolitik
WELTbewusst erLEBEN – konsumkritische Stadtführungen von Jugendlichen für Jugendliche (BUNDjugend)
Beweg:günde – Wanderungen zu Orten des sozial-ökologischen Wandels (Naturfreundejugend und BUNDjugend)
Portal zur ökologischen Gerechtigkeit/Lust auf Zukunft – Vernetzungsportal von Projekten für sozial-ökologische Gerechtigkeit und Transformation (Deutscher Naturschutzring)
Freiraumeroberung – Projekt zu interkulturellen Aspekten einer sozial-ökologischen Transformation (NaturFreundejugend und Aleviten)
Greenpeace: Wachstums-AG und Wachstumspalaver – Thesenpapier mit Konsequenzen für die eigene Arbeit und Checkliste für Kampagnen, Positionierungen und Veränderungen bei GP selbst (S. 13)

Degrowth is not only a label for an ongoing discussion on alternatives, and not just an academic debate, but also an emerging social movement. Regardless of many similarities, there is quite some lack of knowledge as well as scepticism, prejudice and misunderstanding about the different perspectives, assumptions, traditions, strategies and protagonists both within degrowth circles as well as within other social movements. Here, space for learning emerges – also to avoid the danger of repeating mistakes and pitfalls of other social movements.

At the same time, degrowth is a perspective or a proposal which is or can become an integral part of other perspectives and social movements. The integration of alternatives, which are discussed under the discursive roof of degrowth, into other perspectives often fails because of the above mentioned scepticisms, prejudices and misunderstandings.

The multi-media project “Degrowth in movement(s)” shows which initiatives and movements develop and practice social, ecological and democratic alternatives. Representatives from 32 different fields describe their work and history, their similarities & differences to others and possible alliances. From the Solidarity Economy to the Refugee-Movement, from Unconditional Basic Income to the Anti-Coal-Movement, from Care Revolution to the Trade Unions – they discuss their relationship to degrowth in texts, videos, photos and podcasts.

The project was run by the “Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie” (Laboratory for New Economic Ideas) in Germany, so most of the authors are from there. However, there are a couple of clearly international perspectives and most of the movements work far beyond the national level.

The post Degrowth in Movements: Environmental movement (NGOs) appeared first on P2P Foundation.

First of all came the voluntary, politically and ecologically motivated pioneers, who made it politically viable to introduce the second factor, without which it would have stalled or remained a niche.

The second factor is the regulation that permitted feed-in tariffs, which created a safe market to recuperate investments, which was the third factor.

This combination made the enduring success, while in other countries, where such policies and favourable market conditions were not present, the transition stagnated or even regressed.

Report: Diversity is Strength. The German Energiewende as a Resilient Alternative.

By Tadzio Mueller. Source Network /New Economics Foundation / Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2017

Extract:

The Energiewende and its institutions

Social movements, it has been argued since their heyday in the late 1960s, are actors, or maybe processes, that expand the limits of the possible, that bring ‘the new’ into the world, precisely because they emerge around problematics that the existing set of social and political institutions cannot find solutions for. At the same time, it is precisely this quality of bringing the new into the world that also brings with it one of the key problems of a politics based in movement(s): how do the gains of social movements become generalised and permanent? It is hard, in fact impossible, to constantly stay mobilised. The German anti-Nuclear movement, for example, fought long and hard against any new nuclear power installation in the country. But nobody can stay in the streets forever, so at some point, it becomes necessary to institutionalise movement gains. It is here where movements often fail – and where, for a variety of reasons, the German Energiewende did not fail. It is therefore to the institutionality of the process we now turn. I will argue that its remarkable dynamism and resilience are the result of a peculiar combination of local movement processes and national legislation, and of an unusual combination of political and economic logics. It is what it is not because of the basis of a particular purity, but because it lives by an open logic of articulation.

Diversity is Strength by Tadzio Mueller, as recommended and curated by P2P Foundation on Scribd

Photo by Windwärts Energie

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Global Resistance to Fossil-Fuelled Capitalism

1. What is the key idea of the climate justice movement?

We are not all in the same boat: The climate crisis as a crisis of justice

What is climate change about? First and foremost, justice! The best symbol for this process is not the sad polar bear, but New Orleans destroyed by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. There, the majority of the wealthy white population succeeded in fleeing from the floods and the ensuing chaos, because they (for the most part) owned their own cars, which they could use to leave the city. The mostly poor black population largely remained behind, and was subjected to the government’s incompetent and repressive disaster management for several weeks. Burned into our minds are images of African-Americans, standing on rooftops, signalling to the helicopters flying over the city that they need help —and yet being wantonly ignored.

Black inhabitants of New Orleans call for help after hurricane Katrina while securing themselves on the roof of their house. (Image: World Socialist Web Site)

We often think of ourselves as being all in the proverbial ‘same boat’. Unfortunately, this is not true. If we are all in the same boat —let’s say, the (space)ship Earth— then there are several classes on this ship, and in the event of an accident, the lower decks are flooded first. And just like on the Titanic, there are lifeboats available for those who can afford them. Another example is rising sea levels. They are rising for everyone, but in Bangladesh people are being flooded, while in Holland floating cities are being built with resources accumulated there while using the global environment as a dump, all without a second thought.

