Executive summary

This report introduces a new institutional framework for a transformative socialist politics: the Public-Common Partnership (PCP).

Whilst the era of new public-private partnerships in the UK has apparently come to an end, more than £199 billion of Public Private Partnership (PPP) payments from the public to the private sphere are due into the 2040s. This accumulation of wealth for the few comes at the cost of deteriorating services for the many. The debt itself serves to foreclose political alternatives by tying the hands of future authorities with ceaseless debt repayments and the further entrenchment of market logic.

The popularity of calls for the nationalisation of utilities or services – such as energy, water, and housing – points to a widespread rejection of the marketisation of essential services. Yet straightforward state ownership through nationalisation or municipalisation, often treated as a panacea, is not the only alternative. As well as questioning when and where centralised ownership is appropriate, we need to think about the institutional forms of ownership and governance that are most appropriate to a radical project of social transformation. What are we trying to achieve, and what institutional forms can help take us there?

Drawing on partial examples such as the co-owned energy company in Wolfhagen, Germany, we provide an outline of what we call a Public-Common Partnership (PCP). PCPs offer an alternative institutional design that moves us beyond the overly simplistic binary of market/state. Instead, they involve co-ownership between appropriate state authorities and a Commoners Association, alongside co-combined governance with a third association of project specific relevant parties such as trade unions and relevant experts. Rather than a mono-cultural institutional form applied indiscriminately PCPs should emerge as an overlapping patchwork of institutions that respond to the peculiarities of the asset concerned, the scale at which the PCP will operate (whether it be city-region wide energy production in Greater Manchester or the commercial activity of a North London market), and the individuals and communities that will act together as commoners.

PCPs can help address challenges of political risk and economic cost, enabling more innovative and “risky” initiatives. However their real strength comes from setting in motion a self-expanding circuit of radical democratic self-governance. The aim of this circuit is to bypass the need for private financing and sidestep the mechanisms through which finance capital exercises its discipline and structures the economy. PCPs will function as a “training in democracy” and help foster a new common-sense understanding of how we relate to one another. They are a method for “taking back control” of the infrastructures and resources that underpin our collective well-being – from food markets to water basins – while increasing our collective ability to fight for the wider structural changes in our society and economy that are so urgently needed – from a reduction in the working week to the implementation of a comprehensive Green New Deal.

This report is aimed at policy makers and social movement actors, both of whom are essential to the implementation of PCPs. Whilst a Left Labour government could dramatically increase the potential for the rollout of PCPs, there is already scope for their implementation by progressive municipalities such as Preston and new city-regions such as the North of Tyne. If these projects are to succeed, however, they will also need the mobilisation of social movements, ranging from housing unions such as ACORN or environmental groups such as Frack Free Lancashire. These movements can help define the problems to be addressed, add pressure to change calculations of political cost, and act as seeds in the formation of the Commons Associations that will drive the creation of PCPs.

DOWNLOAD FULL REPORT HERE

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Written by Dana Brown, Director, The Next System Project. Article reposted from The Next System Project

They are our collective heritage as a species—both those resources which we inherit from previous generations and those which we create—managed in such a way as to preserve shared values and community identity. The commons are the collective resources themselves, and the practice of collective economic production and social cooperation used to steward those resources—as well as the values of equity and fairness that underpin them—is often referred to as commoning. Many resources can be managed as commons (though often there are attempts to privatize or “enclose” many of those same resources). These can include knowledge, urban space, land, blood banks, seed banks, the internet, open source software and much more.

Potential Impact

The commons are pervasive and as such, often go unnoticed. However, their thriving existence alongside forms of private and public ownership provides a framework for understanding and creating social value beyond the confines of conventional economics.

The rich traditions and successes of commoning provide models for how to push back against privatization and enclosure, ensuring common resources are protected for future generations. Meanwhile, political economist Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize-winning work has disproved the enduring “tragedy of the commons” hypothesis that collectively managed natural resources would necessarily be overexploited and destroyed over the long term.

Taxing the private use of common resources, combined with
redistribution or other efforts to formalize “commons trusts” to ensure their sustainable stewardship, could help stem the tide of privatization and extraction. The tax proceeds could be used as a form of reparation to communities that have traditionally borne the brunt of extraction of their common resources, and to restore those resources when depleted.

Transformative Characteristics

Commoning is a generative and “value-making” process that can decommodify land and other resources, and demonstrate that communities can manage them effectively without private control or state governance. It asserts a different “universe of value” and worldview from capitalism and unfettered consumerism, and helps communities break free from the scarcity mindset of capital. “The commons does not compete on p rice or quality, but on cooperation,” says commons activist and author David Bollier. It “‘out-cooperates’ the market … by itself eliciting personal commitment and creativity and encouraging collective responsibility and sustainable practices.”

The commons, and related peer-to-peer production models, offer concrete, replicable, and dynamic frameworks for sustainably managing existing resources and creating new ones. They also offer a model for deciding what not to produce in order to most effectively protect our global common resources.

Examples

WIKIPEDIA

Wikipedia is a form of online knowledge commons, “a multilingual, web-based, free-content encyclopedia project supported by the Wikimedia Foundation and based on a model of openly editable content.” It contains more than 5 million encyclopedia entries (a shared resource), created and edited by its authors and editors (a community) with a set of community-determined content and editing guidelines (rules). Wikipedia displaced once-expensive bound encyclopedias to become one of the world’s largest reference websites, attracting hundreds of millions of unique users per month and engaging over 140,000 active users—a group that anyone with an internet connection can join—in creating and editing content in almost 300 languages.

EL PARQUE DE LA PAPA

Peru’s “potato park” is a community-led conservation project that preserves traditional customs and indigenous rights to the “living library” of genetic information contained in the over 900 varieties of potato found in the Inca Valley region. The native Quechua peoples bred and cultivated these potato varieties for centuries, but biotech and agricultural corporations moved to appropriate the genetic information in the seeds and take commercial control without the consent of the Quechua people. They then forced the Quechua to pay for the seeds their ancestors had worked so hard to breed and protect. Indigenous representatives organized and successfully negotiated the repatriation of the potato varieties and the rights to conserve them in a 32,000-acre potato park. More than 8,000 community members now collectively manage the park  to “promote the cultivation, use and maintenance of diversity of traditional agricultural resources” and to ensure their traditional agricultural resources do not become subject to private intellectual property rights.

Challenges

Most people are not aware of the pervasiveness and enduring nature of the commons and don’t understand commoning as a viable alternative to consumption-driven and competitive economics. The increasing enclosure and privatization of the commons is erasing our collective memory of many enduring commoning practices. For example, control of the majority of the global seed market (a resource once managed as a commons in many communities) is now concentrated in a handful of multinational corporations. Furthermore, scarcity of some common resources may intensify competition for control in the coming years, while others lack adequate infrastructure support and are therefore vulnerable to privatization.  

More Resources

• The Commons Transition Primer:  https://primer.commonstransition.org

• News, analysis and resources on the commons: www.bollier.org

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A new VICE Special Report: The Future of Work premieres April 19 on HBO.

This video has been reposted from the HBO youtube channel.

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Within just three months, 42 councils have signed the pledge – representing over 17 million people between them in the UK  – and more than 34 million in the US, Australia, Canada and Switzerland.

Declaring a climate emergency creates an opportunity to:

1. Involve citizens through citizen’s assemblies and other processes of participation and consultation in setting priorities for ambitious carbon reduction and understanding and engaging with the difficult choices that implies.
2. Create healthier, more resilient and sustainable local communities powered by locally generated low carbon energy, served by affordable and sustainable transport, higher quality and more efficient housing stock and fed by sustainable food and land systems.
3. Un-do business as usual. In a time of cut-backs, reverse costly policies and investments in carbon-intensive infrastructures such as roads or airports and divest council pension funds from fossil fuels.

What does it mean to declare a climate emergency?

For a council to have called a ‘climate emergency’, commonly advanced guidelines say that they must have: used these specific words in a motion or executive decision; they must set a target date to reduce their local climate impacts consistent with the IPCC report; they must set up a working group to report within a short timescale; and they must engage with a cross section of the community.

When in ‘emergency mode’, councils must allocate discretionary funds towards climate action. That includes things such as: educating the community, advocating for action from higher level governments, mitigating and building resilience against the impacts of climate change, and funding or undertaking the planning and research needed to implement full state and national emergency mobilisation.

So far, councils’ pledges and aims have varied enormously. For example: Scarborough council has committed to a target of zero carbon emissions by 2030, and will seek up to £80,000 in funding over two years for a sustainability officer to help achieve their goals. Meanwhile, Liverpool City Council deleted all references to declaring a ‘Climate Emergency’ and many of the suggested actions to be taken. Its plan has no stated target, no timeline and no budget. In Lancaster and Oxford a Citizen’s Assembly is being set up as part of their process; this is a deliberative process in which a representative group of citizens selected at random from the population, learn about, discuss, and make recommendations in relation to a particular issue or set of issues.

Local governments are often in the front line of dealing with climate change impacts (such as flooding, fires, storm damage) and the on the receiving end of demands for mitigation action. A key issue is working out what local governments have exclusive control over (as opposed to national and regional authorities): and where the boundaries of responsibility lie, because with climate change they are often very complex and diffuse. Clearly councils also facing funding difficult constraints. Yet, across transport, energy, housing, waste, buildings, people are looking to councils for leadership.

So what can they do?

We are not short of concrete ideas about what to do. Reports such as Zero Carbon Britain show sector by sector analysis of what’s possible in the UK by 2030. Many cities have already taken the lead with emissions reduction pledges and zero carbon targets including commitments from Bristol and Manchester aiming to be carbon neutral by 2030 and 2038 respectively. Across the world, the cities organisation C40 has been calling for fossil free streets: commitments to procure only zero-emission buses from 2025; and ensuring a major area of the city is zero emission by 2030.

Planning is key and so is reducing demand. The services people want, such as heat and mobility, are often those they show the greatest indifference towards. We are often fearful of challenging people’s attachment to their cars, for example. But if safe, reliable and affordable alternatives are provided, people will use them. When affordable and accessible infrastructures are built for buses and bikes and pedestrians, people use them as numerous examples around the world have shown.

Around housing, councils can help to deliver on the government pledge to halve energy use from new build by 2030 and for all new homes to be heated by fossil free systems by 2025. They can promote energy efficiency schemes and exploit other grant funding, promote new carbon neutral housing schemes, either as authority owned projects or with partners and transform council’s own properties to maximise their own potential for energy production and saving.

Regarding transport, councils can promote energy efficiency in local transport, promote cycling and car sharing, consider car exclusion zones or access charges, promote the use of electric cars by providing charging points and invest in EV infrastructure, improve public transport integration (bikes, buses and trains) and consider how transport contracts can be used to promote green travel.

On energy, councils can promote low energy use- smart energy, energy efficiency and conservation. They can consider providing funding for solar energy installations on the basis of shared returns, review the authority’s own energy use and consider setting up ESCOs (energy service companies).

