In yesterday’s submission, Erik Douglas described four pillars of democracy. He here continues his contribution with a focus on the issue of the state in a p2p-inspired society.

1.      Is a State Necessary at all?

I assume a minimal model of the state here, but it is not self-evident whether any kind of state at all is necessary for the P2P paradigm to function, calling into question any endorsement whatsoever.  For example, Kevin Carsons (P2P 147: 10/10/06) advocates eruditely for a species of greenish, decentralized, libertarian anarchism premised on the dynamics of mutualism.  While I am not convinced of the viability of purely stateless societies, at least not when composed of the sort of individuals who predominantly populate the planet today, I will not argue the issue here at length.  However, I would briefly interject two points in response to Carsons’s article:

i.        It is true that, historically, sub-societies of especially disenfranchised “workers” have managed to provide many of the services and functions usually touted as grounds for the existence of a state, but they typically have introduced implicate political structures into their volunteering ranks in the process.  Furthermore, although the effect of the state on such societies is largely negative (e.g., they are “left with only a fraction of their labor-product”), this may in fact help to establish a degree of identity and community, which should not be underestimated in its motivational significance.

ii.       There is a danger in distinguishing between so-called stateless societies and those with governments without paying proper attention to the naturalistic fallacy of conflating categories.  A naturalist or anthropological perspective finds structures in all societies that are at the least analogous to political orders, however diffuse.  There are then normative arguments for different degrees of formal structure to be supernaturally superimposed on the natural order.  These are two kinds of things, and it is important to note how we employ the one in support of the other as well as to be clear about which category characterizes our discourse; in one extreme, all the world is anarchy already, and in another, none of it can ever be.

So, does the P2P society logically endorse the existence of a state?  While I do not sense the verdict is in on this, I suspect that the range of possibilities that are widely endorsed tend to reinforce models of the state emphasizing less over more political concentration of power, infrastructure and authority.  So, I assume a minimalist model of the state for the purposes here.

2.      Non-violence and the State:

Dale Carrico (P2P 147: 10/10/06) contends the origin of the state lies in the need to control the violence which necessarily results from the plurality of the society and its inevitably uneven distribution of wealth.   Following the logic of Max Weber’s influential essay, “Politics as a Vocation,” the state thus achieves a moral monopoly on violence in the interests of the society.  Carrico goes on to point out the problematic that has resulted historically, namely, that frequently the state ceases to serve the general interests of the society, but rather only those of an elite class of individuals.

I concur with Carrico’s analysis, but I take issue with Weber’s conclusion.  In fact, it is not the *state* that should acquire such a monopoly, but rather the *law* – and there is a subtle but important distinction between the two.  The state is composed both formally of the law and materially of some or all individuals belonging to the society, whereas the law in itself is radically impersonal, ideal and symbolic, and the closest in can come to embodiment is in such a document as a constitution.  The origin of the *law* lies very much in the anthropological dawn of our civilization as the supernatural antidote to naturally occurring violence, its primary purpose in fact (cf. Catherine Burton’s article reproduced in P2P 147: 10/10/06).  In this respect, state sanctioned violence results from a perversion of its function as a servant of the law, not creator or even arbiter of the law per se.  Thus, societies which are able to restrain the state from such megalomaniacal misappropriations of function will prosper in a manner consistent and resonant with a P2P principled community – and one way this may be explicitly encouraged is through the avocation of a constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights and outlining an alternative to violent interaction.

3.      Equivocality, Individuals and Status:

The value identified here is that of a basic political equality of participants in a society, but a simultaneous recognition that not all individuals are identical or equally capable. Clay Shirky (P2P 147: 10/10/06) reasonably contends against social orders premised on a distinction of class endowing some individuals (“experts”) more political clout than others.  The context of his discussion pertains to the Wikipedia and its derivative projects, and in particular refuting the logic of proposals to alter the current model of openness in favour of one that is more technocratic in flavour.  What is, however, of particular interest is his proposal rather to augment and supplement current open, egalitarian structures with more exclusive structures reflecting certain kinds of expertise, which may then play a more pedagogic than authoritarian role.  Thus I draw from this the value that all participants should be regarded as equally politically entitled irregardless of their qualifications otherwise (or in 4PoD speak, to which “organizations” they belong), but that such equivalence need not extend to, for example, the composition of advisory groups within a state.  One of several locations where such advisory groups may be of particular relevance and value in a P2P friendly government is the judiciary.