In summary: On average, those who have contributed least to climate change suffer the most, while those who have contributed most suffer the least. The latter usually have sufficient resources to protect themselves from the effects of climate change. They have accumulated these resources, this wealth, precisely through those activities that have driven climate change. This central fact, which, by the way, applies to almost all so-called ‘environmental crises’, is perhaps best described as ‘climate injustice’. That is why the call for mere climate protection does not go far enough. What we need is climate justice.
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2. Who is part of the climate justice movement, what do they do?

From the environmental justice movement to the climate justice movement

In order to understand the demands and requirements of the climate justice movement, it is worth taking a look at the history of social struggles, in particular the emergence of the environmental movement in the USA in the 1960s, which was first and foremost a movement of the white middle class for the white middle class. It originated in relatively privileged ‘white’ city districts and towns, and fought to keep these communities free from air pollution and to prevent the inhabitants’ children from being poisoned by chemical plants and power plants. As understandable as these demands were, they had a regrettable effect. Instead of such plants being closed down, they were simply moved; from the richer communities to the poorer ones, populated mostly by African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans and other marginalised groups. The struggles of the liberal environmental movement did not lead to the solution of the problems they had criticised — instead, they were simply shifted a few steps further down the ladder of social power.

The fight for environmental justice is a fight for your own life. Material from the website “beautiful solutions”. (Image: Wake Forest University)

Resistance to environmental and climate racism

The communities of colour, suddenly oppressed by a whole range of polluting industries, did not merely become passive victims. Instead, they organised themselves, accused the environmental movement of ‘environmental racism’, and began their own movement for environmental justice. Analytically, this means: If apparent environmental problems are not seen as social problems, if there is no awareness of how a single polluting factory is embedded in broader social structures of domination and exploitation, not only are these problems impossible to solve, but existing social inequalities will be exacerbated.

In the 1980s, as the debate on climate change began to gain momentum, the idea developed that the problem was above all technical —that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere had to be reduced and eliminated through certain mechanisms. In the 1990s, this in turn facilitated the development of so-called market mechanisms to combat climate change. Without opening up the entire critical debate on these impressively ineffective environmental policy tools (Altvater/Brunnengräber 2007; Moreno/Speich Chassé/Fuhr 2015), they are based on a technical logic that does not take social structures into account; i.e. that because every CO2 particle is the same, it does not matter who saves CO2 where and under what conditions.

In economic terms, it is actually best to save CO2 where it is cheapest, and that is easiest in the global south, where everything is cheaper on average. So, we could give money to development aid organisations to protect forests from deforestation, so as to protect the climate, while we in the global north continue to burn fossil fuels. However, this idea has a huge catch: the forests which were suddenly to be saved from excessive deforestation were often home to indigenous peoples who have excelled at sustainable forest management for thousands of years. And these peoples were threatened by expulsion from their ancestral lands, so-called ‘green grabbing’ (see Heuwieser 2015) through the market mechanisms negotiated in the 1990s as part of the Kyoto Protocol. In the context of these negotiations, the story of environmental justice was once more taken up. In response to the ‘climate racism’ of official climate policy, American activist for indigenous peoples and founder of the Indigenous Environmental Network Tom Goldtooth, who himself comes from the environmental justice movements, for the first time formulated the demand for climate justice. Thus began the fight to construct climate change as a question of human rights and justice.

The next step in the development of the climate justice narrative was the publication of the Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice report (Bruno et. al. 1999). The report focused on fossil fuel energy companies; and instead of suggesting solutions at the individual level (for example, ethical consumption), it focused on major structural transformations. In addition, the struggle for climate justice was quite explicitly described as a global struggle. The report also put forward the movement’s most important policy framework to date, namely a critique of the Kyoto Protocol’s market mechanisms as ‘false solutions’.

This image was made by the Ingham County Health Department in Michigan (USA) and shows topics connected to environmental justice (Image: Jessica Yorko, Environmental Justice Coordinator, Ingham County Health Department)

A global movement for climate justice is created

In Bali in 2002, the organisations that would later become the core of the movement, and articulate the Bali Principles of Climate Justice, met for the first time. In 2004, several groups and networks which had long been working on a critique of market mechanisms in general, and emissions trading in particular, came together in Durban in South Africa and founded the Durban Group for Climate Justice. The final breakthrough came at the 13th Climate Change Conference in Bali in 2007. The aforementioned network of critical organisations provoked an open conflict with the politically more moderate Climate Action Network, whose cosy lobbying strategy had been shown to be something of a flop. One result of this conflict was the founding of the Climate Justice Now! network in 2007. The press release announcing the formation of this new actor articulated a number of claims which still apply to the climate justice movement today. Later translated into a sort of founding manifesto, the press release demanded:

• that fossil fuels be left in the ground, and replaced with investment in suitable, safe, clean and democratic renewable energies;
• the drastic reduction of wasteful overconsumption, especially in the global north, but also in terms of southern elites;
• a massive transfer of funds from North to South, under democratic control, based on the repayment of climate debt (…);
• resource conservation based on human rights and enforced under indigenous land rights, with control of energy, forests, land and water driven by these communities;
• sustainable, small-scale farming and food sovereignty.