Others areas include waste and food. Councils can review waste and recycling policies- take pressure off land-fill and reduce methane and other emissions. Where possible they might target food consumption through procurement and menus in schools to include less meat and dairy.

In terms of business, they can promote support services for local businesses. Preferential business rates for local firms, for example, as part of much needed regional redevelopment, or creating Local Enterprise Partnerships to set up low carbon enterprise zones with tax breaks to nurture jobs, investment and innovation.

What can we stop doing?

As well as thinking creatively about how to deliver services in low carbon ways, we also need to accelerate the shift away from the fossil fuel economy.

Declaring an emergency permits a veto over actions which are incompatible with radical decarbonisation in line with the Paris agreement, and climate-proofing all areas of policy. This should mean divestment from fossil fuels. Local councils in the UK invest over £14 billion in the fossil fuel industry. Divestment from cities assets from fossil fuels though pension funds sends a powerful signal and makes a major contribution. Of the 1032 institutions that have divested from fossil fuels worldwide, just 15% are governments. But there are now more than 15 UK councils – from Sheffield to Stroud, Brighton to Birmingham –calling for divestment from their pension funds.

Beyond the local

Local council action doesn’t exist in a vacuum of course. Some of the measures described above require a supportive national regulatory environment. Financing could be delivered as part of a Green New Deal. Carbon budgets need to be set and enforced by independent national agencies such as the climate change committee. National government needs to give direction by laying down limits and reversing major decisions that produce carbon lock-in incompatible with 1.5 around airport expansion and fracking for example. Local government can make their voice heard to lobby government on this.

Declaring a climate emergency is just a starting point, and not without its challenges. But the good news is there are numerous policies that can be put in place as well as initiatives bubbling up from below that can be harnessed to scale up and accelerate the pace of change.

So what are we waiting for?

Reprinted from Rapid Transitions Alliance. You can find the original post here!

Featured image: Climate Emergency – PeoplesClimate-Melb-IMG_8280. By Takver. Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.0).

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When: Thursday, 27 June – Friday, 28 June
9:00 am – 8:00 pm

Where: University of London, Malet Street, London

In previous years, we’ve promoted platform co-ops in a traditional conference format. This year we’re doing things differently and will be exploring opportunities to increase decentralised collaboration in a completely open space format. We’re proud to be working on collaboration with Phoebe Tickell and Nati Lombardo from Enspiral, to convene and facilitate the event.

Who is OPEN 2019 for?

OPEN 2019 is an inter-network event for community builders, network organisers and key connecting members of organisations from a wide range of progressive communities. We welcome all cooperators, rebels, mavens, network builders, systems architects, open source developers, and anyone else who is interested in designing and building our collective future. The idea is to network the networks by creating deeper connections and relationships between some of the key connectors from a wide range of mutually aligned communities.

What will we be doing?

To kick off each day attendees will be introduced to a handful of new, distributed, cooperative, technical and social projects, through a selection of lightning talks. After that attendees will be guided to co-design the event by proposing, refining and voting on the content for the rest of the two days’ sessions. Experienced facilitators from the Enspiral network will help us create a ‘container’ for our time together. Working in small groups we will discuss, debate and feedback ideas to the wider group, to ensure everyone has a chance to have their say and that the collective wisdom of the group is captured and shared.

With an informal evening dinner and drinks and more networking opportunities, there will be plenty of time for building deeper understanding and relationships too.

What will you get out of it?

Recognising that effective collaboration, at any scale, can be hard to define and even harder to achieve OPEN 2019 does not aim to build immediate collaboration between attendees. Having studied the key ingredients of collaboration we know that the first step towards effective collaboration is building deeper connections and trusted relationships, and that is what OPEN 2019 aims to deliver.

By introducing more connectors to each other, getting to know one another, and working together over two days we aim to strengthen our relationships, deepen our understanding and to cross-pollinate and fertilise the pre-existing projects and evolving ideas within our networks.

We will explore opportunities to coordinate our existing organisations better, to keep each other better informed about what we are working on and to potentially cooperate if we can find opportunities to do so. Ultimately, as a result of the networking, we aim to pave the way for any collaborative opportunities which might arise as things evolve…

When and where is it?

The OPEN 2019 Community Gathering will take place on the 27th and 28th of June at the University of London in Holborn, London.

What should I do if I want to come?

Spaces are limited to 150 attendees in order to keep the group small enough to be effective so, if are interested in being involved, please order your tickets below asap. If this event becomes over-subscribed we will explore the possibility of running additional events. If you have a project you would like to present at a lightning talk we’d love to hear from you (please email a short description of your project) but please note – all attendees, including presenters, will be required to buy a ticket.

Please join us to discuss, explore, connect and decide how we can deliver systemic change, together.

For more information and tickets click here!

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It was just a montage of words uttered over a video in the summer of 2018. Soon the words went viral. They helped unseat a Wall St-friendly Democrat – one primed to be the next Congressional leader. They were uttered by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.

This race is about people vs money. We’ve got people. They’ve got money. A New York for the many is possible. It doesn’t take a hundred years to do this. It takes political courage.

She was right. It did not take a hundred years. All it took was one summer, political courage, a big idea – The Green New Deal – and hard graft. A Green New Deal would subordinate the financial system to the interests of society and the ecosystem, and help transform the economy away from its addiction to fossil fuels, she argued.

The big idea, her hard work and courage were all that was needed to harness latent power: the power of the people of the Bronx.

Her story will underpin the theme that follows. Citizens’ latent and untapped power in countries with sound taxation systems to hold financial elites to account – and implement a Green New Deal. It can be used to transform the balance of power between the people and the private finance sector. It is power that lies in abeyance, repressed by the dominant moneyed class. But suppressed also by the narrow, myopic view that we, and our politicians, have of the potential economic power of citizens.

Video explainer on the Green New Deal

To harness citizens’ power, it is important to understand that taxpayers have agency over global financial markets. Around the world, taxpayers subsidise, embolden and enrich centres of financial power like those of Wall St and the City of London.

The bank bailouts after the Great Financial Crisis demonstrated that citizens and their publicly financed institutions have the power to protect capitalism’s rentiers from the discipline of the ‘free market’. Thanks to the backing and firepower provided by millions of honest, taxpaying citizens, central banks deployed immense financial power and bailed out the globalised banking system – stemming a cascade of debt deleveraging that could have contracted the money supply, credit, and economic activity and deepened the crisis.

Thanks to taxpayers, central bankers prevented another Great Depression. It was a great power deployed in the name of citizens, but without their authority – or even their knowledge.

To grasp and deploy this financial power in the interests of society and the ecosystem, citizens need to understand that this was and is ultimately our power. It is latent power, not used by citizens to defend the public interest, but by technocrats to defend the interests of private wealth.

To grasp and deploy this financial power in the interests of society and the ecosystem, citizens need to understand that this was and is ultimately our power. It is latent power, not used by citizens to defend the public interest, but by technocrats to defend the interests of private wealth.

Money and debt

The reason for our political impotence can be found in the fog and mystery surrounding the creation of money and the operation of the monetary system. Thanks to the economics profession’s neglect of money, debt and banking, there is a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion about money and the financial system.

Arguments rage about whether money is just ‘created out of thin air’ – or whether gold or bitcoin are real money. Whether bankers and/or governments can just ‘print’ money ad infinitum. Or whether there are limits to the printing of money. The ignorance and confusion is probably no accident. It helps protect the private finance sector from scrutiny: ‘all the better to fleece you with’ to quote the wolf in the fairy tale.

Sensible people (including the Bank of England) agree that money, as Joseph Schumpeter explained, is nothing more than a promise to pay, as in, ‘I promise to pay the bearer’. As such, money is a social construct, based on trust or promises to pay and upheld by the law.

When someone applies for a loan from a bank, the money is not in the bank. Instead, licensed commercial banks ‘create’ money every time a borrower promises to pay. They make the loan by entering numbers into a computer, and (digitally) depositing funds into a borrower’s account. The borrower promises to pay back the money created by the banker. As guarantee the borrower offers collateral, signs a contract, and agrees to pay interest on the loan.

For that trust to be upheld, the institutions that create money (licensed commercial banks) are supported and regulated by a publicly backed central bank issuing the currency. Regulation ensures that trust between banker and borrower is enforced.

Private bankers can only create new money and operate effectively as part of the monetary system, which includes a central bank. While commercial bankers can digitally create new money at the bidding of a borrower, they cannot print currency or mint coins. Only the central bank can do that. The central bank’s great power is to issue the currency – sterling or the dollar or the rupee –in which new money is created. And to help determine the value of the currency.

That power can be exercised by central banks only because of the collateral backing the currency they create. That collateral is made up of citizens’ tax revenues. The more taxpayers that back the currency, the sounder the tax-collection system, the greater the value of the currency.

This process is illuminated if we compare the collateral that backs up the US Federal Reserve with that of Malawi. The central bank of Malawi, like the Federal Reserve, issues a currency. But Malawi has far fewer taxpayers than the US.

Thanks largely to colonialism and to IMF policies, Malawi also lacks important public institutions: an independent central bank; a sound tax-collection system; a system for enforcing contracts or promises to pay (criminal justice); and a well-regulated accounting system for assessing assets and liabilities. Consequently, Malawi’s currency – the kwacha – has little value compared to the dollar.

Even worse, due to the absence or weakness of public institutions, Malawi is reliant on other people’s money – obtained via other monetary systems. Access to foreign monetary systems mostly takes the form of loans in dollars, sterling or yen – that are heavily conditional. While some of the money may benefit the Malawian people, the cost of repayment to foreign financial institutions invariably takes its toll on the nation’s financial resources, its human and ecological assets.

It is the lack of monetary autonomy provided by sound public institutions, including a tax-collection system, that renders citizens in countries like Malawi relatively powerless, and vulnerable to predatory foreign lenders.

It is the lack of monetary autonomy provided by sound public institutions, including a tax-collection system, that renders citizens in countries like Malawi relatively powerless, and vulnerable to predatory foreign lenders. It also explains how and why poor countries remain dependent and subordinate to rich countries.

Regrettably the IMF and World Bank actively discourage low-income countries from investing in the vital public institutions essential to a sound monetary system – one that would restore their financial and economic autonomy.

Citizens in countries with sound monetary institutions and a tax-collection system enjoy considerable potential power and agency over the globalised financial system.

Taxpayers – not banks – underpin the financial system

Understanding how taxes prop up the value of a nation’s currency for private financiers is a first step in understanding citizens’ potential power. The world’s mobile financial speculators and rentiers prefer to deal in currencies underpinned by stable public institutions, financed and backed by millions of taxpayers. While of course there is trading in many emerging market currencies, speculators prefer to hold sterling, dollars, euros and yen. These currencies are backed by strong economies. But their value is ultimately derived from citizens – willing, honest, law-abiding taxpayers – who provide the revenues that underpin the currency.

Taxpayers do not just pay direct and indirect taxes every day, month or year. Because new taxpayers are born every day, citizens will pay taxes for decades into the future. If our publicly financed state institutions remain stable, tomorrow’s new-borns will go on paying taxes into the future.

