In anthropology, the traditional progression of social order, from lower to higher complexity, is as follows: tribe, big-man group, chiefdom, proto-state, and state. While the lines between these designations are necessarily blurry, there is also a general increase in centralization and hierarchy as one moves from the less complex to the more complex. Do these anthropology terms provide any insight into the social organization of Nation-States post collapse, or of Nation-States that have transitioned to Market-States and abandoned the notion of a social contract?

Perhaps–here are two contemporary examples:

In Mexico, the effective penetration of the state is rapidly retreating, and has been effectively replaced–at least in some areas, times, and roles–by the drug cartels. While consistently referred to as “drug-cartels” in the domestic and foreign press, that term doesn’t seem to do justice to their political platforms or business models any more than it suffices to call Goldman Sachs a “bank.” More accurately, these drug cartels could be described as diagonal chiefdoms. In the anthropological lexicon, “chiefdom” means an intermediately complex form of social organization that 1) exhibits ranked social order, but 2) does not control or extend institutionally into all aspects of social organization. The cartels are certainly ranked (making them more “complex” in the standard lexicon, than big-man groups), and they also exhibit a limited institutional reach (falling short of proto-state by largely ignoring any commitment to a social contract and delegating religion and spirituality to a non-integrated catholic church).

Conversely, I think the internet–specifically the “blogosphere” (a terrible term, but there you have it)–stands as an example of a “big-man group.” More precisely, it is a network of big-man groups that already occupy a diagonal beyond the exclusive control of the state. Big-man group is another anthropological term that requires defining: a non-hierarchal social structure structured by the influence of “big men” actors (of either sex, or even potentially corporate form) who gain their influence through success in a relevant endeavor–growing tubers in Melanesia, popularity in High School social systems, or visitor counts and links in the blogosphere, for example.

Why does it matter what organizational structure back-fills the retreating state? Consider these alternate structures in light of Hakim Bey’s concept of the “TAZ” (actually, his essays on periodic autonomous zone, permanent autonomous zone, or no-go zone may be more appropriate here) and Hardt & Negri’s “Diagonal”: these neo-chiefdoms and neo-big-men-groups are not exclusive in Cartesian space, but rather coexist–with the Market-State, and with each other. Within the Nation-State context this is often phrased “civil society,” but in a post-Nation-State world it will be much different. These Chiefdoms and Big-Men Groups will go beyond modern civil society and fill the vacuum of part of the role of the state–specifically, rather than a single state claiming a monopoly on the use of violence within a Cartesian space, multiple organizations, actors, and networks will claim some source of legitimacy in the use of violence.

Minimizing the oppressive use of violence is far more than a mere nicety–the difference between the minimally complex hierarchal structure (chiefdom) and the minimally complex non-hierarchal structure (big-men network) may be the difference between success or failure (especially from a median quality of life standpoint) in a post-Nation-State, post-Peak Oil civilization. Without the energy surpluses required to fuel a broad-based consumer society, and the related ability to impose a global “South” as a productive base, local feudal chiefdoms do not hold much promise for the median, especially after enough of the local surplus has been siphoned off to maintain the trappings befitting chiefly rank. Just ask the median Mexican in Sinaloa or Tijuana how well that system is working for them. Conversely, the overlapping big-men network represents the application of the blogosphere model to the primary economy. I’ve discussed the benefits of this type of model elsewhere–resiliency through decentralization, parallel innovation/information processing, the elimination of the information processing burden of a centralized hierarchy, the elimination of the need for political surplus that can no longer be sustained in a post-peak environment, etc.

I have yet to spot a full, single definition of the market state. But to judge from scattered elements, it is about states becoming shaped more by global market forces — by globalization — than by national forces of all kinds. It is also about governments redesigning themselves to rely on market-oriented measures: e.g., decentralization, deregulation, privatization, outsourcing, subcontracting. Moreover, Bobbitt claims that “the market state exists to maximize the opportunities enjoyed by all members of society” ( p. 229). It is “above all, a mechanism for enhancing opportunity, for creating something — possibilities — commensurate with our imagination” (p. 232). That purpose, in Bobbitt’s view, is its hallmark, making the market state philosophically and strategically distinct from earlier varieties of the state.