To achieve these goals, the movement has made use of a wide range of instruments, from the publication of clever reports and day-to-day political work in communities particularly affected by climate change, through civil disobedience (for example coal mine blockades), to the militant struggles of the Ogoni in the Niger Delta.

In summary: the climate justice movement is a descendant of the environmental justice movement. Like the environmental justice movement, the climate justice movement originated in the global south (see below), and aims to focus less on technical change and more on basic social structures. I would venture the following definition: Climate justice is not so much a state of affairs — e.g. the fair distribution of the costs of a potential solution to the climate crisis— but more a process, namely the process of struggling against the social structures which cause climate injustice. If we heed this broad definition, we can even say that many of the struggles for climate justice are not necessarily being fought under the banner of climate justice, but are represented as struggles for land, water, and other basic needs and human rights.

USA: Indigenous peoples and communities of colour as supporters of resistance

The fact that the climate justice movement arose in the US also structures the way that the project’s social base is viewed. On average, alleged ‘environmental problems’ hit the most socially vulnerable the hardest. In the US, this usually means the communities of colour, among which Native American communities are once again generally the most marginalised. Thee groups designated in the USA and Canada as First Nations see themselves as part of a global indigenous network which is most affected by environmental disasters. In addition to this, they live (on average) in places where the highest biodiversity is concentrated, and their socio-ecological practices —for example, forest use— are highly sustainable. Our survival may also depend on them, as learning from them could mean learning real sustainability. This is why so-called ‘frontline communities’ or ‘affected communities’ (often indigenous communities) are the main supporters of the resistance, the famous ‘revolutionary subject’ of the climate justice movement.

These ‘frontline communities’, often communities of colour in the USA, thus join forces with typically white and/or otherwise privileged ‘allies’ (see Moore/Kahn-Russel 2010). With regard to these activists, we tend to find the social milieus we have been expecting in this part of the world since the emergence of the so-called ‘new social movements’ from 1968 onwards: younger, more mobile, better educated, and often slightly more ‘alternative’ than the social average.

Boreal forests are destroyed by the expansion of Tarsands (Image: Dru Oja Jay, Dominion)

The view of Europe: The role of allies, and differences from the environmental movement

The European wing of the movement, which does not have the US’s tradition of environmental justice struggles to fall back on, and which is dealing with different social structures, is significantly more represented by the white and privileged than the movement in the US. This is quite logical to a certain extent: in the global north, there are simply fewer affected groups or ‘frontline communities’ —with a handful of exceptions, such as the villages in the Lusatia region and the Rhineland which still fall victim to the madness of lignite mines. Most of us act, globally speaking, in the role of allies.

In Europe, the climate justice movement differs from the broader environmental movement in two main elements: firstly, through its conceptual anti-capitalism, including a clear rejection of all varieties of green capitalism (green market economy) (see Müller/Kaufmann 2009); and secondly, through its focus on the tactics of civil disobedience (often mass civil disobedience) and deliberate rule-breaking, in contrast to the more legalistic tactics of traditional environmental organisations. Examples of this type of climate activism in the global north are the civil disobedience campaigns at the climate summits in Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015), but above all sit-ins and blockades of coal power plants and coal mines, airports and other places where climate change is generated. Of the above-mentioned key demands made by the climate justice movement, the central one is: ‘Leave it in the ground!’ —fossil fuels must be left in the ground!

3. How do you see the relationship between the climate justice movement and degrowth?

Climate justice and degrowth: United against fossil capital!

There is a positive, fairly close relationship between the climate justice movement and the degrowth movement, something which should come as no surprise to anyone after the Degrowth Summer School at the Rhineland Climate Camp in 2015. The reason for this is obvious: they have a common enemy, namely the fossil fuel-based energy system.

Protests at the climate summit in Posen/Poznan (Poland) in 2008: Juana Camacho Otero of Friends of the Earth Columbia at the global action day. (Image: Friends of the Earth International)

On the side of the climate justice movement, the argument is quite clear: Climate change, as explained above, is a deeply unjust phenomenon. Behind this are a number of social structures, but the key driver of climate change is an energy system that has been based on fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution. After the COP21 climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009 demonstrated to the climate change movement and its more radical climate justice wing that little should be expected from ‘the powers that be’ in the fight against fossil fuels, they began to focus on local and national energy struggles (see Müller 2012; Bullard/Müller 2011). The core of the climate (justice) movement now consists of fighting for a rapid phasing out of fossil fuels, opposing fracking and the development of gas infrastructure, and campaigning for the development of democratically controlled, largely decentralised renewable energies.