4.      Interdependence and the Ecological Paradigm:

There seems to be at least an implicit sympathy within the P2P movement for more ecological attitudes about the nature of society as part of the society of nature, both outwardly or explicitly in our apparent environmental values, but also implicitly or inwardly with respect to the way we deem human communities to operate best.  Catherine Burton’s article reproduced in P2P 147: 10/10/06 characterizes and personalizes our species as only now approaching a state of maturation, the final of four stages of cultural evolution, which reminds one of “Third Wave” and “information revolution” memes.  The picture she draws is elegant, and while I loosely concur with her on the whole, I find that she is perhaps a little too quick to interpret the anthropological evidence (e.g., amongst early Neolithic agricultural societies “authority also resided in the major religious teachings and the power of the church.” – this is perhaps anachronistic, ambiguous and not so well-established; nor is the manner in which nomadic peoples first made the transition to agrarian economies, which may have been commensurate with the introduction of slavery.) However, her interpretation of the industrial society as highly mechanistic, egoistic and separate from the natural order does ring truer.  Some doubt lingers over her precise characterization of our current fourth stage of development, but I do recognize its roundness and appeal.  Yet, I would also note that there is still a rather profound divide between mind and matter that has not at all been resolved by Einstein’s physics nor by the introduction of ecological theory – what we are at root is something far more mysterious and remarkable than these still rather crude theoretical manifolds intimate.  And by way of this, I would warn always against views that describe us as approaching an end result, whether it is “maturity” or an “End of History.” Nevertheless, I draw from this article a distinct ecological resonance with P2P philosophy.

5.      Functional vs. Innate Self-interest of Individuals and Organizations:

Whether the Hobbesian thesis of cooperative self-interest defines our motivations completely or even primarily is not so well-established anymore, though most P2P thinkers still treat it as a significant factor (myself included).  However, what is perhaps clearer is that organizations or individuals acting in certain official capacities, as defined by their associated functions or teleology, do indeed behave accordingly.  Thus, once an individual dons the hat of the capitalist entrepreneur, it is only natural that they will act according to the logic of Adam Smith.  Similarly, as noted in Mother Jones (and noted in P2P 147: 10/10/06), the company Google – an organization whose function and telos is entirely founded on such principles – when “faced with doing the right thing or doing what is in its best interests, Google has almost always chosen expediency.”  Is this a surprise?  Is it even a surprise that a company which disclaims against acts of “evil” might not only lie, but even derive its motivations for making such a disclaimer solely from its explicitly mandated functions as a company which must maximize its sales in the interests of its shareholders? Thus, while the ultimate nature of human motivation is not obvious, I do draw from this matter the principle that, by and large, when individuals are placed into a particular structure defined by certain functions and norms, they will behave according to this institutional clothing they then wear.

6.      P2P Typology: a Collection of Values

The P2P Typology lists several categories of structures around which to organize communities with various functions.  In particular, for what I term “organizations,” which exist as part of a larger society or ecology, there is an emphasis on models that only involve leaders and incorporate hierarchies temporarily on a case by case basis as pragmatically needed.  The formal models endorsed include: Chaordic Organizations – Characteristics , Consensus , Consent vs. Consensus , Coordination Format , Council Ceremony , Harmonization Governance , Heterarchy , Holacracy , Horizontal Accountability , Leaderless Organizations , Open Organization , Sociocracy.  In addition, certain limited legal frameworks are introduced as legitimate P2P structures, suggesting – at least prima facie – that some basic legal framework generally should be endorsed. Similarly, certain species of copyrights and models of ownership/use privilege are also noted, namely the Creative Commons and General Public License (BTW – one might consider adding the Free Art License as developed by the Libre Society  to the collection).  In any case, the relevant values in the next section derive from these models.

In addition, certain models are advocated for the larger political society in particular: Citizen Dialogue and Deliberation , Commons , Community Assets , Coordination Format , Council Ceremony , Delegative Democracy , Deliberative Democracy , Deliberative Development , Democracy 2.1 , Disaggregated Democracy , Extreme Democracy , Gaian Democracies , Global Microstructures , Global Villages , Glocalized Networks , Inclusive Democracy , Mega-communities , Participatory Democracy Networks.