As to timeline, Bobbitt treats the market state as something quite new. He dates its appearance from 1989, and foresees that the “transition to the market-state is bound to last over a long period” (p. 233). At present, “the market-state has not fully emerged or been fully realized and accepted by any society” (p. 335). Indeed, he reiterates in an interview, “We are only just a few of years down the road to what will be a many decades long process, but you can already see signs of this happening.”

Yet, what seems mostly new to me in all of this is Bobbitt’s novel name for the phenomenon. In substance, it is not much different from what Richard Rosecrance earlier termed the “trading state” (1986) and the “virtual state” (1999). More to the point, I’d say, its emergence began in the early 1970s when “transnational interdependence” began to gain notice in writings about the rise of multinational corporations and other nonstate actors, the fusing of domestic and international matters, the globalization of commerce and communications, and hence the growth of new constraints on the traditions of sovereignty and territoriality. (See writings by a host of theorists back then, notably Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and James Rosenau).

Thus, it is inaccurate for Bobbitt to go on to argue, as he does in his next book, that developments like these “are outside the frame of reference of the popular theories of international relations that circulated at the end of the 20th century” (pp. 30-31). Many of the trends he emphasizes had been noticed for decades and took hold during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton presidencies in the 1980s-1990s. Even the individualist, opportunity-maximizing goal that Bobbitt stresses reflects the libertarianism that has coursed so strongly the past decade or two. And it is not at all clear that other market states elsewhere will be so libertarian — possibly quite the contrary.

In other words, insofar as the United States is concerned, Bobbitt’s concept is far more a reflection of the present than a portent of the future, and it’s been developing decades longer than his analysis conveys. It may be true that the nature of the market state is still unfolding in the United States, and that it has barely taken hold elsewhere around the world. But it may also turn out that the recent U.S. version proves more an exception than a rule, more ephemeral than enduring.

Thus, my TIMN angle is that, much as I’m impressed by Bobbitt’s coinage of “market state” as a term, it may turn out to say more about the American present than the world’s future, and it began to emerge decades earlier than he argues. The term does illuminate the exalted (overweening?) influence that global market forces exert over states these days. It also reflects the rising importance of outsourcing, subcontracting, and other market-oriented measures — sometimes called “government by market” (or acidly, “market-mimicking governance”) — as options for government policies and programs. That is useful and revelatory; it means the concept helps focus people’s perceptions on how powerful and pervasive market forces have become. But are we thereby opening our eyes to the beginning or the end of a long trend?

Let’s recall that the +M form began to spread centuries ago, and that its principles long ago filtered into and altered the nature of states, enabling the rise of increasingly open competitive political systems. That helps account for Europe’s evolution from the absolutist state to the liberal democratic (or parliamentary) state — in other words, from a state devoted to hierarchical (+I) doctrines, to a state whose electoral, party, and other structures also rested in part on market-like (+M) political principles.

From a TIMN perspective, then, the market state actually has a long history. It overlaps with the nation state and does not represent a departure from it as Bobbitt claims. Indeed, the world’s major liberal democracies —nation states all — have amounted to early market states for over a century. What Bobbitt has illuminated is the late market state — its overwrought aging, not its youthful rise.

If Bobbitt’s “market state” is better viewed as the “late market state” arising a century or so after the “early market state,” then its rise is occurring on the eve of the next major form: the network (+N). And that suggests a new proposition about TIMN dynamics. I’m not sure, but perhaps absolutism in the Middle Ages may be viewed not only as a pinnacle of the +I hierarchical form, but also as its overwrought exaltation, again on the eve of the rise of a next major form: in that era, the market (+M). Perhaps — and here’s the proposition (phrasing tentative) — the late aging of one form may interact with the germinal stirrings of the next in a way that leads existing regimes to overemphasize the aging form, partly to defend against the rise of the germinal form that those regimes are just beginning to detect.

The welfare state and the market state are now two defunct and mutually supporting failures. The real merit of the current conservative renaissance has in some way escaped notice. Those on the now bankrupt left argue that the new Toryism is but a cover for Thatcherism Mark II, while those on the bankrupt right secretly agree and seem to want nothing more than a return to monopoly capitalism and the dominance of their kind of people.

According to Blond, the civic state will restore people’s participation in “the common good” by re-enabling “the associative drive” that liberalism stifled. Thus it will be a state that “privileges the associative above the alienated, the responsible over the self-serving and . . . the communal over the individual.” It will express a “radical communitarian civic conservatism” — his “red Toryism” concept — that can “inveigh with equal vigour against public monopolies of state and giant cartels of the market”.