From the perspective of degrowth, the argument is a little more complicated, due to the ‘political polyvalence of the growth-critical paradigm’ (Eversberg / Schmelzer 2016). In other words, there are a wide range of political positions on the degrowth spectrum, some of which are more critical of capitalism than others, and some which concern themselves with environmental issues to a greater or lesser extent. Nevertheless, Eversberg and Schmelzer describe degrowth as having a perspective of transformation which is predominantly ‘critical of capitalism’, and which has abandoned the idea that sustainable development is possible in the context of a capitalist economy. Although there are also non-ecological reasons to be interested in the topic of degrowth, it appears that many people become involved with the issue due to the constantly escalating socio-ecological crises with which we have been confronted in recent years.

And so we come to the crux of the matter: If the post-growth movement is first and foremost about the destruction of our natural resources, then it also has to be about capitalism, because capitalism has an in-built microeconomic compulsion towards infinite growth. The growth dynamics of capitalist production are not explained through oft-cited metrics such as gross domestic product, but through the microeconomic behaviour of individual companies, which are driven by market forces to invest money today in order to make more money tomorrow —companies that don’t achieve this don’t survive. If this is not mere speculation, then the result is the following correlation: money => commodity production => consumption => more money, followed by the re-investment of at least part of this money. Or in summary: M => C => M’. This microeconomic equation represents the general formula for capital, and it expresses the compulsion to act felt by each businessperson every day. From an ecological point of view, this means that this necessary additional daily profit must come from somewhere ‘in nature’. If every day more workers convert more raw materials into commodities by using more energy, then M => C => M’ also means a continuous rise in global resource consumption (see Müller 2014). This is the nature of capitalism.

And capitalism would not have developed in this way, perhaps would never have arisen at all, if it had not entered into a quasi-symbiotic relationship with fossil fuels (coal at that time) in 18th century England (see Malm 2016). I do not believe that a form of capitalism based on renewable energies is impossible, but the capitalism which exists today, and which has already passed several ‘environmental limits’, could never have existed without fossil fuels. Whether we speak of fossil capital or fossil-fuelled capitalism, capitalism is the root of our global need for growth, and its motor runs on fossil fuels —precisely those fossil fuels which are also driving climate change.

4. Which proposals do they have for each other?

Better together: The weaknesses of one are the strengths of the other

Accordingly, the climate justice movement can provide the degrowth movement with something that the latter occasionally lacks: a common, antagonistically structured field of practice. This has nothing to do with the now somewhat tedious question of whether degrowth is a movement or not, given that it has no identifiable opponents. I accept the argument of Eversberg and Schmelzer (2016) that the target of the post-growth movement is not a single sector or institution or external process, but the ‘imperial mode of living’ as a whole, which we in the global north have —at least to a certain extent— internalised. This is not about the academic definition of a movement, which is ultimately irrelevant anyway, but about the motivation of the people involved, and the need to create conflicts so that the movement can develop transformative potential beyond articles in the culture section and niche day-to-day living practices. In 2015, the Ende Gelände campaign brought more than 1,000 people together (and over 4,000 people in 2016!) in an act of mass civil disobedience, namely the peaceful occupation of a lignite mine. This action created a conflict which the campaign then won, thus generating an enormous sense of collective empowerment (see The Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination 2015). It is this collective empowerment that enables the creation of a type of antagonistic identity construction, without which major social transformation is almost certainly impossible.

Ende Gelände activists in the lignite mining region Lusatia claim the democratisation of energy production and much more. Image: CC BY-NC 2.0, Ende Gelände 2016 / Fabian Melber.

In turn, the degrowth movement can offer the climate justice movement something that it lacks: a narrative that will have strong appeal in parts of Europe and the global north. Exhibit 1: The fourth Degrowth Conference succeeded in gathering together approximately 3,000 people in Leipzig, while no other social movement I am aware of can muster more than 2,000 (even in Berlin); I would hazard that a conference on climate justice would find it difficult to attract even 1,000 participants. Doubtless this success is in part due to the amazing work of the organisers. But it is also an indicator that the degrowth narrative is attractive to more than just the ‘usual suspects’ who attend social movement events. (This impression is reinforced by the fact that many of the participants had never been to a social movement conference before.) Exhibit 2: The culturally important (albeit politically somewhat irrelevant) German parliamentary commission of inquiry on ‘Growth, Prosperity, Quality of Life’ from 2011 to 2013 shows that criticism of growth has even ‘infected’ conservative and liberal cultural milieus. Exhibit 3 (from my own experience): When I try to convince my conservative grandfather of the climate justice narrative, and of the fact that the wealth we have accumulated in the global north is —in reality— a great debt that we should return to the global south, he usually ignores me. When I present him with perhaps the central point of degrowth reasoning, namely that you cannot have infinite growth on a finite planet, he is forced to agree. On this basis, we can then start a conversation critiquing capitalism. In this story, my grandfather is representative of many people in the global north who have little interest in ‘climate justice’, but who share the unease that the degrowth movement is able to formulate.

5. Outlook: Space for visions, suggestions or wishes

Strategy, strategy, strategy!