To understand the duration of taxpayer power, it helps to look back at the history of the British financial system. Back in 1748 the British government issued perpetual bonds, which were debts with no maturity date for repayment, but which paid interest to lenders at 3 per cent each year. The government had no difficulty selling these bonds (known as ‘consols’) to the public. Public confidence – that the British government would fulfil its obligations to pay interest on the loans in perpetuity – was high. That confidence was justified, as interest was paid on the bonds each year until finally they were redeemed in 2015.

No other asset has that kind of long-term, safe backing.

Ambitious and manipulative Becky Sharp in Thackeray’s classic nineteenth-century UK satirical novel Vanity Fair wished that she could

‘exchange my position in society and all my relations for a snug sum in the Three Per Cent Consols…for so it was [wrote Thackeray] that Becky felt the Vanity of human affairs, and it was in those securities that she would have liked to cast anchor.’

Becky’s envy derived from the security granted to those with funds enough to invest in the British government’s debt – known then, and for several centuries, as Three Per Cent Consols (shorthand for Consolidated debt). On an inheritance of £10,000 wealthy young women of the nineteenth century could live on the tidy sum of £300 a year; £25,000 would generate a comfortable £750 a year.

Public debt is an asset that earns income – just as a buy-to-let property earns rent for its owner. But while a buy-to-let investor has to sweat to maintain, advertise and rent out the asset, debt earns income effortlessly for the wealthy and for financiers. It does so by paying interest added at a certain percentage per year.

Unlike an investor’s property, debt is light as air, intangible, invisible. The only evidence of its existence is found in database entries, numbers on a balance sheet or in words on a ‘bearer bond’.

The differences do not end there. A building or property is subject to the laws of physics. It can age, crumble, or be razed to the ground. Football clubs are great assets – because fans are committed long-term, and willingly and regularly pay ‘rents’ to the owner of the asset, for the privilege of watching their team, or by buying a club T-shirt. But clubs can lose value by falling down league tables. Works of art – say a Rembrandt painting – are assets with greater longevity, but are also likely to deteriorate, and in any case, are subject to the whims of fashion.

Not so the government bonds of countries like Britain. While sovereign debts can be defaulted on, safe government debts do not rot with age, as Professor Frederick Soddy (1877–1956) once explained. That is because debts are not subject to the laws of thermodynamics, but to the laws of mathematics. As such, debt effortlessly earns income for investors, at mathematical rates. And if the debt is the safe public debt of nations like Britain, the US or Japan, it can do so for a long, fixed period of time.

The British government has since 1694 honoured its debt obligations without fail. In a world of globalised capital flows in which capital sloshes from one part of the world to another, the price of UK government bonds may rise and fall, but their safety and longevity is never in question. That is because the system is managed by public authority, not left to ‘the invisible hand’ – but mainly because most British citizens regularly and faithfully pay taxes.

It’s the collateral stupid

And to understand why safety is such a big issue for the private finance sector, remember this: the global financial system froze in August 2007 and then collapsed. Not because financiers ran out of money. Not because of a run on the banks. But because everyone in the sector – everyone – lost confidence in the value of assets used as collateral, particularly the value of sub-prime property mortgages on bank balance sheets.

Why did that matter? Because the value of sub-prime assets (mortgages) had been used to leverage inordinate amounts of additional finance through borrowing. If the asset or collateral against which the borrowing had been leveraged was worthless – then the leveraged debt was unlikely to be repaid from the sale of the promised sub-prime collateral.

The collapse of confidence in asset values (or collateral) led to the collapse of the globalised financial system.

And that is where we, citizen taxpayers, came in. Citizen collateral, in the form of tax revenues, did not collapse in value in the crisis. Instead public collateral maintained the authority of central banks, and gave them the power to issue new central bank money (liquidity) in exchange for assets from private bankers. The process was called Quantitative Easing (QE).

The backing of taxpayers enabled central bankers to bail out Wall St and the City of London. The safety and soundness of our taxes upheld the value of currencies, despite the crisis. This was most evident in the US. Even as the global economy tanked, and financial turmoil soared, the value of the dollar rose.

Central banks used the collateral power provided by citizens to leverage vast amounts of central bank money – about $16 trillion – to bail out the global banking system.

Public debt as a gift to financiers and rentiers

To fully understand the power wielded by central bankers, it is important to understand that each time the government applies for a loan, or issues a bond, it creates a debt – or liability – for the government. At the same time, by borrowing, the government creates a valuable financial asset for the private sector.

Governments regularly (once or twice a month) invite pension funds, insurance companies and other private financiers to finance their bonds or loans, in exchange for promises to pay interest annually, and to repay the principal in full at the end of the term of the loan (bond).

This process is in effect no different from a woman seeking a mortgage. She invites a banker to accept her ‘bond’ or promise to repay in exchange for new finance, backs this up with collateral, and commits to pay interest annually and the principal in full at the end of the loan’s term.

Once the commercial banker has issued the finance and accepted the bond, the woman has a liability – to repay the bond. The banker on the other hand, has an ‘asset’ – the woman’s bond or mortgage. It is valuable to the private bank because unlike gold the loan generates income for every year that the woman pays interest. It is probably backed by the collateral of her existing apartment. Plus, the principal on her loan will probably be worth more in real terms when it is finally repaid.

Governments raise finance from both the private finance sector, or from a central bank, in just the same way as an ordinary borrower raises money from a commercial bank. The government promises to pay interest, and offers collateral. The difference between a government’s bond and the woman’s mortgage is that a bond issued by a government with a good record of repayment is a more valuable asset. As such it serves as vital collateral (or ‘plumbing’) for the private financial system.

The woman’s mortgage is also an asset, but will be less valuable because she may not have established a good credit record, and may be backed by just one income (her own). The government by contrast, is backed by a revenue stream from millions of taxpayers.

That explains why government bonds (or government debt) are extremely valuable assets for the private finance sector. They are safe and reliable. They generate income (interest payments) on a regular basis. Debt as a security or asset can be used to borrow (or ‘leverage’) additional finance.

Just as the ownership of a property enables a homeowner to re-mortgage and raise additional sums secured against that property, so safe, valuable financial assets act as collateral for the raising of additional finance. Newly borrowed money, guaranteed against either the original debt/collateral, or against the stream of interest payments derived from the debt, can then be invested, or lent on at a higher rate of return.

At the time of its bankruptcy Lehman Brothers was said to have a leverage ratio of 44. That’s like having an asset that earns £10,000 a year, and then taking out a £440,000 loan secured against it, to go on a gambling spree

To understand leverage, think of a homeowner who borrows £80,000 against a property worth £100,000 with just £20,000 in equity or capital. She has a leverage ratio of four. In other words, she has borrowed four times the equity/capital in her asset.

At the time of its bankruptcy Lehman Brothers was said to have a leverage ratio of 44. That’s like having an asset that earns £10,000 a year, and then taking out a £440,000 loan secured against it, to go on a gambling spree. According to the Bank for International Settlements, Wall St’s investment banks started with a leverage ratio of 22 in 1990, which rose to ‘the dizzy height of 48 at the peak’.

Leverage on that scale is most easily achieved against collateral that is as safe as public debt. The scale of wealth generated would be unimaginable to a present-day Croesus.

Shadow banking and the collateral factory

There is another aspect to safe, public collateral not widely understood. That is how it is used in the shadow banking system – the private financial system that operates in the financial ‘stratosphere’, beyond the reach of states and regulatory democracy.

Non-regulated bank-like entities that have scooped up the world’s savings (e.g. asset management funds, pension funds, insurance companies) hold vast quantities of cash. BlackRock for example, has $6 trillion in assets.

These sums cannot safely be deposited in a traditional bank, where only a limited amount is guaranteed by governments. So to protect the value of the cash, the asset management fund will, for example, make a temporary loan of cash to another in need of it, in exchange for, or guaranteed by, collateral. This exchange is known as a repo – or repurchase arrangement.

As Daniela Gabor has argued, the US and European repo markets, the largest in the world, are built on government debt. In other words, ‘the state has become a collateral factory for shadow banking’.

The risks of this unregulated market for the global financial system, are scary. One reason is that while someone operating in the real world, say a homeowner, may only once be able to re-mortgage her asset or property, unregulated shadow bankers can use a single unit of collateral to re-leverage a number of times. Manmohan Singh of the IMF has estimated that by late 2007 collateral ‘churned,’ or was used roughly three times to leverage additional borrowing in speculative markets.

That’s like using the value of a single asset – one’s property – to guarantee additional borrowing from three different banks. In the real world of financial regulation, homeowners are not allowed to do this.

If we are to understand the history of how the rich have become immensely, grotesquely richer on unearned income, while earned income has fallen in real terms, leverage ratios against public assets in the both the real and shadow banking sectors explain a great deal.

In short, the ability to regularly drain a government of interest payments, and to use the asset of public debt to leverage additional finance, is why asset management firms, private equity corporations, insurance companies, pension funds and financial speculators have massively increased their capital gains. It is also why secure government debt is in such demand. Private financiers can’t get enough safe government bonds – or public debt.

The shortage of public debt and the rise of austerity economics

The Great Financial Crisis (GFC) triggered a flight away from private debt and to the safety of public debt – especially the safest – British, European and US debt.

This huge financial shock of the GFC led to a massive contraction of the global money supply, and threatened deflation – a generalised fall in prices – which would in turn lead to bankruptcies, unemployment and wage cuts.

To counteract that threat, central banks – on our behalf – expanded their balance sheets and, in exchange for collateral (much of which was dodgy or ‘toxic’), provided extraordinary levels of new credit or liquidity to the private financial system. In the process, civil servant technocrats in central banks protected free-market players from bankruptcy and the discipline of the free market – dealing a considerable blow to the ideology.

The deflation shock cried out for a massive fiscal response. There was an initial, but limited fiscal expansion, which led to what Credit Suisse called a ‘flood of safe collateral that caused public shadow money (Treasuries, mortgage-backed securities, US government agencies) to soar, fully offsetting the contraction in private shadow money (corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, and non-agency mortgages)’.

As a result of the panicky demand for public debt, the price of government bonds rose, and because of the way the bond market operates, the yield (‘interest rate’) on bonds fell dramatically. Demand for public debt, greatly eased government borrowing (interest) costs.

Pretty soon though, politicians and officials in government treasuries, cheered on by orthodox economists, right-wing think tanks and the media, soon fell back on neoliberal or ordoliberal theory, and imposed fiscal contraction – or austerity. Public investment – government spending – was either slashed or prevented from rising.

These double standards –the expansion of finance for the private finance sector, and contraction for the public sector – are intrinsic to orthodox economics, but seldom challenged by the economics profession.

These double standards –the expansion of finance for the private finance sector, and contraction for the public sector – are intrinsic to orthodox economics, but seldom challenged by the economics profession.

As a result the production of government collateral (public debt) fell.

Austerity and the simultaneous wage freezes and cuts at first worsened the crisis. Since 2010, austerity has both prolonged the crisis, and held back recovery in the US and Europe. The effect of this backward economic policy was to increase insecure, low-paid, low-skilled and unproductive employment, while lowering wages across the board.