This is not just high-sounding rhetoric, for he makes clear the direction he wants the state to go in:

“In the political realm, we have to admit that democracy doesn’t work particularly well, mainly because it’s hugely centralized and substantially captured by vested interests. We need to turn it upside-down — a doctrine of radical democratic subsidiarity that would allow local associations both to select and vote for their own candidates. We can’t do that in the current political settlement. It’s too locked; there are too many vested interests. But if, like budgetary capture, we had a democratic capture, we could send democracy back to the streets. If we could ally that political economy with actual democracy, we could really have bottom-up associations and render the central state increasingly superfluous.” (source; my italics)

“The new civil state would restore what the welfare state has destroyed — human association. This new civil state will turn itself over to its citizens; it will foster the power of association and allow its citizens to take it over rather as it had originally taken over them. . . . So conceived the monolithic state could gradually be broken down into an associative state where citizens took over and ran their own services . . . .” (source; my italics)

Thus, Blond proposes that the “public sector should be broken up — not privatized out” — and many of its services transferred to civil-society actors apart from the existing public and private sectors. That appears to be his main point about the civic state; it is mainly “a facilitator” in this associative scheme. The state is still a parliamentary democracy atop a party system; but its bureaucracy is smaller, and its orientation to the economy and civil society has been redefined and restructured.

He links this to ideas for a “re-moralized market” — a “whole new model of social capitalism” based on a “civic economy” — that would benefit small and medium businesses and be less fraught by government bureaucracies and corporate cartels. However, I’m going to skip over that, and head into what’s far more significant for my sense of TIMN: Blond’s proposals for new kinds of civil-society associations.

Blond’s vision is about creating the civic state. But to make that feasible, his vision is even more about re-energizing civil society — so much so that local civil associations get to assume functions long performed by the state.

It envisages the rise of a “social economy” based on a “new localism”. And it’s loaded with lingo about public service businesses, social businesses, social enterprises, civil companies, and civic companies. I’m not exactly sure what such terms mean, but the aim is clear: a bottom-up system for “citizen groups to take over government budgets and run them for themselves” (source). Blond favors worker buy-outs, employee-owned coops, and local investment trusts, where employees and other locals get to share in ownership, and profit is not the key purpose. His emphasis is on the delivery of public services, but he also proposes reforms to banking. It’s all very much about mutualism and distributism, in conservative senses.

However, criticism has been levelled against Wikipedia regarding its mode of governance. According to some of this criticism, the power structure within Wikipedia is invisible, vague and opaque, giving rise to a tyranny of structurelessness (Freeman, 1970; Bauwens, 2008). Critical questions such as “what kind of problems does Wikipedia’s governance experience?” and “why does it happen?” are examined in this paper. The narrative of this paper is structured around the conflict between inclusionists and deletionists. In conclusion, some tentative enhancement proposals are articulated.

Reflections

Wikipedia is about representations of knowledge, about unfinished artifacts in a constant process of creation and evaluation. It does not rely on hierarchical structures, but on the wisdom of the crowds for its quality control processes. This is undoubtedly a valuable lesson learned by Bruns (2008; interview with Bruns, 2009). It illustrates that Wikipedia is a peer project, most of the times, relied upon self–organized, uncontrollable, heterarchical structures. Of course, this does not imply that there are no particular requirements to be met. On the one hand, Wikipedia follows some certain rules (WP:RULES) for content creation, which are in some cases mutually inconsistent and conflicting. Therefore, administrators who are adept at manipulating the rules are capable of defeating their foes in order to justify a deletion, block or ban. Active and organized minorities often prevail over the uncoordinated majority and others.

Many critically commented on the lack of clarity of Wikipedia’s rules and on the absence of a functional conflict resolution process for content disputes, without turning these disputes into editorial slugfests. The majority of participants in this research suggested that there is an urgent need for reform. In particular, Kort [17] pointed out that “the whole Rules and Sanctions paradigm is ill–conceived and should be scrapped in favor of a ‘21st Century Community Social Contract Model’ consistent with collegial norms of academic and scholarly enterprises.” Further, it was argued that artificial scarcity, which the deletionist approach inevitably creates, leads to a need for a power mechanism. An inclusionist view, on the other hand, would avoid many internal conflicts. Moreover, from discussions with (ex–)Wikipedians, it became clear that this battle over content is detrimental to the project. This struggle facilitates an “unproductive need” for self–definition, while the case itself is much more complex than just a simple dichotomy.