Politically speaking, the climate justice movement reached a new peak in May 2016. In the second round of Ende Gelände, this time held as part of a global campaign entitled Break Free from Fossil Fuels, which led actions against fossil fuels and in favour of energy democracy on five continents, we achieved a number of significant successes. By gathering together approximately 4,000 participants in a highly tactical and strategic act of civil disobedience in the field of climate action, we have set new standards; the level of international participation in the act itself, and the international coordination of the act in the context of the Break Free campaign are reminiscent of the degree of internationalisation which made the alterglobalisation movement so inspiring. More important, however, is the fact that this time we did not remain in the coal mine; instead we reacted to the tactical and political retreat of our opposition from the pit (Vattenfall and the Brandenburg Ministry of Interior) by playing off our political and moral strength and setting up the blockade on the tracks. ‘On the tracks’ here refers to the railway tracks in the Lusatia region that supply the coal-fired Schwarze Pumpe (Black Pump) power station with lignite from three opencast mines. This rail blockade was of prime importance because we in the global north do more damage to the planet through expanding our industrial and service sectors than through primary resource extraction (such as lignite mining): this primarily refers to power plants, factories and server farms, not to gold mines and coal mines.

Start of a group of Ende Gelände activists in 2016. Image: CC BY-NC 2.0, 350.org.

Why am I writing about this at the end of this text? Because this time something happened that very rarely happens in the social movements that I have experienced: They assessed their own strength realistically, and developed tactics and strategies which related this strength realistically to the scale of the challenge. So if I could articulate a wish to both movements (a somewhat strange task, I might add, as for me the two are not unrelated), it would be: Let us plan strategically, let us act wisely, and not merely expressively, because we are few, with scarce resources, and we have an enormous task ahead of us (the abolition of capitalism, saving the climate etc. …). Consequently: strategy, strategy, strategy. Without strategy, it’s all bullshit.

Literature and links

Links

• Ende Gelände
  Socio-ecological restructuring at the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung
  Beautiful Trouble – A Toolbox for Revolution

Applied as well as further literature

Bruno, Kenny; Karliner, Joshua; Brotsky, China 1999. Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice. San Francisco: Transnational Resource and Action Center. Accessed: 11.07.2016. <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=1048>

Dietz, Kristina; Müller, Tadzio; Reuter, Norbert; Wichterich, Christa 2014. Mehr oder weniger? Wachstumskritik von links (Reihe: Materialien). Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. <http://www.rosalux.de/publication/40728/>

Eggers, Dave 2011. Zeitoun. London: Penguin Books.

Elmar Altvater; Achim Brunnengräber (Hrsg.): Ablasshandel gegen Klimawandel? Hamburg: VSA.

Eversberg, Dennis; Schmelzer, Matthias 2016: Über die Selbstproblematisierung zur Kapitalismuskritik. Vier Thesen zur entstehenden Degrowth-Bewegung. Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen 1/2016: 9-17. Access: 11.07.2016. <http://forschungsjournal.de/node/2821>

Focus on the Global South [without year]. What’s missing in the climate talks? Justice! Access: 11.07.2016. <http://focusweb.org/node/1301>

Heuwieser, Magdalena 2015. Grüner Kolonialismus in Honduras. Wien: Promedia-Verlag.

Kaufmann, Stefan; Müller, Tadzio 2009. Grüner Kapitalismus: Krise, Klima und kein Ende des Wachstums. Berlin: Karl Dietz.

Moreno, Camila; Speich Chassé, Daniel; Fuhr, Lili 2015. Carbon Metrics. Global abstractions and ecological epistemicide. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. <https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2015-11-09_carbon_metrics.pdf>

Müller, Tadzio 2012: Von Energiekämpfen, Energiewenden und Energiedemokratie. LuXemburg 1/2012: 6-15. <http://www.zeitschrift-luxemburg.de/von-energiekampfen-energiewenden-und-energiedemokratie/>

Russell, Joshua Kahn; Moore, Hilary 2011: Organizing Cools the Planet: Tools and Reflections on Navigating the Climate Crisis. Oakland: PM Press.

The Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination 2015. Drawing A Line in the Sand: The Movement Victory at Ende Gelände Opens up the Road of Disobedience for Paris. Access: 11.07.2016. <https://labofii.wordpress.com/2015/08/23/drawing-a-line-in-the-sand-the-movement-victory-at-ende-gelande-opens-up-the-road-of-disobedience-for-paris/>

Header-image: 2014 People’s Climate March NYC, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0, Stephen Melkisethian

Author Tadzio Müller was born in 1976 and has been involved in the climate justice movement for a decade, before which he was active in the alterglobalisation movement.

As an activist, his main area of focus is the organisation of mass civil disobedience, for example, the successful Ende Gelände¹ protests. He currently works as an expert on climate justice and energy democracy at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

Degrowth is not only a label for an ongoing discussion on alternatives, and not just an academic debate, but also an emerging social movement. Regardless of many similarities, there is quite some lack of knowledge as well as scepticism, prejudice and misunderstanding about the different perspectives, assumptions, traditions, strategies and protagonists both within degrowth circles as well as within other social movements. Here, space for learning emerges – also to avoid the danger of repeating mistakes and pitfalls of other social movements.