In the US, while the initial Obama-led stimulus stabilised the economy, it was insufficient to restore long-term stability. Instead there were severe state and local government spending cuts, households were left to retrench after the sub-prime trauma, and wages fell in real terms. Between 2009 and 2014, inflation-adjusted wages in the US were flat or falling across a range of available wage measures. More recently, real wages grew, but growth rates for recovery as a whole still trail far behind the 2.0–2.2 per cent annual rates from 1947 to1979.

As a result of austerity, the issuance of safe government debt contracted. Why should this matter? Because the low supply of government debt tends to boost (in fact, crowds in) the creation of unsafe private debt, or assets. These unsafe private assets are used instead by the banking and shadow banking system to expand borrowing and credit. Central banks rightly worry that such credit expansion on unregulated, dodgy assets will probably lead to another financial crisis.

Viewing public debt through the wrong end of a telescope

Understanding the value of public debt changes our view of it. Like a loan undertaken for a project that will create employment and generate income, public debt, if invested in productive activity, is a good thing. It generates income. Not just salaries and wages for those employed; not just profits for the private sector when salaries are spent on their goods and services; but also tax revenues. Income, corporation and consumer tax revenues, then used by government to repay the debt.

Public borrowing and spending are especially important after a crisis, when the private sector is weak, and lacks the confidence to borrow, invest and spend. Yet most Chicago-school economists view public debt as a threat to the economy. Governments that cannot ‘balance the books’ are regarded as incompetent and hounded by the media.

Hostility to public debt varies, but fear is embedded in the German psyche, because the word for debt – ‘Schuld’ – is the same as the word for ‘guilt’. Saint Matthew’s ‘forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors’ was interpreted by Saint Luke as ‘forgive us our sins as we forgive those that sin against us’.

Until we fully grasp the importance of public debt to the finance sector, immensely wealthy, globalised corporations will continue to parasitically extract rent from public assets; inequality worldwide will continue to widen; and we, the many, will become relatively poorer and powerless.

Guilt, sin and the public debt are deeply intertwined, but only in the minds of economists, journalists and the public. Debt becomes something quite different in the minds of financiers and rentiers. To Wall St. and the City of London, the safe public debt of Britain, Europe and the US is a truly awesome and even phenomenal gift.

They cannot get enough of it.

Until we fully grasp the importance of public debt to the finance sector, immensely wealthy, globalised corporations will continue to parasitically extract rent from public assets; inequality worldwide will continue to widen; and we, the many, will become relatively poorer and powerless.

When enough of us do come to understand this latent power, we will discover that another world really is possible.

Social democrats and the financial system

At the heart of neoliberal ideology – ideas shared by those that economic historian Quinn Slobodian defines as ‘globalists’ – is the belief that the state must shrink as a share of the economy. Second, that private capital markets must remain ‘free’ to roam globally and without friction. In other words, globalised capital markets must have the ‘freedom’ to be detached from the world’s states, and from democratic regulation.

As explained above, the deep irony of the ideological obsession with self-regulating capital markets, austerity and the shrinking of the state is that private financial markets cannot function without the backing of governments, their taxpayers, and the safety of public debt.

The ‘timid mouse’ that is the private finance sector cannot operate without the protection of the ‘roaring lion’ that is the public sector, to quote Mariana Mazzucato.

Given that safe public assets are so fundamental to the stability of the private financial system, why would right-wing politicians and officials contract their supply? The answer can only be: ignorance, fed by ideology opposed to the collective role of the state.

But what of the left? The Great Financial Crisis was met with shock and disbelief on the left. While many progressive economists had focused on the domestic, tangible economy – the state, markets, labour and trade – they largely ignored the intangible economy, the globalised finance sector.

Social democratic parties turned a blind eye to a global, deregulated financial system that threatened systemic failure.

In the meantime, many had embraced ‘globalisation’ – the ability to travel widely and draw money in any part of the globe; the ease with which globalisation facilitated the import of exotic fruits and vegetables; cheap smartphones; and the gifts bestowed by technology on the globalised system. These were all met with enthusiasm by social democratic parties that turned a blind eye to a global, deregulated financial system that both facilitated these activities, but also threatened systemic failure.

As a result, the left had no coherent response to the collapse of globalised capital markets. Throughout the period of austerity, the left – both in the US and Europe – found itself on the back foot, defensive of social democratic governments that had built up debts as a result of the Great Financial Crisis. Social democratic governments endorsed both QE for bankers and austerity for the majority. This approach guaranteed their downfall, and even extinction. (The French Socialist Party no longer exists as a political force or organisation, and was obliged to sell off its own headquarters.)

These failures weakened the ability of the left to argue that at a time of catastrophic private economic failure, public investment in jobs was essential to restore social, political and economic stability. Instead taxpayer-backed subsidies and assets were deployed by central banks via QE to protect private profits and capital gains.

No wonder the public revolted.

What is to be done?

A first in the many steps that must be taken to transform the economy is understanding. People cannot act to transform what they do not understand.

Understanding how taxpayers guarantee and endorse the activities of the globalised, deregulated private financial sector, must be more widespread. Only then can we begin to demand ‘terms and conditions’ for public subsidies and guarantees – and to use that power to regulate and subordinate the globalised financial sector to the interests of society as a whole. To demand that public financial assets be used for public, not private benefit.

This understanding is fundamental if we are to respond to the greatest security threat facing humanity: climate breakdown.

Armed with understanding, we will then need a plan. The Green New Deal is such a plan.

The Green New Deal

The genius of Alexandria Ocasio Cortez’s Green New Deal is that it provides a broad, comprehensive plan to transform the US economy and tackle climate breakdown. If the efforts of US Democrats led to an internationally coordinated campaign to implement it, the plan has the potential to transform many economies around the world, and to ensure a liveable planet in the future.

But – and it’s a big but – a comprehensive plan for economic transformation will require financing on a grand scale, comparable to that of a nation embarking on war. We know that can be done. Governments have always found money to finance wars.

Back in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s plan – the New Deal – found money to fight a war against unemployment and poverty. His administration did so by overturning neoliberal economics, and implementing Keynesian monetary theory and policies. By ensuring that the monetary and financial system was managed by public, not private authority, his government raised the financing needed to lead the US out of the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression. Roosevelt’s New Deal not only created jobs and generated national income. It also tackled the ecological catastrophe that was The Dust Bowl.

Implementation of the New Deal was achieved first, because the Roosevelt’s administration had a clear understanding of the nature of money, and of the publicly backed monetary system. But its success in tackling Wall St interests was down to political mobilisation, organisation and action. Roosevelt had the political courage and the political ballast to confront, and subordinate the interests of Wall St to those of society and the environment.

Any international movement for a Green New Deal will have to summon up the same political courage in countries around the world. Campaigners will have to mobilise, organise and act to renounce the economic ideology that allows the 1% to grow fantastically rich on taxpayer-backed subsidies, bailouts and guarantees – while denying financial resources for public investment, economic and ecological transformation.

Campaigners will have to discover, and then deploy, their latent power to subordinate global finance to the interests of society and the ecosystem.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ann Pettifor is a political economist, author and public speaker on the global financial & economic system, on money, monetary policy, and on the UK economy. Her latest book, The Production of Money (Verso 2017) explains the nature of money and the monetary system. She is one of the few economists to have predicted the 2008 economic crisis. During the late 1990s, she led a campaign, Jubilee 2000, which as part of an international movement resulted ultimately in the cancellation of approximately $100 billion of debt owed by the poorest countries. She is currently director of PRIME (Policy Research in Macroeconomics) a network of economists that promote Keynes’s monetary theory and policies, and that focus on the role of the finance sector in the economy.

The post The Latent, Unused Power of Citizens and the Production of Public Collateral appeared first on P2P Foundation.

The interest for citizens co-production of public services is increasing and many digital participatory platforms (DPPs) have been developed in order to improve participatory democratic processes.

During the Sharing City Summit in Barcelona last November we discovered the DDDC, i.e. the Digital Democracy and Data Commons, a participatory platform to deliberate and construct alternative and more democratic forms of data governance, which will allow citizens to take back control over their personal data in the digital society and economy.

Barcelona is already known as a best practice in this field: the city and its metropolitan area constitute anexceptional ecosystem in terms of co-production of public policies and citizen science initiatives. The City Council has created an Office of Citizens Science and the Municipal Data Office, as well as the first Science Biennial that just took place in Barcelona (from 7th-11th February 2019). At the same time citizen science projects abound.

In this frame Barcelona is famous to have launched in February 2016 Decidim.Barcelona (we decide), a project of the City Council to give citizens the opportunity to discuss proposals using an interface for group-discussions and comments. Decidim is indeed an online participatory-democracy platform that embodies a completely innovative approach. First of all it is entirely and collaboratively built as free software. As remembered by Xabier Barandiaran Decidim is a web environment that using the programming language Ruby on Rails allows anybody to create and configure a website platform to be used in the form of a political network for democratic participation. Any organization (local city council, association, university, NGO, neighbourhood or cooperative) can create mass processes for strategic planning, participatory budgeting, collaborative design for regulations, urban spaces and election processes. It also makes possible the match between traditional in-person democratic meetings (assemblies, council meetings, etc.) and the digital world (sending meeting invites, managing registrations, facilitating the publication of minutes, etc.). Moreover it enables the structuring of government bodies or assemblies (councils, boards, working groups), the convening of consultations, referendums or channelling citizen or member initiatives to trigger different decision making processes. The official definition of Decidim is: a public-common’s, free and open, digital infrastructure for participatory democracy.

Barandiaran remembers also that “Decidim was born in an institutional environment (that of Barcelona City Council), directly aiming at improving and enhancing the political and administrative impact of participatory democracy in the state (municipalities, local governments, etc.). But it also aims at empowering social processes as a platform for massive social coordination for collective action independently of public administrations. Anybody can copy, modify and install Decidim for its own needs, so Decidim is by no means reduced to public institutions”.

As of march 2018 www.decidim.barcelona had more than 28,000 registered participants, 1,288,999 page views, 290,520 visitors, 19 participatory processes, 821 public meetings channeled through the platform and 12,173 proposals, out of which over 8,923 have already become public policies grouped into 5,339 results whose execution level can be monitored by citizens. […] It comes to fill the gap of public and common’s platforms, providing an alternative to the way in which private platforms coordinate social action (mostly with profit-driven, data extraction and market oriented goals)”.

But Decidim is more than a technological platform, it is a “technopolitical project” where legal, political, institutional, practical, social, educational, communicative, economic and epistemic codes merge together. There are mainly 3 levels: the political (focused on the democratic model that Decidim promotes and its impact on public policies and organizations), the technopolitical (focused on how the platform is designed, the mechanisms it embodies, and the way in which it is itself democratically designed), and the technical (focused on the conditions of production, operation and success of the project: the factory, collaborative mechanisms, licenses, etc.). In this way thousands of people can organize themselves democratically by making proposals that will be debated and could translate into binding legislation, attending public meetings, fostering decision-making discussions, deciding through different forms of voting and monitoring the implementation of decisions (not only the procedures but also the outcomes).