The consensus of my discussions and interviews with experts and (ex–)Wikipedians can be very well reflected in Bruns’ comments [18]: “If those criteria [Wikipedia’s core principles — neutral point of view, verifiability, non–original research] are met, I can’t see any reason to delete a submitted entry — however obscure the topic may be.” Hence, a recommendation could be that the project return to its inclusionist roots. At the same time, following Kort’s proposal, an unambiguous community social contract model should be openly formulated to secure, protect, empower and enrich the peer mode of governance.

Lessons for peer governance

Wikipedia’s mode of governance is an unfinished artifact. It follows the constant reform and refinement of social norms within the community. However, open participation in combination with an increasing number of participants makes the situation more complex (O’Neil, 2009). By examining the battle between inclusionists and deletionists, it was understood that Wikipedia’s lack of a clearly defined constitution, or what Kort [19] calls a “Community Social Contract Model,” breeds a danger for local jurisdictions where small numbers of participants create rules in conflict with others (O’Neil, 2009). These challenge the sustainability of the peer project. Arguably, the degree of openness in every aspect of a peer project’s governance should be questioned and closely investigated.

During conflicts, persistent, well–organized minorities can adroitly handle and dominate their opponents. The values of communal evaluation and equipotentiality are subverted by such practices. As Hilbert [20] remarked group polarization is a significant danger that open, virtual communities face: “discourse among like–minded people can very quickly lead to group polarization … which causes opinions to diverge rather than converge … [so], it is very probable that the strongest groups will dominate the common life.” In these cases, transparency and holoptism are in danger. Decisions are being made in secret and power is being accumulated. Authority, corruption, hidden hierarchies and secrecy subvert the foundations of peer governance, that is openness, heterachy, transparency, equipotentiality and holoptism — the very essence of Wikipedia.

Peer governance is a suitable mode to govern large sources, working more effectively in abundance [21]. This constitutes the main argument why Wikipedia should return to its inclusionist roots, while a functional, scrupulous and scientifically designed resolution process for content disputes and an unambiguous community social contract model needs to be implemented.

Conclusions

As noted earlier, the main characteristics of peer governance are equipotentiality, heterarchy, holoptism, openness, networking, and transparency. “The aim of peer governance is to maximize the self–allocation and self–aggregation by the community, and to have forms of decision–making that do not function apart and against the broader collective from which they spring.”

Wikipedia is constantly at risk of transforming itself into an inflexible, despotic hierarchy, while new disputes are emerging about the mode of content creation and governance. As the size of Wikipedia increases (in terms of both content and participants), it becomes more difficult and complex for a relatively small group of administrators to keep track of everything that happens “in the far–flung of the site.” [23] Co–ordination problems on interpersonal and interorganizational levels as well as gaps concerning the interests and the identities of the inter–Wikipedian communities result in governance crises, threatening the sustainability of the project. Active and organized minorities often prevail over the uncoordinated majority and others. Further, the vague distinction among the social and technical powers of administrators — who sometimes take more authoritative roles and make more ‘moral’ decisions about user behavior — leads to power accumulation in one section of the community (Forte and Bruckman, 2008). A functional resolution process for resolving content disputes and an unambiguous community social contract model are needed. Wikipedia may follow some rules regarding content creation, which, however, in some cases are mutually inconsistent and conflicting. Thus, administrators, adept at gaming the system, can pick and choose among rules, and defeat their opponents. Moreover, how do you balance participation and selection for excellence? In other words, “how to make sure that truth does not become the rule of the majority and that expertise can find its place?” [24]

In addition, artificial scarcity, the fundamental point of deletionists, leads to a need for a power mechanism. A line has to be drawn between the sphere of abundance, where self–allocation is natural, and the field of scarcity, where cost–recovery requirements demand choices. As has been articulated, for the latter, some formal democratic rules are needed. According to Bauwens [25]:

“Rules and requirements that select for excellence and function against external attacks are legitimate, but processes that protect a privileged layer are illegitimate and destroy or weaken both the self–aggregation and the democratic procedures. So, what can go wrong? 1) The sphere of abundance can be designed to create artificial scarcities, which create limited choices and therefore power to choose … 2) In the sphere of the Foundations, such as the Wikimedia Foundation, which manage the infrastructure of cooperation, a lot can go wrong … such as a lack of differentiation between community and private business interests, and the lack of community representation in the Foundation … So, when the private power of Jimmy Wales and the formal leaders of the Foundation mix and merge with the informal powerbase of the privileged editors, there is a lot of potential for abuse.”