At the same time, degrowth is a perspective or a proposal which is or can become an integral part of other perspectives and social movements. The integration of alternatives, which are discussed under the discursive roof of degrowth, into other perspectives often fails because of the above mentioned skepticisms, prejudices and misunderstandings.

The multi-media project “Degrowth in movement(s)” shows which initiatives and movements develop and practice social, ecological and democratic alternatives. Representatives from 32 different fields describe their work and history, their similarities & differences to others and possible alliances. From the Solidarity Economy to the Refugee-Movement, from Unconditional Basic Income to the Anti-Coal-Movement, from Care Revolution to the Trade Unions – they discuss their relationship to degrowth in texts, videos, photos and podcasts.

The project was run by the “Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie” (Laboratory for New Economic Ideas) in Germany, so most of the authors are from there. However, there are a couple of clearly international perspectives and most of the movements work far beyond the national level.

The post Degrowth in Movements: Climate Justice appeared first on P2P Foundation.

This post is part of our series of articles on the Commons sourced from the Green European Journal Editorial Board. These were published as part of Volume 14 “Finding Common Ground”:

In May 2016 the European Parliament voted on an amendment for the “recognition of energy as a common good” as part of a report about decentralised local production, the “New Deal for Energy Consumers”. While the amendment was voted down by 298 votes to 345 votes, this vote reflects the support of almost half of Europe´s democratic representatives for seeing energy as a common good. The amendment was proposed by the “Commons Intergroup” which is part of the European Parliament´s Intergroup on “Common goods and public services” and is made up of Members of the European Parliament from different parliamentary groups, mainly Greens, the United Left (GUE/NGL), and several Socialists & Democrats Group (S&D) members.

In mid-November of this year, the European Commons Assembly was held in cooperation with that same Commons Intergroup in the European Parliament to promote the establishment of creative institutions and political alternatives, from the local to the European level. In the call for the Assembly, ‘commoners’ from around Europe stated: “We call upon governments, local and national, as well as European Union institutions to facilitate the defence and growth of the commons, to eliminate barriers and enclosures, to open up doors for citizen participation, and to prioritise the common good in all policies.”

The dominant European policy priorities are in stark contrast with the commons perspective – an ethical worldview favouring stewardship, peer-to-peer cooperation, and social and ecological sustainability.

Today, however, the predominant discourses that permeate political discussions in the EU and trump all others are economic growth, competitiveness, and efficiency. The majority of EU policy is focused on macro-economic indicators and the promotion of large commercial actors. Citizens are often uni-dimensionally viewed as entrepreneurs or consumers. For many Europeans and for many global citizens the business of the EU is big business and big member states. There is a growing concern among citizens that decisions affecting the well-being of local communities are often driven by distant centralised institutions with other priorities. In fact, the growing feeling of lack of control is eroding confidence in our political institutions on all levels, often sparking xenophobic and nationalistic movements.

The Commons across Europe

The dominant European policy priorities are in stark contrast with the commons perspective – an ethical worldview favouring stewardship, peer-to-peer cooperation, and social and ecological sustainability. The commons discourse considers people as actors deeply embedded in social relationships, communities, and ecosystems. This holistic perspective also tends to overcome dominant subject-object dualisms and to consider human activity as a part of the larger living bio-physical commons.

Across Europe, more and more people are co-governing and co-creating resources. Whether in small local initiatives or in larger networks, new civic and economic structures are moving beyond the rigid dichotomies of producer and consumer, commercial and non-commercial, state and market, public and private, to construct successful new hybrid projects. The commons use voluntary social collaboration in open networks to generate social-environmental value, in ways that large markets and exclusive private property rights do not and cannot. This enormous value, though it may not be monetised, nonetheless constitutes a significant part of societal well-being in academic research, energy production, nature protection, health, creative sectors, drug development, and digital innovation. However it is largely ignored by EU policymakers and institutions, resulting in the atrophy of such social value-creation or, even worse, its appropriation by large investors and corporations.

Notable examples are community renewable energy, Wikipedia, permaculture, the peer-to-peer collaborative economy, distributed solidarity structures, and open source software. Sometimes local commons initiatives are sparked by the scarcity created by economic crisis, or in response to political powerlessness, or just fuelled by the need for social-ecological connectedness.

The European Union is well placed on many terrains to strengthen, promote, and facilitate commoning activities and commons-based production.

Building the commons encourages EU institutions to take a more holistic ecosystemic approach by combining collaborative, participatory, and egalitarian principles with concrete conditionality in favour of social cohesion and environmental objectives. The moral notion of common goods refers to goods that benefit society as a whole, and are fundamental to people’s lives, regardless of how they are governed. Certain matters will need to be claimed as common goods politically in order to manage them as commons, sustainably, and equitably in terms of participation, access, or use. For instance, natural resources, health services, or useful knowledge, or – like the above example in the European Parliament – decentralised renewable energy.