Coming back to our DDDC, the main aim of this pilot participatory process is to test a new technology to improve the digital democracy platform Decidim and to collectively imagine the data politics of the future. It was developed inside the European project DECODE[1] (Decentralized Citizen Owned Data Ecosystem – that aims to construct legal, technological and socio-economic tools that allow citizens to take back control over their data and generate more common benefits out of them); it is led by the Barcelona Digital City (Barcelona City Council) and by the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute of the Open University of Catalonia (Tecnopolitica and Dimmons), in collaboration with the Nexa Center of Internet & Society, Eurecat, CNRS, Dribia, aLabs, Thoughtworksand DYNE.

The pilot project was launched in October 18^th 2018 and will end April 1^st 2019, for a total of 5 months. It has mainly three goals:

1. to integrate the DECODE technology with the Decidim digital platform in order to improve processes of e-petitioning, to provide more safety, privacy, transparency and data enrichment;
2. to enable a deliberative space around data law, governance and economics within the new digital economy and public policy, in order to provide a vision oriented to promote a greater citizen control over data and their exploitation in Commons-oriented models[2];
3. to experiment with the construction and use of a data commons generated in the process, in order to improve the inclusion of the participatory process itself.

The goals will be reached through several phases that foresee also face-to-face meetings, inside the dddc.decodeproject.eu platform. The infographic illustrates the phases:

Figure 1 DDDC’s phases. Source: https://dddc.decodeproject.eu/processes/main

The pilot project is currently in its second phase. The first 1 was that of  presentation & diagnosis,dedicated to the elaboration of a brief diagnosis of the state of regulations, governance models and data economy. The diagnosis emerged from a kick off pilot presentation workshop, the DECODE Symposium, aimed to imagine possible proposal to move towards a society where citizens can control what, how and who manages and generates values from the exploitation of their data; i.e. to imagine how use digital technologies to facilitate the transition from today’s digital economy of surveillance capitalism and data extractivism to an alternative political and economic project. In this phase a sociodemographic survey was also launched to collect information about the perceptions on the digital economy and to design communicative actions to improve the inclusiveness of the process.

The current phase (2) is that of proposals for a digital economy based on data commons, lunached considering the current situation of data extraction and concentration and based on the diagnosis made on the digital society in the first phase. During the Sharing Cities Summit for example a dedicated meeting took place, divided into a talk and four group work sessions, one for each axes of the pilot project (legal, economic, governance and experimental – see below). During this workshop 64 proposal were collected and in the next phases they will be voted, discussed and signed. The DDDC staff underlines that the process is prefigurative since they are trying to create and practice data commons while deliberating and talking about data commons.

In this phase the results of the survey on sociodemographic data were also analyzed with the aim to define, implement and experiment data use strategies for inclusion in participation (these strategies can potentially be used in future by platforms such as Decidim). The analysis is made by the Barcelona Now – BCNNOW.

The next phases are:

Phase 3 – Debate: discussion on the proposals received.

Phase 4 – Elaboration by the DECODE team and the interested participants

Phase 5 – Signing: collection of support for the pilot project results using DECODE technology for secure and transparent signature (based on encryption techniques and distributed ledger technologies). Crucial phase: this technology, integrated with DECIDIM, will help in the construction of a more secure, transparent and distributed networked democracy.

Phase 6 – Evaluation: closing meeting and launch of a survey to help in the assessment of the satisfaction or participants with the process and with the DECODE technology

Legal aspects, governance issues and economic topics are the three main axes followed during the different phases, since they provide a differential approach to discuss around data. A fourth axis is the experimental one, dedicated to the use and definition of collective decisions around the database resulting from the data shared during the pilot project. Il will become a kind of temporary commons useful to improve the deliberative process itself, a practice that could be incorporated in future Decidim processes.

At the end of the pilot project a participatory document, with paper or manifesto around the digital economy will be released.

The importance of this kind of pilot project is clear if we think to the huge amount of data that everyday every citizens is able to produce… By now we live in a “datasphere”, an invisible environment of data, quoting Appadurai, a virtual data landscape rich in information, cultural and social data. Our data indeed constitute digital patterns that reveal our behaviors, interests, habits. Some actors, especially big corporations and States, can act upon this data, can use them to surveil and influence our lives, through strategies such as ad hoc advertisements or even intervention in elections (see the case of the Cambridge Analytica or the referendum on an EU agreement with Ukraine) or generation of citizens rankings (such as the Chinese case). These “data misuses” can even influence and affect democracy. Nevertheless, if successful, the knowledge and insight created by the datasphere may become a powerful managing and intelligence tool and the debate about the so-called “datacracy” is indeed growing.

In this frame, and considering the little awareness still surrounding the topic, the DDDC pilot project on the one hand tries to stir critically consciousness and common construction in this arena, on the other tries to provide the necessary tools to go in this direction, improving Decidim and pushing forward the DECODE vision of data sovereignty.

[1]For more information about DECODE browse the projects documents: partners, funding, FAQs or the official website

[2] That is, models where people share data and allow for open use while remaining in control over their data, individually and collectively

The post Digital Democracy and Data Commons (DDDC) a participatory platform to build a more open, transparent and collaborative society. appeared first on P2P Foundation.

We’re delighted to be able to distribute the free-to-view copy (embed above) of The People’s Spring, a 2018 documentary made by Ryslaine Boumahdi and her team of supporters. (This post is an update of an earlier post.)

Here’s the blurb from Ryslaine:

In the 20th century, public life revolved around government; in the 21st century, it will center on citizens.

— Matt Leighninger, The Next Form of democracy  

“The People’s Spring” explores a world where Democracy is being transformed to be a better fit with our times.  New ideas and new capabilities have collided with a public that has begun to reject traditional political representation of the people.

Argentina, Iceland, Spain, France, the USA… throughout the world we enter the heart of democratic innovation. Seeing the different solutions that are being experimented with, and listening to the young innovators who suddenly found themselves at the center of a major shift in politics. The documentary explores the many ways to improve our democracies, currently undermined by a disengaged public, lack of transparency, and new modes of discourse.

“The People’s Spring” provides an accessible, wide-ranging view of the different solutions that are emerging. The film investigates the concrete projects, new technologies, and people that are reshaping our democratic systems.

The protagonists: simple citizens, activists, elected officials, technologists, academics – all of whom are using the sparks of innovation to re-boot our concepts of the relationship between citizens and power. 

“The People’s Spring” is above all a message of hope and action. It shows that many people out there agree that it is possible to do politics differently, and that we can build a system in which we want to live. We are more than just a ballot paper.

Speaking in the documentary:

Armel Le Coz, Designer & cofounder of the organization Démocratie Ouverte, France

Loïc Blondiaux, professor of political sciences, Sorbonne, France

Ada Colau, Barcelona’s Mayor, Spain

Águeda Bañón, head of the Communication Department at Barcelona’s City Council, Spain

Pablo Soto, councilor for Citizen Participation, Transparency and Open Government of the City of Madrid, Spain

Miguel Arana Catania, Director of the Madrid City council participation project, Spain

Arnau Monterde, Doctor in Information Society and Knowledge by the Open University of Catalunya, Spain

Pere Valles, CEO Scytl, Spain

Lawrence Lessig, activist, professor of law at Harvard, United States

Ásta Guðrún Helgadóttir, MP Piratar, Iceland

Birgitta Jónsdóttir, MP Piratar, Iceland

Katrín Oddsdóttir, Assembly member of the Constitutional Council, Iceland

Gunnar Grímsson, co-founder of Citizens Foundation, Iceland

Róbert Bjarnason, founder Citizens Foundation, Iceland

First Þórhildur Sunna Ævarsdóttir, Laywer in charge of the International Relationships at the Piratar Party, Iceland

Bergþór Heimir Þórðarsson, member of Piratar, Iceland

Kristín Elfa Guðnadóttir, member of Piratar, Iceland

Hrannar Jónsson, member of Piratar, Iceland

Santiago Siri, founder of Democraty Earth, Argentina

Ana Lis Rodríguez Nardelli, member of the Network Party, Argentina

Stephania Xydia, co-funder Place Identity, Greece. 

More here.

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Milica Begovic, Joost Beunderman, Indy Johar: The intent of putting the Next Generation Governance (#NextGenGov) agenda at the centre of the Istanbul Innovation Days 2018 was to start to explore the future of the world’s governance challenges, and to debate how a new set of models are needed to address a growing ‘relevance gap’ in governance and peacebuilding.

Any exploration into the Next Generation of Governance requires us to recognize that in an increasingly multi-polar world, a world where power is increasingly more directly used and the singular rule of law we had ‘hoped’ for is being challenged, the future of governance is not only about the technocratic capacity to make rules (even if they are machine readable rules), but also our ability to construct new social legitimacy for all and by all.

In a world where we are facing urgent calamities and deep-running risks like never before, organizations like UNDP are witnessing a growing gap between the incremental progress in practice and a rapidly accelerating set of challenges — whether rampant inequality and its impact on social cohesion, growing ranks of forcefully displaced people, the fragmentation of state agency, rapid depletion of the commons, or the seemingly intractable rise of new forms of violence. This gap — between the emerging reality (strategic risks) and existing practice — is set to exponentially grow unless there is a major rethink of development practice and how we remake governance fit for the 21st century.

Earlier, we hypothesized that across the world, our governance models are broken: we are holding on to 19th century models that deny the complexity of the ‘systemocracy’ we live in : a world of massive interdependencies. #NextGenGov therefore is an exploration — the first of many — of the type of experiments that chart a way towards a future in sync with the Sustainable Development Goals. It aims to explore the lessons, challenges and gaps emerging with governance not relegated to a single goal (SDG 16) but as the prerequisite of achieving the SDG agenda as a whole.

A very 21st century kind of failure

It could be argued governance is the central failure of the 21st century — sidelined as an inconvenient overhead, governance innovation has seen consistent underinvestment and a lack of attention. Our means of governance and regulation have become relics in an age of growing complexity. New capabilities and trends like rapid real-time data feedback loops, algorithmic decision making, new knowledge of the pathways of injustice and inequality, and the rise of new tools and domains of power are challenging established ways of decision making. Frequently hampered by simplistic notions about the levers of change, awed by networked power dynamics in the private sector and undermined by public sector austerity, many of us seem scared and disoriented in responding to the scale of failure and new needs we are witnessing. Worse still, we seem unable to make the case that ultimately, good governance should not be a means of state control but a means to unleash sustainably the full and fair capacity of all human beings.

In this context, the growing strategic risks of our age are making past governance protocols and processes increasingly incoherent and misaligned to the need of both member states and our broader global ecosystems; both real-world precedents and statistically derived probability are collapsing as viable decision-making tools. This incongruity is revealed at different scales and conditions:

1. The existing structures, governance and business models, skills, and institutional cultures are producing solutions that do not fit the new nature of problems they are supposed to be addressing (IPCC’s 1.5 C report and genetically engineered baby in China as most recent proxies of misalignment of current practice and emerging existential threats).