Proposals

Bauwens suggested that in the case of Wikipedia it would be essential “to return the project to its inclusionist roots, i.e., recognition of abundance; the strengthening of democracy and community representation in the Wikimedia Foundation; full transparency and business divestment in the Foundation.” Based on my research, I side with a moderate inclusionist perspective of Wikipedia’s content. After all, to put it in Bruns’ style (2008), Wikipedia is about “representations of knowledge.” A bottom–up self–organizational mode is enhanced by the reform of rules for content creation, creation of a functional process for resolving content disputes and the formulation of an unambiguous community social contract model. These developments are crucial steps supporting the sustainability of the project and empowerment of peer governance.

While some worry about a danger of the tyranny of the majority, a notion of meta–governance — that is operating in a context of negotiated decision–making — will handle many issues. Bauwens, partly echoing Jessop (2003) on meta–governance, noted:

“A possible solution is to create a mirror page for experts, who do not make the final decision, but can point to scholarly weaknesses in the open pages. I would also recommend the allowing of personal or collective forks, so that people can encounter a variety of perspectives, next to the official consensus page.”

This was normally an occasion for government officials to present the results of their experiments on the best variety of soybean to grow in the off season, or the best time to apply which kind of fertilizer, etc. All this was based on the results of research that had usually been conducted on the centre’s own trial plots in accordance with accepted practice.

This normally meant that the research question was quite narrow and was investigated without reference to other factors, like cost or the labour needed, that farmers considered quite important. And it was normally a question that some official had thought of, rather than a response to any need expressed by a farmer.

In the end, the research was often ignored by the farmers as irrelevant or misguided, which gave the officials an excuse to talk about the unwillingness to accept scientific facts by wooden-headed farmers for whom, sigh, they worked so hard with so little reward.

The volunteer eventually got to work on that problem, but on that day, the most telling moment came at lunch. The farmers trooped out of the meeting room and into the grounds where styrofoam boxes had appeared. The volunteer made herself useful in handing these round to the farmers, who squatted on the grass and kerbsides to enjoy lunch.

When she thought everyone had been served, the volunteer took a box for herself and looked for a place to sit. She was quickly seized by colleagues who had anticipated her faux pas, her box was quietly taken from her, and she was shepherded into a room to join the officials in a sit-down, spoon-and-fork lunch on proper plates.

In full view of the farmers.

If that had happened back home, she reported, there would have been a riot.

Two aspects of this experience puzzled her. First was the contempt implied by the officials’ action in assuming a superiority over the farmers and openly displaying their privileges. The other was the farmers’ apparent quiet acceptance of their inferior status.

Well, one of these problems is being resolved. The self-styled ‘phrai’ aren’t taking it quietly any more.

It is common to argue that this awakening was the result of Thaksin’s introduction into Thai politics of the amazing idea of first finding out what people might want from their government, then setting out a manifesto promising this, and, most innovative of all, actually delivering on his promises once elected.

Attributing the class enlightenment currently on display at Ratchaprasong to this one cause is an oversimplification and I am confident that Thaksin’s electoral calculations were also influenced by his beliefs about how the country should be managed (just like a private company). This would include the idea that the major shareholders and executives of the nation-cum-business should be adequately rewarded, one way or another.

But I would be interested to know, for example, exactly how much new information and ideas were leaking into the more entrepreneurial rural families (who benefited most from Thaksin’s policies and who form the backbone of the red shirts) when the gadgetry of PCs and satellite dishes got cheap enough. Once young Somchai had figured out internet porn and betting on foreign football games, did he start browsing such subversive sites as, well, Wikipedia (which the Thai bureaucracy sees fit to censor)? Was the dish tuned to stations beyond the editorial control of the government?

The idea started to percolate that development did not have to be, like taxes and conscription, something imposed on you by the government, but was something you could start doing for yourself, once you’d got this dead weight of the bureaucracy out of the way. You had the village fund to work with. If you started a wee business, there were SME loans. You didn’t have to worry about a catastrophic illness unravelling years of hard work and saving. And perhaps best of all, you didn’t have to go grovelling to the civil servants to get what you now thought of as your rights.