The European Union’s Responsibility

Due to its central role in policy-making for all the Member States, and its significant funding budget, the European Union is well placed on many terrains to strengthen, promote, and facilitate commoning activities and commons-based production. These initiatives and practices demand more flexible institutional and legal frameworks that at once prevent centralisation of market-power and promote dynamic, collaborative, self-governed civic networking. This includes orienting policy to enhance the blossoming of vibrant and caring local communities. To some degree this also implies stimulating new economic identities, where an individual or group orients their economic activity towards caring for the common good of community and their natural, social, and cultural surroundings, instead of solely towards maximising material interests.

According to a 2015 report published by the European Committee of the Regions, a “commons-based approach means that the actors do not just share a resource but are collaborating to create, produce or regenerate a common resource for a wider public, the community. They are cooperating, they are pooling for the commons”. This means helping people and communities to generate and regenerate urban, cultural, and natural commons as active citizens, producers, designers, creators, care-takers, local organic farmers, and renewable energy promotors. It also means embracing an open knowledge economy while promoting the Internet as a digital commons based on open standards, universal access, flexible copyright rules, decentralised internet infrastructures, and democratic governance.

Knowledge Policies

With regards to policies on knowledge management, the EU puts great emphasis on what one could call the ‘enclosure of knowledge’. This enclosure happens through the expansion of intellectual property protection, both within and outside of Europe by means of trade policies. Aside from potentially spurring innovation and helping European industries, this also results in, for instance, long patent monopolies on medicines and long copyright terms.

The copyright reform discussed in 2016 is of crucial importance to the online information commons. It will determine the boundaries of innovative social value-creation through sharing and collaboration online. Sufficient exceptions and limitations to copyright are essential. For example, allowing for text and data mining would support scientific and academic research. Moreover, assuring the right to link information from one web to another is one of the key characteristics of sharing online.

On the global level, through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the EU tends to defend the enclosure of knowledge, promoting further expansion of intellectual property rights of all kinds, from medicines and broadcast signals, to education materials and climate technologies. To allow for a collaborative knowledge sharing economy, the EU will have to be more open to socially inclusive and flexible business models that are more compatible with both the digital era and the urgent needs of people, in both the North and South.

The EU continues to allow the centralised infrastructures of giant telecom operators and monopolistic internet companies to control and commodify people’s online lives.

The European Commission has made some efforts that recognise the need to share knowledge and embrace the possibilities of the digital age. This is for example reflected in commitments on open access publishing mandate in the context of Research and Development funding, open data in some of its policies, and the exploration of open science. Recently, Members States called for a review of monopoly-extending rules on biomedical knowledge in the area of pharmaceuticals due to concerns over increasingly high medicines prices.

However, these moves towards knowledge sharing remain timid and are not at the centre of EU policy strategies as it remains mostly conformist to the interests of the cultural industries, the pharmaceutical industry, or agribusiness.

The Internet and the Collaborative Economy

The recent establishment of net neutrality in the EU, an essential prerequisite for a free and open internet, marks an important victory. Yet truly promoting an “internet commons” would include supporting a universal infrastructure based on public and community-controlled digital infrastructures. It would need to be structurally disengaged from dominant market positions and include broad non-commercial access to bandwidth in spectrum, and open source software.

In its “Digital Single Market” strategy, the EU continues to allow the centralised infrastructures of giant telecom operators and monopolistic internet companies to control and commodify people’s online lives. This is accompanied by the violation of our personal data for indiscriminate political-economic control, and the general extraction of profit from social interactions and peer to peer activity.

As part of the Digital Single Market strategy the European Commission released its “European Agenda for the Collaborative economy” in June 2016. The Agenda deals with issues of taxation, market liability, contractual agreements, and consumer clarity. However it fails to pay attention to democratic structures, social equity, and ecological health – the cornerstones of community-based peer-to-peer collaborative initiatives that regenerate the commons. In contrast, the EU Agenda seems to welcome – with just a few technical caveats – multinational “collaborative” platforms such as Uber and AirBnB despite their extractive, non-embedded nature and their tendency to undermine national laws that ensure fair competition and protect workers. The motor of a commons-based collaborative economy is not just a consumer seeking to possess or purchase a service. Instead the user is often also a producer and/or is involved in the governance of a collaborative platform that is serving social and environmental needs. The promotion of local platform economies requires a different regulatory approach than that currently taken by the European Commission. It requires an approach that understands and acknowledges the value of localised social relations and self-governed technologies, as well as having clear indicators that frame policy within high social equity and environmental sustainability objectives.

Energy

The EU can be an enlightened voice and a leader on global climate and energy commitments. Yet, while large energy companies are starting to invest in renewable sources, they may not be best suited for alleviating our social-ecological dilemma, primarily because they have little incentive to reduce overall energy consumption or to prioritise the social engagement of local communities in their commercial operations. At the same time, some climate technologies that can play an important role in energy transition are often not shared as quickly with developing countries as they could be. This is again partly due to intellectual property protections and a resistance to sharing know-how. In this conflict, the EU fights to enclose climate technology knowledge within UN forums.