2. Business-as-usual as a method to address the entirely new scale and modality of problems is a recipe for decline and irrelevance (consider ongoing efforts to apply current regulatory paradigms to distributed technologies like blockchain).

3. Governments and investors too are experiencing the lack of coherence between existing solutions and emerging problems, and are therefore eager to restructure their relationship with UNDP and similar organisations.

Towards new Zones of Experiment

Searching for fresh perspectives, our approach was to hone in on a series of Zones of Experiment — a range of domains that could unlock some of the great transitions the world is facing. We looked at new ways to protect and restore the commons, to actualize the human rights of landless nations, and to prevent conflict and empower civic actors in revealing abuses. We also explored science fiction, arts and culture as seedbeds for imagining alternative economic systems, the role of new technologies in urban governance, and new practices in the way power is organized, manifested and influences decision making.

Across these zones of experiment, we are seeing how a new generation of edge practitioners is challenging the status quo, and how their experiments enable us to learn both context-specific and transferable lessons. Together, they point the way to the #NextGenGov agenda as a new approach to strategic innovation (and feedback coming in after the IID2018 indicates the need to explore additional Zones of Experiments with emerging new practices such as governance of digital financial markets and impact of systemic structural issues, such as decline of trust on single point sectors including attitudes towards vaccination).

Underlying all these is the double edged sword of rapid technological progress in a multi-polar world that is challenging established ethical certainties. The unexplainable AI is one such manifestation, where the advanced identification of correlation is argued to be sufficient to guide decision-making be judicial or even law enforcement, challenging — even perhaps regressing — us to a pre-scientific age and undermining the basic principles of governance — accountability and equality of treatment (as argued by Jacob Mchangama).

As Primavera de Filippi outlined in her keynote speech, new technological capabilities always carry the potential both to disrupt the status quo or conversely reify existing structures of power and inequality. If we want to put the new tools of power in the hands of the many not the few, we need to focus on the governance of the new infrastructures rather than rely on governance by those infrastructures. However, whether in blockchain applications (Primavera’s domain) or elsewhere, it is evident that often we simply don’t know yet what kind of detailed issues, unintended consequences or unexpected feedback loops we might face when applying new technological capabilities. This means experimentation can’t be seen as an add-on but should be at the core of exploring the future and rapid learning about implications of emerging trends.

This is not the place to summarize each zone of experiment discussed during the Istanbul Innovation Days. But we can outline a series of shared lessons and implications for the future of governance and peacebuilding.

1. Micro-massive Futures — A series of new micro-massive data, sensing, processing and influencing capabilities (as revealed in the work of Metasub, PulseLab Kampala and Decibel) is enabling state and non-state actors to transcend the tyranny of the statistically aggregated average, and instead focus on the micro, the unique and the predictive — early warnings on looming epidemics or weather-related crop failure, emerging signs of microbial antibiotic resistance, or the compound impacts of pollution on individuals, particularly in disadvantaged populations. The much more fine-grained understanding they enable (whether through big data, social media mining, or specific sampling and real-time blockchain-anchored measurement) creates radical new pathways to harboring and enhancing the public interest. Achieving decent average outcomes (of health, pollution, human development…) has more than ever become obsolete as a goal: the geographically, individually and temporally hyper specific data we can obtain, and the wicked nature of the issues at hand, require new ways of understanding ‘risk’ — and acting on it. This same micro-massive future on the other hand is also weaponizing the capacity to mine data in order to influence outcomes at the societal scale — opening up huge new questions about the meta governance of these new capacities in the first place. This implies a double set of responsibilities: if we can now govern and influence outcomes at the micro-level of the individual and molecular detail, and at the massive scale of societal bias, with at both scales growing capabilities to understand risk and predict possibilities — how do we govern in this new reality in order to use these powers for good? Or conversely how to ensure that the emerging capabilities of new governing realities are not resulting in human rights abuses, discrimination and violence?

2. From control to ennoblement — Where such distributed data generating and analysis capacity comes into its own is through new contracting agreements that change our capacity to manage shared assets. The multi-party contributory contracts, e.g. the blockchain-based agreements at the heart of the Regen Network, show us how the collective inertia around agricultural restoration could be overcome. Crucially, rather than disincentivizing ‘bad behaviours’ through control, such ennobling regulatory systems can now be imagined to incentivize, communicate and verify contributory systems. Equally, this capability is paving ways for entirely new class of governance mechanisms for the commons — including bestowing legal rights on rivers and the Amazon. How do we reimagine governance if such ennoblement and restoration would structurally be our objective?

3. Making the invisible visible — New ways of building the politics of change are continuously emerging. Using mapping, animation, arts and other visualization tools, practitioners like Forensic Architecture and Invisible Dust — and in different ways, Open Knowledge Germany — are empowering citizens and civic groups to reveal issues which for a wide range of reasons tend to remain hidden — whether in the case of state agents committing human rights abuses or pernicious, slow-moving killers like air pollution (which in many case of course equally implicates states in failing to uphold human rights). By involving distributed civic networks and creative professionals from right across traditional disciplines, and by connecting to the aspirations of populations in different ways, such emerging tactics act as a powerful complement to established tools to build the demand for change.

4. Hybrid participatory futures — Getting to a next level of citizen engagement in the transitions we face requires a next generation of platforms that enable engagement with complexity, new technology and alternative imaginings of the future. This is about new settings for deliberation, new ways of extending invitations to take part, and tapping into the creative resources of science fiction and the arts to reimagine social contract and alternative economic systems. Medialab Prado in Madrid, the Edgeryders community, the deliberative citizens’ assemblies in Ireland or, at local scale, RanLab’s deliberative polls across Africa, show in different ways that new settings for participation can engender new cultures of participation cutting across ‘online’ and ‘offline’. Their deep investment in the tactics of convening people enable the creation of new and highly constructive new communities of concern around difficult topics, as well as building legitimacy for bold experimental approaches. This in turn enables the prevention of potential policy failure or the addressing of topics hitherto thought untouchable by established political players. In an era that frequently bemoans the decline of trust in the abstract, such cultural infrastructure rebuilds avenues towards greater trustworthiness across different parties, and an ability to imagine futures unconstrained by current divisions and biases, as the mitigation of risk. As differing platforms have differing biases in terms of who they attract an what behaviors they foster, such participation will always needs to be hybrid — well curated online platforms, temporal gatherings and permanent physical spaces all play a role in building the shared legitimacy for civic innovation. Enabling the participatory co-creation of the future is a fundamental component of the governance architecture in a complex world: we must complement the nudging of people’s behavior (a crucial tactic which has been applied with considerable success) with nurturing human imagination and facilitating deliberation and engagement with evidence.

5. Public goods & rights beyond the state — In an era where about 68 million people are currently stateless and this number is expected to rise significantly in the coming years, we are seeing state players as unable, unwilling or simply absent in the anchoring of fundamental human rights like people’s individual and family identity, and unable to access public goods provided outside the national boundary. The Rohingya project and IRYO show powerful alternatives and lessons for the remaking of public services like healthcare for both refugee populations and other contexts where access to such services is patchy. These positive alternatives are equally matched by more challenges examples of the quasi privatization of justice — where large technology multinationals are already acting something like a judicial system — “one that is secretive, volatile, and often terrifying.’ They also reveal the need and possibility to reimagine not just service provision but also new architectures of governance beyond the nation state — consider the incoherence of applying national laws to growing numbers of stateless people, para-state futures around the world. The fundamental question arises whether the seemingly limitless rise in populations on the move and para state governance could compel us to imagine and construct at a more structural level new domains of service provision potentially disinter-mediated from the state — and whether that might be more than just dire necessity but also an opportunity to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

6. From Evidence based to Experimentation Driven Policy — In an age of increasing complexity, the danger of traditional evidence based policy leading us by the rear view mirror is evident. Instead, the zones of experiment — whether EcoLogic’s futuristic urban landscapes or the service design innovation shared by Pia Andrews from both New Zealand and New South Wales — show the possibility of a new arc of policy formation: experimentation is used to create new forms of situated intelligence and learning, consisting of both new evidence and new insights to underpin the ongoing and iterative development of policies and programmed. These pathways enable institutions to make sense of changes, (re)formulate intent and execution pathways, and thus co-evolve in an open and collaborative process. Fundamentally this is about recognizing 21st century governance will be structurally different: the new institutional capacity can clearly not be designed in vitro but has to grow in-situ, informed by strategic portfolios of experimental options in order to grow the evidence necessary for policy intervention.

7. Sovereignty 2.0. In an age where a vital commons governance can now also be advanced either by imbuing ecological entities — such as rivers in Columbia and elsewhere — with legal rights or by emerging new sets of capabilities like smart contracts and machine learning — as indicated by Regen Network — could this mean the massive scaling of strategies that imbue new types of bodies with ‘sovereign’ powers and capabilities for e.g. machine-based contracting and fining? If so, and heeding Primavera de Filippi’s warnings, the governance of these infrastructures will be a crucial field of innovation.

Whilst even individually these are important new trajectories, when taken together these emerging lessons show how we need to challenge our existing practices at a deeper level. Given the degrees of uncertainty and emergence we face, this implies a call for strategic investment in a broad portfolio of experiments can guide us to the future; fundamentally these are learning options that enable UNDP and its partners to seed and test new ways of governing across different domains. In parallel,#NextGenGov also pointed towards a further set of questions and challenges we face when staring into the future of Governance in a multi-polar tomorrow.

1. BEYOND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.

In a world of sped-up complexity and change, the social contracts and legitimacy underlying our governance systems are constantly in question, not least because the relevance gaps affecting nearly all players (between needs and capabilities; between promise and delivery; between aspiration and capacity) means that not just trust, but actual trustworthiness is in decline. Across the world, we are seeing broadly two cultural-societal paradigms that underlie potential future social contracts: both of which could be argued as falling. Where individualism is the main tenet, we all too often fail to mainstream and anchor societal innovations that would reduce collective risk, whether vaccination rates or distributed flood prevention strategies. Where the collective is seen to take priority over the individual, the possible inability to accommodate divergence and diversity risks undermining the distributed creativity, energy and drive needed (and available!) to address wicked issues. The challenge we face is to move towards social contracts based on an explicit recognition of interdependence — reaffirming the need for the hybrid participation structures suggested above to provide the distributed fertile ground for this, as well as opening the space for discussions on system governance beyond the human governance. In future Innovation Days and Next Gen Gov experiments we need to transcend natural rights and embrace new sovereignty 2.0: such as sovereignty for rivers, trees and forests, opening the scope for dynamic interactions of such rights frameworks for a new social ecological contract.