Once you stop taking orders from someone else, then, if you live in a democracy, as we fondly believe, you can start setting your own priorities not just about how to order your own life, but about how society should be organized. It is at this point that we do well to recall Winston Churchill’s observation that “the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter”.

I’m really chuffed that the red shirts are free from the practical and ideological shackles that Thai society had, quite unfairly, bound them in. And I’m absolutely terrified at what they might do with that freedom. If, as I suspect, part of their awakening came from the web boards and satellite TV, then I don’t see how these same channels of prejudice, misinformation and appallingly distasteful language will help anyone advance to a more just, a more equitable or even simply a more sensible society.

The Thailand of today is not quite the France of 1789 — there is no history of major tensions between rich and poor here, and most of the country is peaceful despite the noisy protests. But more than ever Thailand’s underprivileged are less inclined to quietly accept their station in life as past generations did and are voicing anger about wide disparities in wealth, about shakedowns by the police and what they see as the longstanding condescension in Bangkok toward people who speak provincial dialects, especially from the northeast.

The deference, gentility and graciousness that have helped anchor the social hierarchy in Thailand for centuries are fraying, analysts say, as poorer Thais become more assertive, discarding long-held taboos that discouraged confrontation.

The haves in Thailand have a lot — the country has one of the most inequitable income distributions in Asia, a wider gap between rich and poor than in China, Malaysia, the Philippines or Vietnam, according to a World Bank report.

Four years of political turmoil have brought clearer divisions between wealthy families and their domestic staff, between the patrons of expensive restaurants and the waiters who serve them, between golfing businessmen and the legions of caddies who carry their bags.

“This is a newfound consciousness of a previously neglected part of Thai society,” said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, one of the country’s leading political scientists and a visiting scholar at Stanford University’s FSI-Humanities Center. “In the past they were upset, but they weren’t cohesive as a force and coherent in their agenda. New technologies have enabled them to unify their disparate voices of dissatisfaction.”

The role of technology in bringing together the protesters has been crucial. The leaders of the protest movement have used community radio stations, mobile-phone messaging and the Internet to forge an identity for lower-income Thais and connect a vast constellation of people in villages and towns.

At times the protests in Bangkok could be described as flash mobs of the disaffected. Protesters, who wear trademark red shirts, have converged on government buildings, banks and military bases across the city guided by text messages.

“This would not have been possible 10 years ago,” said Ms. Thanida, who was returning from military barracks in Bangkok where protesters had demanded that soldiers leave the area. The military acquiesced. Like many protesters, she subscribes to D Station, a “red shirt” news service that gives updates and instructions to protesters.

… Glenn Beck’s attacks on deeply held Christian principles of social justice have ironically brought newfound attention, focus, and discussion about what it truly means to be a “social justice Christian.” As wrong and often vitriolic his caricatures, insults, and attacks on such core gospel teachings and biblical tenets have been, they have provided what is often called a “teachable moment” and perhaps, a mobilizing moment as well. The Beck attack on Christian social justice has given us an opportunity to teach what true gospel principles are and offers us an opportunity to reach out to even more people who are being attracted by the biblical call to social justice — which is the mission statement of Sojourners.

One of the projects I have been working in which these open collaboration principles apply is a gift circle we have here in Fairfax,California. The idea of the gift circle is we come together to share our needs and services. People help each other out with our needs, and offer their services without expectation of getting anything in return. It’s a way of creating a gift economy (which is different than a trade, local currency, or money system). There has opened a field of generosity, caring, and community. People have been gifting each other massages, car mechanic help, graphic design services, bean soup, readings, babysitting, computer advice, clothes, veggies, editing, cleaning, places to stay, rides, help moving house, etc.. Over time many people have come through our weekly circle, and a kind of tribe has begun to form centered around the gift circle – with people helping each other during the whole week outside the circle. The vision is to have a whole network of these circles synergizing with each other in a local area to aikido the whole community into the gift economy.

Can the circle self-organize?

At first the gift circle was dependent on mine and my friend Matthew Edward’s energies. I wanted to transition it to become a self-organizing and self-running circle. What that at times required me to do was to let go of being the facilitator and allow others to facilitate. I could see all these things that needed to be looked at in order for the circle to work. So it was sometimes a little hard for me to let go and have someone really new to it facilitate it. But that was necessary in order for others to step up, and it empowered them to guide the circle in directions that they thought were useful, and sometimes they took it to great places that I would not have thought of myself. Over time we gradually had a larger base of different facilitators.