In general, the EU’s energy strategy promotes large gas pipelines, giant energy infrastructures, and modest CO2 reductions. Despite more and more Europeans producing their energy locally or at home, most proposed European market regulations do not promote community controlled or self-produced renewable energy, do not offer financial risk facilities for community based energy, nor do they defend the right to sell electricity to the grid. While EU policy proposals are often unsupportive of feed-in tariffs or flexible grid infrastructures to support local renewables, little is being done to eliminate massive direct or indirect subsidies to large gas, coal, and nuclear projects.

A large part of the EU energy budget could be earmarked for community renewable projects and compatible infrastructures, with broad citizen participation. This would help optimise resilient energy supply costs through more efficient, short, and visible distribution loops while promoting flexible local energy autonomy. With this approach the EU could “commonify” energy as opposed to the current principal strategy of “commodifying” it.

Research & Development and Financing

EU research and innovation policy, such as Horizon 2020, the European Research Council, or public-private partnerships such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative, sadly also continue to allow the privatisation of knowledge generated by EU-financed scientific, technological, and academic projects. Instead, they could try to ensure a fair public return on public investments by mandating conditions such as social licensing, open source research, and open data.

To support the commons in the EU’s funding policies would include earmarking significant parts of EU funding programmes with criteria and indicators that give preference to commons-based economic, environmental, cultural, and research activities.

However, through its Horizon 2020 Research & Development programme the EU already funds important projects: Initiatives working on decentralisation of internet infrastructure, such as ‘DCent’ and ‘Netcoms’, as well as networks of renewable community energy cooperatives, such as RESCOOPS, and urban commons projects like Barcelona’s community wifi, guifi.net. This funding is hugely important and the expansion of such programmes could have a structural impact on our societies. The requirements and procedures for EU financing and grants could be especially adapted to commons-based projects to accommodate matching funds for peer to peer crowdfunding, municipal or community-based risk-sharing, small-scale, self-governed projects, and sliding-scale administrative demands.

Democracy for the Commons

The deep crisis of the EU and the lack of confidence of its citizens in the European project is to a large extent due to the lack of democracy in all its different forms, whether the lack of transparency, the power of corporate lobbies, the unaccountable role of national politicians vis-a-vis Brussels, or the lack of public debate on policies. People need to feel much more connected and have opportunities to engage with EU policy making.

The defence and regeneration of the commons depends on meaningful strengthening of EU participative policy processes, greater institutional and legal responsiveness to local civic communities, and concrete advances in creating transnational citizen collaborative instruments to influence EU policy. This means, for instance, wider political support for new digital tools that render visible EU political decisions and empower citizen opinions on concrete legislation, such as a recent Green pilot programme proposal in the European Parliament.

The European Parliament´s Petitions Committee should be a very important channel for citizen power in favour of the application of EU law in defence of environmental or social standards. Unfortunately, it sorely lacks political backing, visibility, and sufficient resources to respond diligently and responsibly to citizen concerns. The European Citizens Initiative petition process, which was instituted as an instrument for grass-roots transnational citizen legislative proposals has been a near total failure due to a series of byzantine processes, and the lack of political will to take it seriously. These institutions need more support, and at the same time the EU has to significantly invest in the creation of additional and innovative tools & institutions for participatory democracy while supporting civic decision-making on local issues.

Allowing the Potential of the Commons to Flourish

Pivotal choices about the commons are also being made today in EU decisions about agriculture, climate, fishing, transport, international trade, and financial markets, amongst other areas.

The crisis of the EU begs for new, unifying, and constructive narratives that will crowd out the xenophobic populist right with its demands for democracy and sovereignty. The commons narrative with its emphasis on participative democracy, community, ecology, and stewardship could reinvigorate progressive politics and contribute to a better, socially and ecologically sustainable Europe. The logic of the commons is able to give clear guidance on policy, and does not sit within one ideological framework of left or right. It does not pretend to be an answer to all our problems. Yet it gives a clear ethical perspective and helps us to understand what happens when people collectively manage and steward resources without the dominant, centralised roles of either the state or the market.

Overall, EU policy objectives and standpoints contrast strongly with the commons approach. The alignment we do see is in some funding programmes and in the knowledge realm where the dynamics of scientific discovery and knowledge creation make this almost unavoidable. What is needed to favour this shift, in addition to strong social pressure from civil society, is a pro-commons shift in the discourses and political proposals of political forces of change such as the greens, and left and social liberal parties.

Due to the general political and economic power relationship within the EU today one cannot expect a major strategic shift toward commons-based EU policies anytime soon. What can be achieved is a significant enlargement of favourable EU policy environments where commoning activities can more easily take root and flourish.

The Green European Journal, published by the European Green Foundation, has published a very interesting special issue focusing on the urban commons, which we want to specially honour and support by bringing individual attention to several of its contributions. This is our 7th article in the series. It’s a landmark special issue that warrants reading it in full.

Photo by Shohei Hanazaki

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