2. MORE THAN ONE DEMOCRACY?

Irrespective of scale or context, it is clear that no sole actor — whether state, civic sector, corporate or start-up — has the ability to tackle the wicked issues of our time alone. This means that discourses on good governance and democracy fundamentally have to be about the distributed power to co-create society. Clearly this is conditioned both by the openness of institutional infrastructures and by the socio-economic fundamentals that enable or hinder people’s agency. Recognizing democracy as creating the positive freedom of ‘being able to care’ (whether about individual life choices, the craftsmanship of work, and about wider social and planetary interdependencies) implies not just a concern about the trends that reduce such capabilities (such as declining economic growth, growing job insecurity or the disasters that uproot people’s lives) but also a focus on the multitude of avenues that enable such care to be expressed and acted upon. The challenge we face is that in this reality, seeing multiparty parliamentary systems as the sole mechanism for delivering democracy seems increasingly hollow: citizen assemblies and participative, high-frequency accountability & feedback systems are examples of vital complementary mechanisms for the enhancement and preservation of public and shared goods. The examples we have seen are evidence of how they can unlock positive, inclusive new avenues to the future at any scale from the local to the global — in ways that ‘politics’ as usual cannot.

3. BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION.

In the non-pejorative sense of the word, bureaucracy is at the core of governance. Innovation and experimentation in the realm of our everyday bureaucracy can change the nature and people’s experience of governance and everyday life itself — look no further than Mariana Mazzucato’s work on the role of bureaucracy to create new markets. Just like the 19th century centralized bureaucracies shaped the notion of the modern state, the present ‘boring revolution’ in our capabilities (e.g. around data insight, zero overhead cost of micro transactions and transparent multi-actor contributory contracts) can drive a radical reinvention of the notion of governance and power. This is what is at stake. The challenge we face is evident in the many salutary lessons that IID2018 provided, on how positive outcomes of this process should not be taken for granted. Instead they can only result from clear intent, human-centered design and an approach to strategic innovation that is up to the magnitude of the issues at hand.

Beyond IID2018…to be continued

The IID2018 was an effort to manifest the strategic relevance gap between our rapidly growing needs and risks, and our all-too-slowly developing practice — in this case that of increasingly inadequate global governance models and implications across a range of interdisciplinary policy spaces. If revealing strategic risks and their interrelated nature is about building the demand side for ambitious change — Invisible Dust’s credo of “making the invisible visible” clearly struck a chord — then what comes next has to be a strategic innovation response that goes beyond organizational tweaks or individual responses. After all, in a show-of-hands poll on the first day of IID2018, only 5 people thought the world is on track in achieving Sustainable Development Goals — hardly surprising, given recent news on climate change or the accumulating impact of air pollution on health and learning. Addressing governance failures is at the heart of delivering the SDGs and it will require concerted belief, effort and strategic scale investment.

By virtue of its cross-sectoral strategic development role, UNDP has a natural and unique responsibility to focus on addressing the strategic, entangled and systemic governance risks facing us at a national, transnational and global level — and in doing so it needs to act as integrator on a country and transnational levels, whilst recognizing and respecting the necessity of a multipolar yet machine advanced interoperable future — where the notion, means and conceptions of governance are fully reimagined and socially co-created for a 21st century. Practically, this means NextGenGov was just the beginning of investing in and building a strategic portfolio of experiments that enable partners to learn, manage risk, and effect system change, in order to rebuild the (technical, political, informational, financial) capability of states and civic actors for agile, iterative governance that is premised less on building solutions and more about dealing with our new certainty — uncertainty.

*Special thanks in developing a part of this blog (strategic relevance gap) go to Luca Gatti of Axilo.

The post 7 Lessons & 3 Big Questions for the Next 10 Years of Governance appeared first on P2P Foundation.

In recent years, many researchers and social activists from very different countries, like myself, have rediscovered the notion of the commons as a key idea to deepen social and environmental justice and democratise both politics and the economy. This reappropriation has meant questioning the vanguardist and hierarchical visions, structures and practices that for too long have characterised much of the left. This concept has resurfaced in parallel with the growing distrust in the market and the state as the main suppliers or guarantors of access to essential goods and services. The combined pressures of climate change and the crisis of capitalism that exploded in 2008 (a permanent and global crisis, which is no longer a series of conjunctural or cyclical recessions) force us to reconsider old paradigms, tactics and strategies. This means discarding both the obsolete models of planning and centralised production at the core of the so-called ‘real socialism’ of the last century and the state capitalism that we see today in China and a few other supposedly socialist countries, as well as the equally old and failed structures of present-day deregulated capitalist economies.

At first, the concept of the commons was disseminated by progressive intellectuals inspired by the work of Elinor Ostrom, the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in Economics, in 2009. Ostrom, an American political scientist, was a progressive academic, but could hardly be classified as a radical thinker or as a leftist activist. In the last decade, academics and activists from very diverse ideological families of the left have reviewed her contributions and have engaged in intense theoretical debates about the potential of the commons, based on the analysis of many inspiring prefigurative experiences currently underway.

Ostrom’s main contribution was to demonstrate that many self-organised local communities around the world successfully managed a variety of natural resources without relying on market mechanisms or state institutions. Currently, it is possible to identify various perspectives in the theoretical debates around the commons, but in general they all converge on the importance of a third space between the state and the market (which should not be confused with the Third Way outlined by Anthony Giddens and adopted by politicians as dissimilar as Tony Blair in Britain, Bill Clinton in the United States, or Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil as a hypothetical social democratic alternative to socialism and neoliberalism).

Nowadays, a quick search in Google about the commons results in millions of references. Most definitions tend to characterise commons as spaces for collective management of resources that are co-produced and managed by a community according to their own rules and norms. We (TNI) have recently published a report on the commons in partnership with the P2P Foundation, in which we refer to this concept as the combination of four basic elements: (1) material or immaterial resources managed collectively and democratically; (2) social processes that foster and deepen cooperative relationships; (3) a new logic of production and a new set of productive processes; and (4) a paradigm shift, which conceives the commons as an advance beyond the classical market/state or public/private binary oppositions.

In Latin America and Spain, those of us interested in this field of activism and research must overcome a linguistic obstacle, since the translation of the concept of the commons from English into Spanish is not always easy or appropriate. This problem also appears in other parts of the world, so we often use the original English word to avoid confusion. Some of our friends and comrades use the concept of bienes comunes, but this term refers to ideas linked to the old economy or the social imaginary propagated by the church and other conservative institutions, without capturing all the richness, complexity and potential of recent theoretical developments and empirical processes around the commons. Obviously, the production of meaning in this field has already spread beyond the Anglo-Saxon world and there are already many people in countries of the South involved in this type of processes. That’s why the P2P Foundation and other friendly organisations have added a new word to the Spanish dictionary, procomún, while others (like myself) prefer to use the word comunes, which derives from a literal translation of the original term. From a similar perspective, many European or African activists prefer to use the English term instead of bens comuns (Portuguese), beni comuni (Italian), biens communs (in French), or gemeingüter (German).

Are the concepts of ‘the commons’ and ‘the public’ synonymous?

This question is the axis of heated theoretical debates, since it alludes to the old discussion about the nature and role of the state. The defenders of the commons who are most disillusioned with the left in government in several Latin American countries, particularly those linked to the fundamentalist autonomist current (like many of my friends in the Andean region, mainly those who are involved in struggles around the rights to water or energy) are convinced that the state should not assume any role and that the social order should be restructured by transferring political and economic power to self-organised local communities. Other researchers and activists (including myself, something that’s not surprising having been born in a country as state-centric as Uruguay) retort that such a contradiction is artificial and that we should at the same time expand the reach and influence of the commons – for example, by creating and interconnecting new types of authentically self-managed cooperative enterprises– and democratising or ‘commonising’ the state – for instance, incorporating workers and users into the management of existing state-owned enterprises or creating new public-public partnerships for the provision of essential public services.

My friend Michel Bauwens, a Belgian social activist internationally recognised as one of the most creative and influential thinkers in this field, often highlights the importance of what he has characterised as the partner state. From his (and mine) perspective, the state is perceived not as the enemy, but as an entity that could provide local communities and self-organised workers with the institutional, political or economic power that would be required for these processes to reach their maximum potential in the framework of the political and economic transition that we need. It also means, among several other possibilities to be considered, the provision of financial or in-kind support for cooperatives or other initiatives inspired by the notion of the commons.

The idea of the ​​partner state is in line with some relatively recent theoretical debates among Marxist thinkers. Today, and especially after a series of counter-hegemonic governments that we have had in Latin America, we’re already very aware that the contemporary state is not simply that “committee for the management of the common affairs of the bourgeoisie” that Marx and Engels referred to in the Communist Manifesto. Neither Marx nor Engels were interested in developing a unified or integral theory about the state, so we should not interpret their statement (from the year 1848!) literally,. In the 1970s, Nikos Poulantzas and other non-dogmatic thinkers began to rethink the institutional framework of capitalist societies and argued that the state should be understood as a social relationship and not as an abstract entity floating above conflicting social classes, and added that the transformation of state institutions could be possible in the context of a “democratic way to socialism” (opened by the government experience of Popular Unity in Chile and brutally repressed by a military coup in 1973). More recently, Bob Jessop has shown how, although the state has a strong structural bias towards the reproduction of social relations, it’s also influenced by the totality of social forces, including counter-hegemonic struggles. My perspective of analysis on the state and the commons is very influenced by Jessop, and also by David Harvey, when he argues that a big problem on the left is that many – pointing to John Holloway and other proponents of the thesis of “changing the world without taking power” – think that the capture of state power wouldn’t be of much importance in emancipatory processes. We must recognise the incredible power accumulated in the institutions of the state and, therefore, we shouldn’t underestimate the importance of state institutions; in particular when there’re opportunities to enable the expansion of the commons.

To those who are interested in deepening the knowledge of contemporary theoretical debates on the state and the commons, I would recommend reading our comrade Hilary Wainwright, the British political economist with whom I co-coordinate the TNI New Politics Project. A few years ago Hilary wrote a beautiful book, Reclaim the State: Experiments in Popular Democracy, where she argued the need to ‘occupy’ state institutions while, in parallel, we organise ourselves to create and connect new political and economic institutions rooted in local communities and workers’ collectives. Her books, the one mentioned here and more recent ones, are based on the detailed investigation of positive examples of commons-related initiatives across the Globe.

In recent years, within the framework of our New Politics project, Hilary, myself, and many other activist-scholars from different regions of the world have tried to make sense of a substantial shift in emancipatory thinking. Until not long ago, the economic policy of much of the left included the proposal of nationalisation of key industries. Nowadays, and maybe influenced by the recognition of the failures or shortcomings of nationalisation in places like Venezuela (where in recent years there’s been a recentralisation of political and economic power in the hands of the bureaucrats and military that control the reins of the state, with very negative in terms of lesser autonomy and influence for popular organisations and with very bad indicators in the management of nationalised companies) many of us are more interested in the design of a new economy based on cooperative relations, in which state institutions would play a facilitating and protective role. We emphasise the importance of public ownership of public services and productive infrastructure, but only as long we ensure a significant level of decentralised ownership and management; for example, in the provision of water and energy services and in the production of a vast range of goods through networks of self-managed ventures.