Many open collaborations start out as being more hierarchical or dependent on its founders. At some point comes the critical step where the founders have to let go. If they don’t and keep holding onto the power it’s difficult for the whole system to become a truly non-hierarchical self-organizing open collaboration.

In our circle sometimes we would have little discussions after the meetings to reflect on what worked, and what did not and figure out how better ways to run it. Our gift circle is a learning circle. Its format is emergent over time. As our circle grew and found success in meeting a lot of people’s needs, and began to develop a tribe around it, we wanted to put a little manual together to explain to others how the gift circle worked so they too could start their own circle. I was looking for a genotype for a gift circle (a genotype being the DNA blueprint that guides what an organism grows into) that we could give to others to start their own gift circle. I was thinking the blueprint/genotype for a a set format/schedule. However, what happened was that different people each week would try out different ways to run the circle, and the format was continually evolving, adapting to the circumstances. I have begun to think that genotype of a gift circle is not the format itself, but the circle’s continual process of reflecting on what works and what doesn’t and trying new things each time. A genotype based on process means that the gift circle format has the open collaborative quality of being emergent, not planned from the start. This genotype is useful as the gift circle spreads to different demographics and subcultures, and different formats may be more favorable. It’s not to say a genotype of a set format/schedule is not useful to pass onto others, but that a genotype in the form of a process would be even more powerful; it helps a circle become a complex adaptive system. For those of you who know the spiral dynamics model of system development, a social system that can use different and evolve social structures/formats/worldviews is probably a characteristic of yellow level and higher systems.

During the growth of the gift circle many different people took initiative and helped with various tasks – promoting the circle, cooking the circle meal, putting the email list together, explaining to new comers the gift circle culture etc.. People were stepping up and activating different aspects of the circle. Around week 11 of the gift circle the circle began to feel self-organizing. It did not necessarily need Matthew and I for its survival anymore. It was becoming an autopoietic system. An autopoietic system being a system that is able to self-heal, self-regenerate, self-maintain, and self-regulate; examples of autopoietic systems being cells and organisms.

In a brain the neurons rewire themselves into connective nets. The neural net will then fire in different patterns in response to different situations. In the gift circle people’s connections and ways of relating with each other will grow and change. These person-to-person connections form a kind of autopoietic social neural network that fires in different patterns in response to different social situations and goals. The tribe that forms around a gift circle has a social brain made of these person-to-person neural networks. This social brain figures out how to get people’s needs met in a distributed intelligence way. As the social neural network evolves to a more highly functioning state, it will allow the tribe to satisfy more of its own needs.

Letting go of exchange

In a social system if when a person gives something they expect something in return then there is attachment of emotion to the giving. People may feel upset if there is nothing gotten back. A society may put in laws that make it expected that every gift has an exchange back. In money and trade systems there is often this attachment to an emotion if ones does not getting something in return for what they gave.

In some gift cultures if you gift something to someone, you may expect that they may pay back the tribe/group/community at some point in time. There is a loosening of the constraints of the giving, there is less obligation, and it would be hard to create a law around this kind of amorphous giving back. There is less attachment to an emotion if someone does not give back. There is also an increase in gratitude in the system as this kind of gift giving increases. The more there is a sense of community the more giving happens. If a social group is architected in such a way that people can see how the flow of resources happens, how people are contributing, what happens when people contribute this can greatly help the whole gifting process. A gift circle for instance where everyone can hear each others needs and see how people are helping each other can increase the amount of flow a lot.

Then there is yet another state that you give without expecting anything. There is no attachment. In that state there is no underlying emotional attachment associated with the giving. When the attachment is released one can enter into a more pure place of giving. And as you do so, your body and being can more easily access a place of bliss, of pure magic and spirit. If there is attachment to reciprocity then that constrains the system to function with tighter boundaries as only reciprocal exchanges are allowed if the emotional field is not to be triggered into a state of upset. Clearing up the emotional field allows the social system to enter into a collective consciousness state where intuition and inner knowing guide the unfolding of events. A gift circle in these states has a lightness to it. The energy is less dense, with an ethereal quality to it.

One may ask but how do I know I will get taken care of, if I will get what I need if one doesn’t mandate reciprocity? As the group opens up, puts its intentions out there, lets go and trusts, something magical begins to happen. Needs begin to get met in magical ways, you will be helped in ways you had not ever thought of. Its almost like there is a field of grace around the tribe, and things begin to click into place without trying. It’s almost a paradox; first you have to let go of any feeling that you have a right to anything, and then in that nonattached space things will come to you.

One way to look at attachment and exchange is that there is a oneness that everyone is part of. If we are all one when you give to another part you are giving to yourself. And if we are one other parts will give to you because they are the same as you. However, it’s only when we clear away this attachment to emotions and the stories we tell ourselves about exchange, morals, and how society works that we can begin to access this oneness power to get us the needs we are asking for.

What is progress in a social system?

A social system has many levels of functioning. As it progresses to higher stages of functioning it undergoes phase transitions in its behavior, in its values, in its ways of relating to each other. In each new stage there is a paradigm shift in the way things are done, and it can be quite a shock to the people in it that you can do things this new way. In a gift circle at each new stage the social neural network will have different configurations and patterns, and the emotional field and value system shifts.

Here are some laws I propose about social systems and the different phases/stages it evolves through.

LAW OF NONATTACHMENT IN A SYSTEM: A system phase transitions to a higher state when the participants become more nonattached e.g. they do not become attached to getting something in return for what they give.

LAW OF EMPATHY IN A SYSTEM: A system phase transitions to a higher state as the amount of empathy of the participants increases.

LAW OF NONDUALITY IN A SYSTEM: A system phase transitions to a more integrated and cohesive system as it becomes more nondual. Examples of some nondualities that correlate with more highly functioning systems 1. wants=service 2. play=work 3. waste=food 4. you=me.

LAW OF DECENTERING IN A SYSTEM: A system phase transitions to a more transcendent state each time it decenters: A social system decenters when it can become nonjudgementally aware of its own cultural norms, worldviews, social architectures and nonattach from it. A gift circle that can nonjudgmentally decenter from its format, culture, and worldviews, step back and nonattachedly observe itself, is moving to a higher level of development. This nonattachment allows it to evolve new formats and cultures.

LAW OF DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION: A system phase transitions to higher states where the parts/people are more individuated, and also more integrated and synergized with each other. (This law is basically Ken Wilber’s holonic tenet 12b ) A gift circle at higher levels would have individuals expressing a wide variety of unique needs and perspectives and have the group synergizing well and communicating clearly across values systems and worldviews to help meet those needs.

Spiral Dynamics is a theory that attempts to map out the stages a system can go through. It assigns a color to each of the stages – blue, orange, green, yellow, turquoise,… A gift circle at the orange level will have probably have people looking to directly get back something in return for what they give. A gift circle at the green level will have people acting more from empathy and love directing the flow of services to where people have been expressing their needs. A gift circle at the yellow level will have empathy, an ability to integrate people with different worldviews,and be able to evolve its own format and structure. It will be less judgmental (while still being discerning) of different worldviews. A gift circle at the turquoise level will have empathy and integration of multiple worldviews. It will be able to evolve in its own structure in a less herky jerky fashion than at yellow levels, as at this level it more deeply understands the systems cause and effect chains, sees how everything is influencing everything else, and knows how to integrate emotions, values systems, and worldviews into a coherent system. At turquoise level will have intuition, psychic insight, and a collective consciousness that guides the group. A spirit of gratefulness, grace, and magic flows through the group. There is an effortless in how things unfold. An actual gift circle will be a mixture of stages/colors in the spiral dynamics model.

I was less concerned with individuals modifying themselves through, say, education or societies changing populations through educational institutions. These things, on their face, have the intention of shaping the person and society. They are, at least in principle, geared towards the preservation of individual and social existence. Or, at least, they do insofar as they are generated by a public in service of the ideal public which they represent.

On the other hand, there are technologies that seem to be introduced with the stated purpose of achieving one objective, yet have the larger objective of changing human populations. Take, for instance, the infamous case of Nestle’s infant formula strategy in Africa. Company reps masquerading as health workers introduce infant formula to a population that had not used it previously. The suggested purpose is to provide nutrition and humanitarian aid. But when women stopped lactating and suddenly found themselves forced to pay for the product or watch their children starve, a much more radical technical innovation becomes apparent–the forced creation of a new social web in service of corporate interests.