This perspective also means a deeper and more serene examination of the ambivalent consequences of the scientific and technological changes currently underway. We already know that the emerging forms of organisation and control of information and communication technologies and distributed production constitute a very contested space, in which a few transnational corporations (I’m thinking of Uber, Airbnb and other examples of the wrongly called ‘sharing economy’) financialise and benefit from precarious workers, the users of social networks and independent software programmers – with negative impacts on unions’ power and on the quality of work – but we should also be able to recognise that the same technological developments could be beneficial for the (re)creation of truly solidarity, democratic and self-managed forms of ownership and management. Around the world, we can see the emergence of a new generation of workers who use their technological knowledge to launch new enterprises and networks based on the principles of the commons and coordinate and collaborate among themselves, transcending economic sectors and geographical borders, and being ethically (and increasingly also politically) aware of the new social and economic order they’re creating.

How would you appraise the so-called ‘pink tide’ in Latin America vis-à-vis the commons?

My personal perspective on these issues has evolved, as I tried to understand the arguments of comrades from other Latin American countries who posed a very strong critique of the statist political culture prevalent in some political and academic circles of the region. Like many Uruguayans, it was hard for me to assimilate the positions of compañeros like Pablo Solón in Bolivia, Edgardo Lander in Venezuela, Arturo Escobar in Colombia, Maristella Stampa in Argentina, or Eduardo Gudynas himself in Uruguay. They (and many others) are strong critics of ‘development’, and in particular of its ‘(neo)extractivist’ component. In short, my critique to them focused on two aspects: their staunch criticism of the state, and their inability to formulate alternatives or proposals to transcend the reality that they criticised. With the passage of time, and after many and agitated discussions with Pablo and Edgardo in workshops at the World Social Forum, seminars of our New Politics project and other similar spaces, I could understand that their criticisms of the state (not always so homogeneous nor so acidic as I perceived them) were not that far from my own criticism of the Latin American left, and I also ended up realising that indeed there were proposals embedded in their criticisms.

My position on these issues has also been influenced by my increasingly pessimistic interpretation of the outcomes of our progressive of left governments. After having followed very closely the processes of Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, and to a lesser extent also those of Bolivia and Nicaragua, I think we should ask ourselves up to what point is it possible for the left to get involved in government without losing autonomy and our utopian perspective. In other word: is it possible to operate within the state apparatus without being caught in the demobilising logic of institutional power? Unlike some of the friends I mentioned before, I don’t have a single or categorical answer to such question. I still believe that the state has a very important role to play, but I’m also convinced that it is now imperative for the left to get rid of its obsolete state-centric vision and open up to fresh perspectives like those of the commons.

For the Uruguayan left, such transition could be difficult, if we consider the heavy weight of the state in our society, politics, economics and culture. A significant difference between Uruguay and most other countries in the region is its long tradition of strong and efficient state-owned companies, which are highly appreciated by the population. In Uruguay, people perceive the state as a catalyst for development and guarantor of equity and social integration. On the other hand, the transition could be made easier if we consider the already high significance of workers’ and housing cooperatives. I grew up in a mutual-aid housing cooperative, so I might not be entirely objective. And we know that not all cooperatives are well managed or are internally democratic or participatory, but when we compare the reality of the Uruguayan cooperative sector with other countries of the region and the world, it’s clear that we already have a very fertile terrain for the development of the commons.

From a purely theoretical or ideological point of view, many components of the current global debate around the commons wouldn’t be a novelty for the Uruguayan left. If we look at several parties that compose the ruling coalition Frente Amplio(Broad Front), we realise that parties as different as the Progressive Christian Democrats (PDC, the advocates of the thesis of socialismo autogestionario, self-managed socialism), the People’s Victory Party (PVP, in line with their libertarian roots), or the Socialist Party (PS, with their proposal of transition from co-management to self-management, which the party has been advocating since 1930, when it demanded workers’ control of the economy) have been for a long time formulating programmatic ideas that transcend the limits of statism.

In other countries of the region, it would seem that the proposal of the commons would be more compatible with the governmental discourse. In fact, the proponents of the commons in Europe often refer to the concepts of vivir bien (living well) or buen vivir (good living), which came from Latin America. These concepts became popular on a world scale as a supposed alternative paradigm to capitalism. The concepts of suma qamaña and sumaq kawsay have their roots in the economic and societal models developed over centuries by the indigenous peoples of the Andean and Amazonian regions, prioritising forms of production more horizontal and in harmony with nature. The translation (or ‘export’) into other languages and cultures is problematic, but in the countries of origin the significance of these concepts can be debated as well. Bolivia and Ecuador, during the governments led by Evo Morales and Rafael Correa, incorporated the notions of living well and good living in their respective constitutions and policy guidelines, but the policies implemented have not always been coherent with the spirit or with the letter of the new legal and institutional framework. In Ecuador, in the framework of the very radical turn to the right performed by president Lenin Moreno in recent months, the discourse of buen vivir (which sounds beautiful and guarantees a left patina) is being used to provide justification for an impending wave of privatisation and corporatization of public services. In Venezuela, there was also much talk around self-management and people’s power, and considerable resources were allocated to the creation of cooperatives and associative ventures of a new type, but in practice very little progress was achieved; the rentier model based on the exploitation of a single resource – oil – deepened during the governments of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, and its current exhaustion is the most important factor to explain the political, economic and social crisis that the country suffers today.

What are the organisational and programmatic challenges of the left for the integration of the idea of the commons into its political platform?

To answer this question, I should start by clarifying that I do not believe that the promotion of the commons should be the only strategy of the left. I believe that we must embrace the emancipatory vision of the commons, but without forgetting the role of the state and the need to respond to the very urgent problems of large sectors of the population. I agree with the criticisms of the hegemonic model of development and support the struggles against extractivism. I also tend to agree with many elements (not the whole package) of the emerging theorisation around the concept of degrowth – which is already very influential among European left circles, but not very significant within the Latin American left. But I disagree with visions such as Escobar’s when he speaks of “underdevelopment” as a mere “narration”, presenting it as an abstract concept that the colonialists would have elaborated and spread for the colonized to repeat. We can’t ignore the terrible rates of poverty, exclusion, and poor access to basic goods and services that still affect millions of Latin Americans. Our region should be incorporated into the global fight against climate change, and we must promote new forms of organisation and production that preserve the ecological balance, but we must also respond to social demands in the context of a quite likely deterioration of the economic situation in the short or medium terms. In that sense, I believe that the impulse to the commons must be framed within a broader strategy of growth, different from that offered by predatory and savage capitalism.

Thinking about the specific conditions of Uruguay, and based on data and projections published by local researchers, it should already be evident that the promotion of mega-projects like the huge paper mills run by Finnish corporations, or the already privatisation of the wind segment of the energy sector, don’t constitute the most appropriate developmental strategy. I would have preferred that the effort made by the government to convince us that the attraction of direct foreign investment and the liberalisation of trade are the right path would have been accompanied by serious studies sustained by reliable information to appraise the pros and cons of two different strategies: supporting large private investment on the one hand, and the promotion of the local and popular solidarity economy on the other. What would be the impacts of redirecting the tax exemptions and the large explicit or covert subsidies received by large transnational corporations if all that money were used to support cooperatives and other associative enterprises rooted in the national economy? I don’t have concrete answers to these queries, but I know that other Uruguayan economists and social researchers also raise similar questions and could provide objective and relevant information to deepen this exchange.

How to incorporate the commons within a political project that aims at the de-commodification of public services?

In Latin America we have many valuable examples of de-commodification of public services, past and present, that we should reconsider in the framework of current exchanges around the commons. A few years ago, during the heyday of what we then praised as the Bolivarian ‘revolution’, I worked in Venezuela and I was able to appreciate very closely the emergence of multiple processes of popular self-organisation in which millions of people participated. I’m referring to the mesas técnicas (people’s technical committees), the consejos comunitarios de agua(community water councils), the consejos comunales (communal councils) and the comunas (communes). Unfortunately, most of these processes are no longer in existence or in terminal crisis. Individualism and competition has been stronger than solidarity and cooperation in the responses to the crisis that Venezuela is experiencing today. This is a sad realisation, which forces us to question ourselves about the reasons and the conditions that made possible the erosion of processes that many of us considered very strong and even irreversible. A large part of the communal and participatory initiatives that had emerged in the most fecund years of the Venezuelan transition have gone into rapid regression when faced with the loss of the resources provided by the state (of which they had become dependent), in the context of the terrible deterioration of the social and economic situation. I think that many lessons can emerge from Venezuela, both on the potential of the commons and on the fragility of processes of this type. It also forces us to rethink the limits of ‘revolutionary’ political projects that are excessively focused on the state.

At the international level, and taking as a basis for analysis the European reality – which is the one that today I know better, since it’s my place of residence, activism and research – I believe that Latin Americans could ‘import’ some interesting ideas from current European exchanges on alternatives to commodification and corporatization. The side of the European left most active side in the promotion of the commons is that linked to struggles around the right to the city and the citizen platforms that won local office in several Spanish cities. Today, an important part of the European left perceives the city as the privileged space for political, social and economic experimentation, without seeing cities as isolated entities or at the margin of processes aimed at changing the state on a national scale, but recognising their growing significance in the new regional and world order. It’s not by chance that the fight against climate change or for the recovery of public services are led by networks of progressive local governments. Barcelona En Comú, the citizen coalition that now governs the Catalan capital, in particular, is a very powerful source of inspiration of regional and world importance. The political influence of Barcelona today is comparable to the hope that Porto Alegre, Montevideo and other Latin American capitals had been generated in the 1980s and 1990s, when the left began to experiment with participatory budgeting and other innovative policies for the radicalisation of democracy at the municipal level. Barcelona is today a laboratory for the design and testing of multiple initiatives inspired by the principle of the commons.

Another possible source of inspiration could be the current program of the British Labour Party. Since Jeremy Corbyn became party leader, Labour has become much more radical than our Frente Amplio and most other left parties in Latin America and Europe. The Labour Party has a proposal for renationalisation that’s much more advanced than similar initiatives applied or proposed anywhere else in the world. In the specific case of the energy sector, Corbyn and his party propose to bring back the sector into public hands, so that the country’ energy becomes environmentally sustainable, affordable for users, and managed with democratic control, as stated in the programmatic manifesto launched last year. But renationalisation, from this perspective, does not simply implies that the state retakes control by going back to the obsolete state-owned companies of the past, but rather the combination of different forms of public ownership and management. In short, Labour proposes not merely to re-nationalise companies that had been privatised during Thatcherism and Blairism, but to reconvert the big banks and other financial institutions that during the crisis had been saved from bankruptcy with public monies into a network of local banks based on mixed ownership (state and social), or the creation of new municipal utilities. The party is committed to create new municipal utilities, inspired by some socially-owned companies already in operation – such as Robin Hood Energy in Nottingham – or by popular campaigns – such as Switched On London – that propose the de-privatisation of power through the launch of new public enterprises, rooted in a more democratic type of management based on the active participation of users and workers, being environmentally sustainable, and securing services with affordable rates for the entire population.

Originally posted at the Transnational Institute Website

Lead image by Roger Cunyan. Additional image by Isabella Jusková.

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